

**CHRIS SCHABEL et al., *Peter of Palude and the Parisian reaction to Durand of St. Pourçain on future contingents*, in «Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum» (ISSN 0391-7320), 71, (2001), pp. 183-200.**

Url: <https://heyjoe.fbk.eu/index.php/afp>

Questo articolo è stato digitalizzato della Biblioteca Fondazione Bruno Kessler, in collaborazione con l'Associazione culturale Oscar A. Romero all'interno del portale [HeyJoe](#) - *History, Religion and Philosophy Journals Online Access*. HeyJoe è un progetto di digitalizzazione di riviste storiche, delle discipline filosofico-religiose e affini per le quali non esiste una versione elettronica.

This article was digitized by the Bruno Kessler Foundation Library in collaboration with the Oscar A. Romero Cultural Association as part of the [HeyJoe](#) portal - *History, Religion, and Philosophy Journals Online Access*. HeyJoe is a project dedicated to digitizing historical journals in the fields of philosophy, religion, and related disciplines for which no electronic version exists.



## Nota copyright

Tutto il materiale contenuto nel sito [HeyJoe](#), compreso il presente PDF, è rilasciato sotto licenza [Creative Commons](#) [Attribuzione-Non commerciale-Non opere derivate 4.0 Internazionale](#). Pertanto è possibile liberamente scaricare, stampare, fotocopiare e distribuire questo articolo e gli altri presenti nel sito, purché si attribuisca in maniera corretta la paternità dell'opera, non la si utilizzi per fini commerciali e non la si trasformi o modifichi.

## Copyright notice

All materials on the [HeyJoe](#) website, including the present PDF file, are made available under a [Creative Commons](#) [Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License](#). You are free to download, print, copy, and share this file and any other on this website, as long as you give appropriate credit. You may not use this material for commercial purposes. If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you may not distribute the modified material.



PETER OF PALUDE AND THE PARISIAN  
REACTION TO DURAND OF ST POURÇAIN  
ON FUTURE CONTINGENTS

BY

CHRIS SCHABEL, RUSSELL L. FRIEDMAN,  
IRENE BALCOYIANNOPOULOU\*

A number of important Dominican theologians were active at the University of Paris in the 1310s, but afterwards the Paris *studium* of the Friars Preacher went into sharp decline, if we are to judge from the relative paucity of surviving writings. Probably the greatest and most controversial of the figures from the 1310s was Durand of St Pourçain, whose ideas were the object of two Dominican investigations to determine their Thomist orthodoxy. One of the most interesting theological problems that these Dominicans dealt with was the reconciliation of divine foreknowledge and future contingents. The following critical editions of the pertinent texts from this decade of the Parisian Dominicans Peter of Palude, James of Lausanne, John of Naples, and Hervaeus Natalis, as well as that of Bernard Lombardi from the 1320s, provide a test case to illustrate the currents in the Order's thought at the intellectual center of Europe. In addition, Peter of Palude's text allows us to reconstruct part of the "lost" version of book I of Durand's *Sentences* commentary, and, on the issue of divine foreknowledge and future contingents, to trace the development of Durand's thought and its impact on the next generation of theologians at Paris.

---

\* Schabel thanks Paul Bakker, William Duba, Elzbieta Jung-Palczewska, Lauge Nielsen, the University of Cyprus, the Hill Monastic Manuscript Library, the Institut de Recherche et d'Histoire des Textes, and all of the individual libraries preserving manuscripts used in the editions. Friedman would like to thank Pernille Harsting, Iwakuma Yukio, and Roberto Lambertini for their help in connection with his part of the article, for which much of the necessary research and writing was done while Friedman resided at The Danish Academy in Rome. The Academy also made it financially possible for him to consult material at the Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana in Florence; thanks go to the Academy's director Gunver Skytte and Dronning Ingrid's Romerske Fond.

## I

**Peter of Palude and the Writing and Reception  
of Durand of St. Pourçain's *Sentences* Commentaries**

With the release of the first version of Durand of St. Pourçain's (1270/75-1334) *Sentences* commentary sometime between 1303 and 1308 began one of the best known intellectual disputes of the later-medieval period. For the next 25 years and more, Durand and his innovative philosophy and theology bore the brunt of an enormous polemic by a number of his Dominican colleagues, many also alumni of the University of Paris, who tried to show how Durand on many issues had misinterpreted or incorrectly rejected the views of Thomas Aquinas. And Durand certainly did not take the polemic lying down. In this long story, one of the key players was the French theologian and canon lawyer Peter of Palude (†1342), the figure whose text (I *Sentences*, d. 38, q. 3) is the focus of the editions offered in this article. Indeed, Joseph Koch, whose *Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* of 1927 laid the modern foundation for the historical study of Durand, his literary and intellectual legacy, and the Dominican polemic against him,<sup>1</sup> claimed that "Durand's [*Sentences*] commentary in its original version is contained in Peter of Palude's [*Sentences* commentary], since Peter quotes his opponent in such detail that a nearly complete reconstruction of [Durand's] work is possible."<sup>2</sup> In the following historical introduction, first the *status quaestionis* on the Durand affair will be sketched: who were the major participants, when did they write, and how do we know? Then

<sup>1</sup> Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters 26 (Münster i. W. 1927). This book is further sub-titled *Erster Teil: Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung*; a projected second part on Durand's thought (see *ibid.*, p. 4) never appeared. This work supplemented and revised several of Koch's earlier studies on Durand and early fourteenth-century Thomism: "Die Jahre 1312-1317 im Leben des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P.," in *Miscellanea Fr. Ehrle* I (Rome 1924), pp. 265-306 (reprinted with added appendices as "Die Magister-Jahre des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. und der Konflikt mit seinem Orden," in Koch, *Kleine Schriften* II (Rome 1973), pp. 7-118); "Die Verteidigung der Theologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin durch den Dominikanerorden gegenüber Durandus de S. Porciano O.Pr.," *Xenia Thomistica* III (Rome 1925), pp. 327-62 (reprinted *Kleine Schriften* II, pp. 127-68).

<sup>2</sup> Koch, *Durandus*, p. 22: "in diesem Werke des Petrus de Palude der Kommentar des Durandus in seiner ursprünglichen Fassung enthalten ist; denn Petrus zitiert seinen Gegner so ausführlich, daß fast eine völlige Rekonstruktion dieses Werkes möglich ist." Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 31, 63-4, 272.

Joseph Koch's claim about the literary relationship between Palude and Durand will be examined in the light of newer research and of the texts presented below.

*Durand of St. Pourçain and his Controversy with the Dominican Order*

Any discussion of Durand and the polemic surrounding him must begin with Koch's *Durandus*. In this brilliant piece of historical detective work, Koch created a picture of Durand's career and troubles that has laid the ground for all further research on Durand's writings and thought, and indeed on early fourteenth-century Dominican theology in general. Later scholars, such as Anneliese Maier, Bruno Decker, and Prospero T. Stella, have focused Koch's picture, correcting it and making it more precise, but the picture is still Koch's. Perhaps the fundamental contribution that Koch made in his work was that he showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that Durand produced three versions of his *Sentences* commentary over the course of his career, carefully distinguishing these three versions and showing whenever possible who among Durand's many opponents used which versions.

When Koch wrote his work, it was the received view that Durand had authored *two* commentaries on the *Sentences*. Indeed, Durand himself seems to claim just this in the "Postscript" that he set at the end of the late version of his *Sentences* commentary – this is the version that was printed some fifteen times in the early modern period, and the Venice 1571 edition of this version was reprinted by The Gregg Press in 1964.<sup>3</sup> Here, Durand claims that he had made a first version of his *Sentences* commentary when he was young, and that this was made public by some overenthusiastic followers of his (*curiosi*) without his permission and before he had corrected it sufficiently; there was also another version, Durand says, bearing the incipit "*Est Deus in caelo revelans*," which he completed as an old man and which he approved as accurately reflecting his views – this is the incipit to the Prologue to book I of the version that contains the Postscript itself.<sup>4</sup> While there was at least some indication that

---

<sup>3</sup> The popularity of this version is also attested by the many manuscripts that contain it. On Durand printings and manuscript information, see Th. Kaeppli O.P., ed., *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi I* (Rome 1970), #927.

<sup>4</sup> "Scripta super quatuor Sententiarum libros iuvenis inchoavi, sed senex complevi, siquidem quod in primis dictaveram et scripseram, fuit a quibusdam curiosis

Durand had in fact produced three commentaries on the *Sentences* – for example, a fifteenth-century bibliographer, Louis of Valladolid, testified to the fact<sup>5</sup> – this was ignored in Koch's day as not being in agreement with the facts.<sup>6</sup>

Koch demonstrated that Durand authored three *Sentences* commentaries. He did this in one of the most exciting, inventive, and sustained examinations of medieval manuscripts and doctrine in the twentieth century. In the aftermath of Durand's *Sentences* lectures at Paris, a committee had been appointed by the Dominican Order to examine Durand's *Sentences* commentary for any possibly heretical views. On this committee sat, among others, Hervaeus Natalis (ca. 1265-1323) – perhaps Durand's first and most influential opponent – Peter of Palude, James of Lausanne, and John of Naples. The committee issued on 3 July 1314 a list of 93 articles taken from Durand's *Sentences* commentary and suspected of heresy or error.<sup>7</sup> Koch determined (*Durandus*, pp. 18-19) that the list itself was compiled by Peter of Palude (books I and III) and John of Naples (books II and IV). Most significantly, among the articles dealing with book I, mention is made of book II of Durand's "old" *Sentences* commentary (*in suo secundo antiquo d. 27 a. secundo*); in four of the articles taken from book IV, mention is made of a "new" or a "modern" version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary; in eight of the articles concerning book II, moreover, the doctrine contained in

---

mihī subreptum antequam fuisset per me sufficienter correctum, propter quod hoc opus solum quod per omnes libros incipit: 'Est Deus in caelo revelans' etc., tamquam per me editum et correctum approbo" (ed. Venice 1571 [reprint Ridgewood N.J. 1964], f. 423rb). For an analysis of this text, including the meaning of the term *curiosi*, see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 68-9.

<sup>5</sup> See the edition by H. Ch. Scheeben, "Die Tabulae Ludwigs von Valladolid in Chor der Predigerbrüder von St. Jakob in Paris," AFP 1 (1931), pp. 223-63; for Durand, p. 255, nr. 14: "Dominus frater Durandus de Sancto Porciano alumnus (!) doctor ingeniosus, episcopus Meldensis, scripsit tribus vicibus super IIII libros Sententiarum valde notabiliter." Durand is also mentioned as having read the *Sent.* three times by Albert de Castello; see R. Creytens, ed., "Les écrivains dominicains dans la chronique d'Albert de Castello (1516)," AFP 30 (1960), pp. 227-313, for Durand, p. 282, nr. 185.

<sup>6</sup> See, e.g., Quétif-Échard, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum*, I, p. 587, which was the standard reference work on Dominican writings until superseded by Kaeppl's *Scriptores*.

<sup>7</sup> This list is found in ms. Le Mans, Bibliothèque communale 231 and is now edited in Koch's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. II, pp. 53-72. See on it, Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 16-22, 200-03. Of the 93 possibly heretical or erroneous articles listed, it seems that only 91 were judged by the entire committee to be problematic; see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 200-01.

Durand's *antiquum scriptum* is set in explicit opposition to that found in his *novum scriptum* (*Durandus*, pp. 19-22, 28-31). Thus, by 1314, there were already two versions of Durand's *Sentences* commentary, an old and a new. Moreover, the "new" version mentioned in the list of errors cannot be identical with the last, printed version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary. This Koch proves because the printed version refers to events that took place after 1314; because the text of the printed version disagrees in important ways with the list of error's description of the doctrine contained in the *novum scriptum*; and because the printed version refers to Durand's *Quodlibetal* questions disputed at Avignon in the period 1313-17.<sup>8</sup> Thus, Koch distinguished between three versions of Durand's *Sentences* commentary: a first version (hereafter: A), called the "old" version in the list of 93 errors and identical to the first version mentioned in the Postscript above; a middle version (hereafter: B), called the "new" or "modern" version in the 1314 list of errors; and finally, the printed version (hereafter: C), which Durand himself towards the end of his career sanctioned as that representing his thought.

To this deductive evidence, Koch (*Durandus*, pp. 58-9) could add some explicit medieval testimony for the existence of three redactions of Durand's *Sentences* commentary. The earliest of this evidence came from the *Sentences* commentary of Bernard Lombardi, who read the *Sentences* at Paris in the academic year 1327-28. In books I and IV of his written *Sentences* commentary, Bernard clearly distinguished between an older and a newer version of Durand's commentary (A and C), and in book II, Koch argued that Bernard also knew the B version. Bernard was, therefore, as far as Koch knew, the oldest witness attesting to the three redactions of Durand's commentary. A second explicit medieval witness was a record of a gift by a Dominican to his convent in 1347, which included "*opus tercium et ultimum super secundo et tercio sententiarum fratris durandi ordinis predicatorum in duobus voluminibus.*" Thus, Koch had irrefutable evidence that Durand had redacted three distinct versions of his *Sentences* commentary.

What circumstances led Durand to produce three redactions? When were they made? What was the relationship between them

---

<sup>8</sup> Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 21-22. The printed version (IV *Sent.*, d. 13, q. 3) makes mention of Durand's second stay at Avignon, which occurred in 1325-26 and Durand also mentions (IV *Sent.*, d. 24, q. 3) that he is no longer bishop of Le Puy, which was true only after he was made bishop of Meaux in 1326; cf. Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 76, 428-29, 431.

and Durand's status as the "black sheep" of the Dominican Order at the beginning of the fourteenth century? Much of Koch's book gives the necessary background for answering these questions. The scenario that Koch ended with has been modified slightly by more recent research, and what follows will be called for convenience' sake "the modified Koch view." We now surmise that the A version of Durand's *Sentences* was put into written form 1304-07 or 1308 at the latest in connection with lectures held at some provincial *studium* of the Dominican Order, whereas Koch believed that this version was connected with the lectures Durand held at Paris in pursuit of his master's degree. Version B is now believed to have been the by-product of Durand's Parisian lectures, which began perhaps as early as 1307, but more probably were held 1308-10, and then reworked into their written form in around 1310-11.<sup>9</sup> But the rest of the story of

<sup>9</sup> For Koch's dating and explanation, see *Durandus*, pp. 60-63, 72-74. The modified scenario for Durand's A and B versions was first suggested by Anneliese Maier, "Literarhistorische Notizen über P. Aureoli, Durandus und den 'Cancellarius' nach der Handschrift Ripoll 77bis in Barcelona," *Gregorianum* 29 (1948), pp. 213-51, although we refer to the reprint in Maier's *Ausgehendes Mittelalter I* (Rome 1964), pp. 139-73, 466-67, esp. pp. 146-53. It has since been accepted by both P.T. Stella (see at and around n. 60 below) and Bruno Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz. Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts* (Münster 1967), pp. 77-88, 108 (esp. 81, 88). Decker's results (p. 88) for Durand's A version are "1303 als Terminus a quo für die Ausarbeitung; 1307/08 als Terminus ad quem für die Vorlesung selbst, die wahrscheinlich in einem Ordensstudium der französischen Provinz gehalten wurde"; nevertheless there appears to be no reason why these lectures could not have been held at any time (or the whole time) during the period 1303-07/08, which represents the time period in which Durand could have been working on the written version of his *Sent.* (A).

Guimaraes' ("Hervé Noël" [cit. below n. 11], pp. 38, 45) dating for Durand's Parisian lectures (i.e., his second lecture series) of 1308-09 or '10 seems more convincing to us than does Koch's of 1307-08, but, e.g. Bruno Decker, op. cit., pp. 78-81, is more convinced by Koch. Maier (loc. cit.) dates Durand's lectures at Paris to 1310-11, in part because she wants to hold that the B version of Durand's *Sent.* commentary is a *reportatio* of his Parisian lectures. This is unlikely for at least two reasons. First, because Guimaraes' dates of 1308-9 or '10 for Durand's lectures seem more solid than Maier's (and Maier appears not to have known of Guimaraes' work). More importantly, we are not dealing with a *reportatio* in the B version, but with an *ordinatio*: how else can one explain that e.g., with allowances for scribal inaccuracies, the texts of the question "utrum angeli sint in aliquo magno numero" are identical in the A and C versions (= II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 4) while in the B version (= II *Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2), out of approximately 1400 words in the entire question, the text deviates from that in the other two redactions by just fifty words added or substituted in four specific spots (obviously with the intent of ameliorating criticism of other positions)? Durand composed three *Sent.* commentaries, and if there exist any *reportationes* of his lectures, this needs to be proven. (For this last point, see also V. Heynck, "Die



Durand's threefold redaction of the *Sentences* and the role it played in his problems with his Order descends basically from Koch.

The person who took the leading role in criticizing Durand on behalf of the Dominicans was without question Hervaeus Natalis. The opposition between Durand and Hervaeus, found in many of their works, both edited and unedited, lasted from 1307 or 1308 until Hervaeus' death in 1323.<sup>10</sup> Hervaeus was not your run-of-the-mill opponent: having read the *Sentences* at Paris shortly after 1300 (probably in 1302-03), he was regent master in theology there in 1307-09 and again in 1316-18, and his *Quodlibetal* disputations from this period witness heavily to his polemic against Durand. Moreover, he was the head of the Dominican province of France beginning in 1309, giving up that position to become Minister General of the Dominican Order in 1318, a position he retained until his death.<sup>11</sup> Both the *terminus a quo* and *terminus ad quem* for the A version of Durand's commentary are provided by works of Hervaeus. Durand in his I *Sentences* (A) cites quite specifically positions taken from

---

Behandlung der Lehre" [cit. below n. 44], pp. 45-49; L. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz, O.P.* [Leipzig 1966], p. 95; see also below n. 62).

The modifications first proposed by Maier and accepted by both Decker and Stella have unfortunately not yet become general knowledge even in specialist literature on Durand and his conflict with the order. For example, in an outstanding recent collection of papers on the topic *Saint Thomas au XIVe siècle* in *Revue Thomiste* 97,1 (January-March 1997), three articles give very short synopses of the literary history of Durand's *Sent.* A and B; of these, only the article by Lanczkowski and Wittmer (cit. below n. 31) gives the modified view. The other two articles by S.-T. Bonino and J.-L. Solère still rely on Koch's original version of events and dating (Bonino, p. 102: "La première rédaction (A), fruit de son enseignement comme bachelier sententiaire à Paris, date de 1307-08"; Solère, p. 219: "son opposition à saint Thomas se manifesta dès son enseignement de lecteur sententiaire au couvent Saint-Jacques de Paris en 1308, recueilli dans la première rédaction de son *Commentaire des Sentences*.").

<sup>10</sup> Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 214-18, e.g., shows the back and forth discussion between Hervaeus and Durand in their *Quodlibetal* disputations; see also *passim*. The most recent study of this dispute is the doctoral dissertation of E.A. Lowe, "The Dominican Order and the Theological Authority of Thomas Aquinas: The Controversies between Hervaeus Natalis and Durandus of St. Pourcain" (Fordham University 1999). Lowe's method, using intellectual history in conjunction with institutional history (especially the history of the Dominican Order and the University), has a great deal of promise, but to bring that promise to fulfillment will require greater familiarity with the period's theology and philosophy: Lowe's statements on these matters must be read with much caution.

<sup>11</sup> For an excellent biographical study of Hervaeus, see A. de Guimaraes, "Hervé Noël (†1323). Étude biographique," *AFP* 8 (1938), pp. 5-81. On the dating of his *Sent.* lectures and of the written version of his commentary, see Decker, *Gotteslehre*, pp. 73-77, 108.

Hervaeus' *Sentences* commentary, which gives a *terminus a quo* for Durand's first major work of 1303, the year Hervaeus lectured on the *Sentences* at St. Jacques – a year in which Durand also was in Paris, quite likely auditing Hervaeus' lectures.<sup>12</sup> As for the *terminus ad quem* for Durand's first version, this is given by Hervaeus' earliest datable critique: in his *Quodlibet* I (probably held in 1307), Hervaeus exhibits no knowledge of Durand, while in his *Quodlibet* II (Christmas 1308 or Easter 1309) he does.<sup>13</sup> It seems likely that even before his criticism of Durand in his *Quodlibet* II, Hervaeus had written the short treatise *De relatione contra Durandum*.<sup>14</sup>

Hervaeus' early critique of Durand should be seen in context: it is clear that Hervaeus felt that he had a mission to defend the theology of Thomas Aquinas, which as early as 1286 the Dominicans had ordered their teachers to uphold and defend. Even before Durand's highly independent philosophical and theological system was made public, Hervaeus had written several tracts against, e.g., Henry of Ghent and James of Metz.<sup>15</sup> In addition, he authored probably around

<sup>12</sup> Durand and Hervaeus both signed on 26 June 1303, along with many other Dominicans of St. Jacques, a call for a Church council; see the testimony in A. Dondaine, "Documents pour servir à l'histoire de la Province de France: L'appel au concile (1303)," AFP 22 (1952), pp. 381-439, cf. p. 405 (Durand), 409 (Hervaeus). The *Ordinatio* version of Hervaeus' commentary was worked through in 1309 or later; cf. Decker, *Gotteslehre*, pp. 73-77, 108. Decker (pp. 45, 72, esp. 86-88) maintains that Durand offers, in his I *Sent.* (A), d. 2, q. 1 (on the distinction of the divine attributes from one another), the first Dominican critique of Duns Scotus, and this supports a *terminus a quo* of 1303 for Durand's work (when Scotus lectured on the *Sent.* in Paris).

<sup>13</sup> Guimaraes (p. 48) raises the possibility that Hervaeus' *Quodl.* II was disputed at Easter 1309 (traditionally it has been dated to Christmas 1308), and P.T. Stella argues for the later dating in "A proposito" (cit. below n. 16), pp. 252-53. On the relation between Durand and Hervaeus, see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 60-64; Decker, *Gotteslehre*, pp. 85-86, 88. While the dates for Durand's *Sent.* (A) are from Decker, Koch had arrived at very similar dates on the basis of different calculations: Koch started with the basic assumption that Durand lectured on the *Sent.* at Paris in 1307-08, and that the A version that served as the basis for these lectures would take some 3-4 years to complete; hence a date of 1303-07 for the A version (cf. *Durandus*, pp. 398-99).

<sup>14</sup> On Hervaeus' *De relatione contra Durandum*, see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 218-21. The treatise has been edited: *Hervei Natalis O.P. De relatione contra Durandum et Durandi de S. Porciano O.P. Quol. Paris. I Q. 2 (3)*, Takeshiro Takada, ed. (Kyoto 1966 = Series of Hitherto unedited texts of Medieval thinkers 3).

<sup>15</sup> Against Henry of Ghent, Hervaeus wrote his *De quatuor materiis*, dated by P.T. Stella to around 1304-07, since Durand makes use of this work in his *Sent.* (A); see "La prima critica di Hervaeus Natalis O.P. alla noetica di Enrico di Gand: Il 'De intellectu et specie' del cosiddetto 'De quatuor materiis,'" *Salesianum* 21 (1959), pp. 125-70, esp. p. 135. For more on this work, see R.M. Martin, "Le table des matières de l'ouvrage *De quatuor materiis* d'Hervé de Nédellec, O.P.," *Revue des sciences*

1308-09 a substantial treatise, the *Defensio doctrinae Divi Thomae*, dedicated to the then Minister General of the Dominican Order, Aimeric of Piacenza.<sup>16</sup> Now, in the A version of his *Sentences* commentary, Durand often takes a rather independent point of view with regard to particular aspects of Thomist doctrine; perhaps more importantly Durand does not hesitate to challenge interpretations of Thomas' positions that were current with Thomists when Durand wrote. With this in mind, it is relatively clear that Hervaeus' responses to Durand throughout the course of his career are well in character.

---

*philosophiques et théologiques* 18 (1929), pp. 291-95; Kaeppli, *Scriptores* II, #1892. With regard to James of Metz, we have a so-called *Correctorium* of James' I, II, and IV *Sent.*, probably written by Hervaeus; this text is found in MS Le Mans, Bibliothèque communale 231, ff. 150-75; for the state of the research on this text, see most recently T.W. Köhler, O.S.B., *Der Begriff der Einheit und ihr ontologisches Prinzip nach dem Sentenzenkommentar des Jakob von Metz O.P.* (Rome 1971), pp. 2-3 and 9.

<sup>16</sup> Parts of the *Defensio doctrinae Divi Thomae* were published by Engelbert Krebs in *Theologie und Wissenschaft nach der Lehre der Hochscholastik. An der Hand der bisher ungedruckten Defensa doctrinae D. Thomae des Hervaeus Natalis mit Beifügung gedruckter und ungedruckter Paralleltex-te* (Münster 1912), pp. 1-114; the treatise has since been reedited in its entirety by Paolo Piccari, "La *Opinio de difficultatibus contra doctrinam fratris Thome* di Erveo di Nédellec," *Memorie Domenicane* n.s. 26 (1995), pp. 5-193. Krebs dated the treatise to 1303-12, the approximate dates of Aimeric's Generalship (he was in fact elected General 1 May 1304 at the General Chapter in Toulouse and resigned shortly after the General Chapter held at Naples in May 1311), and probably 1307-12 (p. 1\*, n. 1). Koch (*Durandus*, pp. 269-70) thought that Hervaeus made no reference to Durand in this treatise, and argued on that basis that, if Hervaeus had known about Durand by the time he wrote his *Defensio*, then he would have made it a point to attack Durand; Koch thus proposed 1303-07, i.e. before Hervaeus knew the A redaction of Durand's *Sent.* commentary. Since then, P.T. Stella, "A proposito di Pietro da Palude (In I *Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1): La questione inedita 'Utrum Deum esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari' di Erveo Natalis," *Salesianum* 22 (1960), pp. 245-325, on account of the *Defensio's* apparent relation to the text edited in that article, dates it to around 1309 (pp. 260-62), noting that Koch's reasoning assumes a certain obsession with Durand on Hervaeus' part, which is not borne out by the texts. G. Groppo, "La teologia e il suo 'subiectum' secondo il Prologo del commento alle *Sentenze* di Pietro da Palude, O.P. (†1342) (In I *Sent.*, Prol., q. III; q. V, a. 1)," *Salesianum* 23 (1961), pp. 219-315, esp. pp. 302-05, contends contrary to Koch that in the *Defensio* Hervaeus *did* attack Durand, and Groppo cautiously proposes a dating of 1308-09. Piccari (p. 6 and n. 3) repeats Krebs dates for the work (1304-11), not mentioning the later debate on the dating, although he notes that É.-H. Wéber ("La démonstration de l'existence de Dieu chez Hervé de Nédellec et ses confrères Prêcheurs de Paris," in Zenon Kaluza and Paul Vignaux edd., *Preuves et raisons à l'Université de Paris: logique, ontologie et théologie au XIVe siècle* [Paris, 1984]) proposed the 1303-07 dating (suggested by Koch) for the treatise.

It seems that in the lectures that he gave on the *Sentences* at Paris in ca. 1308-10 in pursuit of his master's degree, Durand maintained his independent approach. Perhaps as a reaction to Durand's attitude towards Thomas, the 1286 order to uphold and defend Thomas' doctrine was reissued and augmented at the Dominican General Chapter at Saragossa in 1309.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, Durand appears to have been told that unless he follow a more strict Thomistic line, he might well sacrifice the master's degree. In any event, in the B version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary, redacted around 1311, but probably only loosely linked with his Parisian lectures, some of the more egregious examples of Durand's independence from Thomas have been removed or toned down. Koch describes the B redaction as a work made under pressure to conform, and which was only a source of embarrassment to Durand later on (a "Verlegenheitsprodukt," p. 74); this explains why Durand appears never to have considered it a serious work. Despite his problems with the Order, Durand was promoted to the *magisterium* in 1312, and Koch was able to show (*Durandus*, pp. 105-19) that during his regency at Paris (1312-13) Durand held two *Quodlibetal* disputations, records of which have survived. Interestingly, Durand's promotion may have been a result of pressure from a higher authority,<sup>18</sup> since immediately after his regency, Pope Clement V called him to Avignon to be *lector sacri palatii*, while the Dominican Order issued yet another general injunction to uphold Aquinas' doctrine (at Metz in 1313) and also initiated the investigation into Durand's orthodoxy mentioned above.<sup>19</sup>

While there were clear doctrinal reasons for Hervaeus to reply to Durand, the immediate source of Durand's *juridical* problems with his Order seems to have been the circumstance that he mentioned in the postscript to the C version of his *Sentences* commentary: that the A version of his *Sentences* commentary was released without his prior permission, and hence without its having been examined by censors of the Dominican Order.<sup>20</sup> Hervaeus, at this

<sup>17</sup> The link between Durand's lectures and the reenactment of the 1286 statutes at Saragossa in 1309 was first suggested by Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 74 and 410.

<sup>18</sup> See for this suggestion, and for more on the events of these years in general, Guimaraes, "Hervé Noël", p. 46ff.

<sup>19</sup> On the 1313 reissuance of the order to uphold and defend Aquinas, see Koch, *Durandus*, p. 411.

<sup>20</sup> Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 68-69; J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400* (Philadelphia 1998), pp. 6-7, 29. That all works had to

point head of the Dominican province of France (1309-18), undoubtedly had something to do with this first investigation; Koch (*Durandus*, pp. 412-13) also suggests that Aimeric of Piacenza's successor as Dominican Minister General, Berengar of Landorra, took a new, harder line on the issue of the doctrinal unity of the Order. At any rate, by July 1314, a group of nine Parisian theologians, including Hervaeus, Peter of Palude, James of Lausanne, and John of Naples, agreed on the list mentioned above of 93 possibly heretical or erroneous statements taken from Durand's *Sentences* commentaries. Durand was given the chance to reply to the list, which he did in 1314, apparently retracting some of his statements, explaining others. No copy of Durand's *Excusationes* seems to have survived, and we know them only indirectly through Hervaeus Natalis' reply, the *Reprobationes Excusationum Durandi* of late 1314.<sup>21</sup> As the name given this work clearly indicates, Hervaeus considered Durand's replies insufficient and he almost certainly played a major role in successfully convincing the Dominican Order of this. As a result a second committee was formed to investigate Durand's writings. This committee's charge, in contrast to the first committee's, was not to find possibly heretical statements, but statements in which Durand deviated from the teaching of Thomas Aquinas – part of, in Koch's felicitous phrase, the “Thomistic turn” (*thomistische Wendung*) in the Dominican Order's controversy with Durand (*Durandus*, pp. 198 and 206). The committee assembled a list of 235 articles (taken from Durand's *Sentences* [A]), a list that Koch dates to 1316/17.<sup>22</sup>

Meanwhile, Durand had taught as *lector sacri palatii* in Avignon until he was named Bishop of Limoux in August 1317. But the favor and trust of Pope Clement V and then of John XXII in no way slowed down the Dominican critique of him, as the list of articles composed by the second committee indicates. Thus, Hervaeus himself “corrected” the first of three *Quodlibetal* disputations that Durand held and then redacted during his time in Avignon,<sup>23</sup> and

---

be censored was stated in the early statutes of both the large mendicant orders; see e.g. L. Bianchi, “Censure, liberté et progrès intellectuel à l'Université de Paris au XIII<sup>e</sup> siècle”, *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age* 63 (1996), pp. 45-93, esp. pp. 58-60.

<sup>21</sup> On this work of Hervaeus, see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 70-72, 222-29.

<sup>22</sup> For Koch's dating, see *Durandus*, p. 204, and further 203-08; for an edition, see Koch's *Kleine Schriften*, vol. II, pp. 72-118.

<sup>23</sup> Hervaeus' text, *Correctiones supra dicta Durandi de Sancto Porciano in Primo Quolibet*, is edited along with Durand's three Avignon *Quodlibets* in P.T. Stella ed., *Quolibeta Avenionensia Tria* (Zürich 1965). See also Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 229-36.

between 1314 and 1316 he wrote a critique of all four books of Durand's *Sentences* commentary.<sup>24</sup> Finally, in the period from 1316 to his death in 1323 – during much of which Hervaeus was Minister General of the Dominican Order (1318-23) – Hervaeus wrote a work criticizing Durand's IV *Sentences*, the *Evidentiae contra Durandum super quartum Sententiarum*, the only manuscript of which was destroyed by fire during the Second World War.<sup>25</sup>

Hervaeus Natalis was, as mentioned, the most significant of the opponents that Durand had. Yet he was not the only one. Peter of Palude (†1342), who lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris probably in 1310-12 and was regent master in theology there 1314-17, became embroiled in the conflict against Durand at an early date. As we have seen, Peter participated in both the first and the second of the Order's committees assembled to review Durand's *Sentences*. Moreover – and we will return to this in the second part of this introduction – in his own massive *Sentences* commentary, redacted in 1310-11 and after, Palude made a heroic effort to answer Durand's *Sentences* commentary at length.<sup>26</sup>

Whereas Palude has gotten fairly good reviews as a thinker – Cyril Vollert for instance, commenting on Palude's theory of original sin, says that it “approaches the best writing of modern authors in clarity and solidity” and Koch also gives a positive evaluation – Palude's student James of Lausanne has normally been scorned as extremely derivative. James, a member of the first committee to review Durand's commentary, read the *Sentences* at Paris probably in 1314-15. Koch claims that James in his *Sentences* commentary

<sup>24</sup> Hervaeus' *De articulis pertinentibus ad IV libros Sententiarum Durandi*; see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 236-48. Articles 1-5 against Durand's book I have been edited by Takeshiro Takada, “Die gegen Durandus gerichtete Streitschrift des Hervaeus Natalis *De articulis pertinentibus ad primum Sententiarum Durandi* (Art. 1-5),” in Theodor W. Köhler ed., *Sapientiae procerum amore* (Rome 1974), pp. 439-55.

<sup>25</sup> See, however, Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 249-68. A great deal of modern research has focused on Durand's book IV and has dealt in passing with Hervaeus' critique; see, e.g., L. Hödl, *Die Grundfragen der Sakramentenlehre nach Hervaeus Natalis O.P. (†1323)* (Munich 1956), passim; K. Plotnik, *Hervaeus Natalis OP and the Controversies over the Real Presence and Transubstantiation* (Munich 1970); P.J.J.M. Bakker, *La raison et le miracle. Les doctrines eucharistiques (c. 1250- c. 1400)* (Nijmegen 1999), pp. 94-120. G. Loreti, *La dottrina della conversione e della presenza eucaristica in Durando da S. Porciano* (Rome 1948) has been unavailable for consultation.

<sup>26</sup> See the next section below on Palude, and esp. at and around n. 68 for the dating of Palude's *Sent.* commentary.

sees the world through Palude's eyes, and e.g. Cyril Vollert has offered similar unfavorable assessments of his talent.<sup>27</sup>

Another Dominican who polemicized against Durand was John of Naples. After Hervaeus Natalis, Koch (*Durandus*, pp. 285-314) judged John to be Durand's most significant critic. This is partly because John presented a modified Thomistic standpoint that could answer Durand point for point – Koch in fact considers John a major proponent of the "Thomistic turn" in the Dominican Order's controversy with Durand (*Durandus*, p. 314). In addition, however, John is significant for enabling us to determine the course of events of Durand's trouble with his Order. For one thing, John, along with Peter of Palude, compiled both the first list of errors of July 1314 and the second list of errors of 1316/17, and it is John's work that was of most immediate use to Koch. Just as important, it is John who gives us a *terminus a quo* of 1317 for the third and final version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary (C), based on Durand's citation (in the Prologue to I *Sentences* [C]) of John's *Quodlibet* I, which Koch can securely show must have been disputed at Christmas 1315 or Easter 1316.<sup>28</sup>

This C version of Durand's commentary, the version contained in all the early modern printings that we have and in some 40 manuscripts, was a project that probably occupied Durand – undoubtedly on and off – for much of his later life. He wrote it, as we have seen, after he had had the good fortune of being elevated to the rank of bishop, and therefore when he was no longer under the disciplinary and jurisdictional authority of the Dominican Order, so he was not forced to tow any particular doctrinal line. Thus, in this third redaction, Durand returned to many of the positions (sometimes modified on the basis of his critics' arguments and often with replies to those arguments) that he had held in redaction A but dropped from redaction B.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> For the Vollert quotation on Palude, see C. Vollert, *The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin* (Rome 1947), pp. 259-60, and for Lausanne, see p. 112, 260. For Koch on Palude and Lausanne: *Durandus*, pp. 272-85, esp. 285 for Lausanne.

<sup>28</sup> Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 75-76 and 286ff. On medieval testimony, John became master ca. Nov. 1315, and an explicit in one of the mss. containing it claims that his *Quodl. II* was *editum* at Paris in 1317, so Koch concludes that *Quodl. I* (which is called *Quodl. I* and which precedes *Quodl. II* in all the mss. that carry both) was disputed Christmas 1315 or Easter 1316; hence we can be certain that Durand, residing outside of Paris, could have seen John's *Quodl. I* by 1317.

<sup>29</sup> The most detailed study of the thought contained in this version of Durand's

If Durand began redacting his *Sentences* (C) sometime after 1317, when did he finish the C version? Koch suggested that books I-III were finished at latest in 1325, and book IV at latest in 1327. These dates were based on the following observations: 1) Durand himself describes events from 1325 and 1326 in his IV *Sentences* (C)<sup>30</sup> and 2) Bernard Lombardi, O.P., read the *Sentences* at Paris in 1327 and shows cognizance of Durand's C version in all books of his *Sentences* commentary. If we assume that Durand worked on his IV *Sentences* (C) only after he had already completed his I-III *Sentences* (C), then Durand's I-III *Sentences* (C) was composed sometime in the period 1317-25. As for book IV, Koch's *terminus ad quem* depends on whether Bernard Lombardi actually knew Durand's *Sentences* (C) in 1327 when he held his *Sentences* lectures, and this in turn requires either that no time elapsed between his lectures and his written version or, if the written version of Bernard's *Sentences* commentary was composed after his lectures, that it corresponds well to them. There seems to be no evidence that we can be certain that either of these is the case. Thus, while Koch's dating may well be right, it is probably safest to say that the C version was finished before 1334, the year of Durand's death.

Koch was rather positive in his assessment of Bernard as a witness to theological development, saying of him that he was well informed about contemporary debate, and often steered an independent course between the position offered by Durand and that offered by Thomas Aquinas – often leaning towards Durand. Perhaps he was a little too inclined towards Durand: in 1329, for the first time since 1313, the Dominicans at their General Chapter issued an injunction to follow and defend the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, and Koch suggested that this was issued with an eye towards Bernard's independence from Aquinas. At any rate, Koch claimed that Bernard's work gave clear evidence of the

---

work (and of Durand's thought in general) is M.T.B.-B. Fumagalli, *Durando di S. Porziano. Elementi filosofici della terza redazione del "Commento alle Sentenze"* (Florence 1969). Koch describes Durand's *Sent.* (C) as a work full of compromises, where Durand had given in to his opponents and turned his back on important elements of his early system; in addition, Koch claims that only books I-II were fully reworked, books III and IV much less so (*Durandus*, pp. 83-85).

<sup>30</sup> For these events, see above n. 8.



increasing influence of Durand, whom Bernard called the *Doctor Modernus*.<sup>31</sup>

And Durand? He was throughout this time a busy official, high in the Church hierarchy. Not only was he a bishop – first of Limoux (1317-18), then of Le Puy (1318-26, during which Durand was involved in a long standing dispute with the canons of his cathedral), and finally of Meaux (1326-34) – but he was one of the theologians that Pope John XXII turned to for important matters. Thus, in 1322 Durand penned a contribution to the apostolic poverty controversy;<sup>32</sup> more famously he was involved in the process against William of Ockham in 1325-26. Towards the end of Durand's life, John asked him to give his opinion of John's own, rather disputed, view of the beatific vision. The view that Durand put forward, however, in his treatise of spring or summer 1333, *De visione Dei*, was not pleasing to John, who turned it over to Jacques Fournier (later Pope Benedict XII) and a group of theologians with instructions to examine it for signs of heresy.<sup>33</sup> Once again, Durand was embroiled in conflict. Eleven articles taken from the work were condemned on 6 September 1333, just a year before Durand's death on 10 September 1334. Durand lived anything but a quiet life.

---

<sup>31</sup> See Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 328-32. A final Dominican opponent of Durand is the otherwise anonymous Dominican known as "Durandellus"; on him see, M. Lanczkowski and R. Wittwer, "Les *Evidentiae contra Durandum* de Durandellus: remarques introductives," *Revue Thomiste* 97,1 (1997), pp. 143-56, where an edition is announced of this text along with an introduction by P.T. Stella (and extensive excerpts from Durand's *Sent.* (A) matching the points Durandellus criticizes; see below n. 66). Friedman has examined the copies of the *Evidentiae* found in the Bibliothèque nationale de France (lat. 14550) and the Vatican Library (Ross. 161 and Vat. lat. 6736, an abbreviation), and it has no material regarding Durand's position on future contingents. See also n. 51 below.

<sup>32</sup> Edited by Jürgen Miethke in "Das *Votum de paupertate Christi et apostolorum* des Durandus von S. Porciano," in *Vera lex historiae. Studien zu mittelalterlichen Quellen. Festschrift für D. Kurze* (Köln 1993), pp. 149-96. A work of political philosophy dates from this period: *De origine potestatum et iurisdictionum quibus populus regitur*, which Koch dates to between September and December 1329 (see *Durandus*, pp. 171-73) and is found in many mss. and several early printings (see Kaeppli #943).

<sup>33</sup> The treatise has been published in a critical edition: G. Cremascoli, "Il 'Libellus de visione Dei' di Durando di S. Porciano," *Studi Medievali* 25 (1984), pp. 393-443.

*The Redaction Question and Peter of Palude's Sentences Commentary*

As mentioned above, in Koch's reconstruction of Durand's earliest known work, the *Sentences* commentary of Peter of Palude played a key role. Indeed, Koch believed that the whole of Durand's A version could be reconstructed from Palude's own enormous commentary. Palude was important because, in his effort to rebut Durand's position, Palude incorporated in his own *Sentences* commentary parts of Durand's *Sentences* commentary verbatim and at great length.<sup>34</sup>

But which version? To determine this, Koch (*Durandus*, pp. 25-31) returned to the first list of errors of July 1314. Remember that in nine of the articles in this list a clear distinction was drawn between Durand's old version of II *Sentences* and his new version of the same. Koch went carefully through a copy of Palude's II *Sentences* and found that all of the references to the old version could be found in the passages that Palude so laboriously copied verbatim from Durand. Thus Koch concluded that Palude was using Durand's *antiquum scriptum*, his II *Sentences* (A); by extension Koch claimed, as we saw above, that Palude's *Sentences* commentary could be used to reconstruct Durand's entire *Sentences* (A).

What are we to think of this claim? If we start with book II, having investigated at least nine instances in which Palude's transcription of Durand's *Sentences* commentary agreed with the A version and not with the B version (according to the first list of errors), Koch had relatively strong evidence on which to claim that Palude in his own book II was using Durand's II *Sentences* (A). So convinced was Koch that he could reconstruct Durand's II *Sentences* (A) on the basis of Palude's *Sentences* commentary, that he – in the absence of any copies of Durand's work<sup>35</sup> – prepared an edition of one question from Durand's II *Sentences* (A)

<sup>34</sup> On Palude's method see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 24-25 (as well as the interesting comparison between Hervaeus, Palude, and Durandellus, pp. 277-78).

<sup>35</sup> Two copies of II *Sent.* (A) are now known, but discovery of the first (in ms. Magdeburg, Domgymnasium cod. 91 [now in Berlin's Staatsbibliothek]) was announced by Koch only in 1933, in *Historisches Jahrbuch* 53 (1933), pp. 380-81. See also J. Müller, "Quästionen der ersten Redaktion von I. und II. *Sent.* des Durandus de Sancto Porciano in einer Hs der Bibliotheca Antoniana in Padua," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg) 19 (1941), pp. 435-40. The second copy (in Vat. Chigi. lat. B VIII 135) was identified by V. Doucet, *Commentaires sur les Sentences: supplément au répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller* (Florence 1954), pp. 27-28, nr. 192.

dealing with philosophical psychology using Palude as his source.<sup>36</sup> R.M. Martin followed the same method when he edited portions of Durand's *II Sentences* (A) for his book *La controverse sur le péché originel*.<sup>37</sup> Indeed, as far as we know, Koch's conclusion that Palude's *II Sentences* incorporates Durand's *II Sentences* (A) has never been contested. On the contrary, Koch's findings have even been confirmed by at least two scholars examining sections of Palude's *II Sentences* that Koch did not: Mark Henninger's investigation of *II Sentences*, d. 3, q. 2,<sup>38</sup> and R. Loss' examination of *II Sentences*, d. 24, q. 2.<sup>39</sup>

But if we turn from book II of Palude's commentary to the other three books, Koch had precious little evidence that Palude in books I, III, and IV was using Durand's A version. At times, in fact, Koch modestly limited himself to writing what he did have a strong case for: that it was in book II that Palude gives the text of Durand's *II Sentences* (A).<sup>40</sup> Yet, as mentioned at the beginning of this intro-

<sup>36</sup> See *Durandus*, pp. 274-77; for the full edition, see J. Koch, ed., *Durandi de S. Porciano, OP. Quaestio de natura cognitionis (II Sent. [A] d. 3, q. 5) et Disputatio cum Anonymo quodam* (Münster 1929; a second edition of this work appeared in 1935, which according to Ullrich, *Schöpfungslehre*, p. 91, n. 17, gives the text following the Magdeburg ms. of Durand's *II Sent.* (A) and not following Palude's *Sent.* commentary; Koch's 1935 edition has been unavailable for consultation).

<sup>37</sup> *La controverse sur le péché originel au début du XIVe siècle. Textes inédits* (Louvain 1930). Martin published Durand's *II Sent.* (A), d. 30, q. 2; d. 31, qq. 1-3; d. 32, qq. 1-2; and d. 33, qq. 1-2 (as well as *II Sent.* [B], d. 30, q. 2). This book served as the major source for Vollert's *The Doctrine of Hervaeus*.

<sup>38</sup> "Durand of Saint Pourçain (B. CA. 1270; D. 1334)," in J.J.E. Gracia (ed.), *Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650* (Albany 1994), pp. 319-32, esp. p. 320 and in nn. 3-6. Henninger found that the report of Durand's position in Palude's *II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 2 (in ms. Vat. lat. 1073) was very nearly identical to the text found in Durand's *II Sent.* (C), d. 3, q. 2. But Durand simply drops this second question in the B version of his commentary (consulted in ms. Melk, Stiftsbibliothek 611), moving directly from what are in the A and C versions q. 1 to q. 4 of this distinction (cf. ff. 204rb-7rb). Thus, here again Palude cannot be using Durand's *II Sent.* (B), and hence must be quoting Durand's *II Sent.* (A).

<sup>39</sup> "La dottrina del libero arbitrio nel commento alle *Sentenze* di Pietro de Palude O.P. Studio e testi" (Unpublished Diss. di laurea, Pont. Ateneo Salesiano, Rome 1955). Loss' work has not been available for consultation, but P.T. Stella reports (in "Le 'Quaestiones de Libero Arbitrio' di Durando da S. Porciano," *Salesianum* 24 [1962], pp. 450-524 on p. 461, n. 14) that Loss determined that, in Palude's *II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, the report of Durand's position is identical to the text contained in Durand's A version.

<sup>40</sup> E.g. p. 31: "Resultat der langen Untersuchung: Petrus de Palude gibt den Text der ersten Redaktion (wenigstens im zweiten Buche) getreu wieder"; see also p. 63.

duction, Koch did make the claim that Durand's commentary (as a whole) in its original version was contained in Palude's *Sentences* commentary, and it has been this more ambitious statement that has set the research agenda on Durand's relation to Palude: was Koch right? As it happens, for books I, III, and IV, Koch's view has come in for some criticism.

If we take book III first, the situation is complicated by the fact that we have no copies of Durand's III *Sentences* (A).<sup>41</sup> Thus, it was never more than a slightly educated guess that Palude in book III was using the A version of Durand's commentary. It was O. Lottin who, after Koch, first compared Palude's III *Sentences* (printed at Paris in 1517) with Durand's B and C version of book III. Lottin concluded that, in the text that he examined (III *Sentences*, d. 34, q. 1, a. 1), Palude's text was absolutely identical to that found in the second redaction of Durand's commentary (and extremely close to that found in version C). Lottin's question, then, was important: "le texte de Pierre de la Palu, identique à celui de la seconde rédaction de Durand, est-il ipso facto un témoin de la première? C'est ce qu'il faudrait démontrer."<sup>42</sup>

Book IV has also been the object of research. In 1972, L. Ott published a study of early fourteenth-century Dominican thought on the sacrament of ordination, focusing on Durand, and including discussions of all three versions of Durand's *Sentences* commentary. Ott writes without reservation that Palude is not always a witness to Durand's A version: "Petrus de Palude im vierten Buch nicht immer die erste Redaktion des Kommentars des Durandus benützte. In der Frage nach dem sakramentalen Charakter des Ordo benützte er einen von der ersten Redaktion abweichenden Text. Petrus de

<sup>41</sup> We can be quite certain that III *Sent.* (A) existed on the basis of the donation (quoted above) which mentioned the "third and last" version of Durand's III *Sent.* Moreover, Durandellus and the second list of articles seem to make use of Durand's III *Sent.* (A).

<sup>42</sup> O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, vol. 4 *Problèmes de morale*, part 3, II (Louvain-Gemblouy 1954), pp. 709-10, esp. p. 709, n. 2. In fairness, Koch himself (*Durandus*, p. 43) admits that "die Unterschiede zwischen der ersten und zweiten Redaktion beim dritten Buche unerheblich sein müssen; denn sämtliche Artikel der beiden Irrtumsverzeichnisse lassen sich beim dritten Buche in den Hss der zweiten Redaktion nachweisen." Note that the second list of errors was concerned exclusively with Durand's *Sent.* (A). Koch (pp. 42-43) does believe that he can show a difference between Durand's III *Sent.* (B) and the text that Palude used in III *Sent.*, d. 23, concluding that Palude used Durand's now lost III *Sent.* (A).

Palude kann darum nicht mehr vorbehaltlos als Zeuge der ersten Redaktion des Durandus angesehen werden."<sup>43</sup>

Valens Heynck has also explored the textual relation between Palude's book IV and Durand's in an article concentrating on Palude's teaching on the sacrament of confession.<sup>44</sup> Here, interestingly, Heynck showed that Palude had both the A and the B version of Durand's IV *Sentences* available to him, and in fact Palude clearly knows that Durand had modified his view from the first to the second version on the basis of the criticisms that he had received. Ludwig Hödl has arrived at similar results for Palude's book IV.<sup>45</sup> That Palude might have had both the A and the B version of Durand's *Sentences* was a possibility never raised by Koch. Moreover, Heynck could give a more reliable dating for Palude's written commentary than ever before: on the basis of Palude's citation of the reissued Papal Bull *Inter cunctas* and several other forms of evidence, Heynck argued convincingly that the *Ordinatio* version of Peter's IV *Sentences* that we have today was not completed before 1315.<sup>46</sup> This then showed that Palude was composing his written *Sentences* commentary from around late 1310 or early 1311 right up to 1315 and possibly even later. We will return to the question of dates.

<sup>43</sup> L. Ott, *Die Lehre des Durandus de S. Porciano O.P. vom Weihesakrament* (Munich 1972), p. 136, see also p. 42.

<sup>44</sup> "Zur Datierung des Sentenzenkommentars des Petrus de Palude," *Franziskanische Studien* 53 (1971), pp. 317-27; for the conclusion, p. 327. See also Heynck's "Die Behandlung der Lehre von dem Wiederaufleben der Taufe in den Sentenzenkommentaren des Durandus de S. Porciano," *Franziskanische Studien* 42 (1960), pp. 27-50, esp. pp. 34-35 and n. 19.

<sup>45</sup> Heynck, "Zur Datierung," p. 327: "Petrus de Palude übernimmt in seinem Sentenzenkommentar bei der Behandlung dieser Frage zunächst wörtlich die gesamten Ausführungen des Durandus in seiner ersten Redaktion, übt daran Kritik und fährt dann fort: *Postea autem isti idem correxerunt hoc dicentes, quod idem potest sustineri, si virtus inhaerens sit in sacramentis, quia ista virtus ...* Und nun zitiert er einen Text, der sich wörtlich in der zweiten Redaktion des Durandus wiederfindet. Ihm hat also offenbar ein Exemplar dieser Redaktion vorgelegen, und er hat die Korrektur, die Durandus hier an seiner Kritik der thomasischen Theorie anbringt, wohl bemerkt." Hödl, *Die Grundfragen*, pp. 207-08 shows that in IV *Sent.*, d. 4, q. 5, Palude considers the position found in Durand's B version to be an improvement on that found in the A version (cf. also, pp. 152-62, esp. 153, n. 3 and 162).

<sup>46</sup> "Zur Datierung," p. 327, conclusion on p. 326; J. Dunbabin, *A Hound of God: Pierre de la Palud and the Fourteenth-Century Church* (Oxford 1991), p. 42, corrects Heynck on a problematic reference of Palude's to the King of France's election to the Roman Senate.

At last, then, we come to Palude's book I: which version of Durand's *I Sentences* was Palude using there? For Koch this was a cut and dried question: he concluded that there *never existed* a second version of the first book of Durand's commentary. Hence Koch devotes no space whatsoever to showing which version of the text Palude utilized: Palude could only have used the A version, since the B version never existed and the C version was composed too late for Palude to have used it. We need to examine Koch's evidence for his claim that Durand's *I Sentences* (B) never existed before proceeding to challenge the claim. Koch relied on three basic arguments:

a) *Additiones* to *I Sentences*: In Paris, Bibliothèque nationale lat. 15364, a fourteenth-century manuscript, there is a list of 61 question titles from Durand's *I Sentences*, which Koch could identify as *additiones* to the A version of Durand's *I Sentences*.<sup>47</sup> This identification was on the basis of the list's explicit, which is written in a humanist hand from the fifteenth century:

Expliciunt tituli 61 correctorii, qui sunt addiciones et declaraciones magistri Durandi, ord. pred., doctoris venerabilis, quos super lectionem suam sententiarum addidit, quam Parisius copiavit et compilavit. Unde 100 et 9 et 61 faciunt 170, et tot sunt questiones summatim primi Durandi. Unde primus Durandi habet centum et septuaginta questiones.<sup>48</sup>

Koch believed, then, that these were questions that Durand intended to add to those that already existed in his Parisian *lectura*, i.e., for Koch, his *I Sentences* (A).<sup>49</sup> Koch gave one example (which he claimed was representative of the whole list) that showed that the titles in the list were titles of full questions found in Durand's *I Sentences* (C), that had either not appeared in *I Sentences* (A) or had been minor parts of more comprehensive questions (*Durandus*,

<sup>47</sup> Note that these should not be confused with the *additiones* to Durand's *I Sent.* (A) which Durandellus knew and of which Koch found a mere fragment; on these other *additiones*, see *Durandus*, pp. 44-46.

<sup>48</sup> Taken from Koch, *Durandus*, p. 47; see further pp. 46-49 and the description of the manuscript on pp. 9-10. This manuscript has unfortunately *not* been available for consultation, and here Koch's own evidence is relied upon.

<sup>49</sup> NB: here one should remember that Koch thought that *I Sent.* (A) was written in connection with Durand's Parisian *Sent.* lectures; hence he believed that this explicit referred to *I Sent.* (A). The modified Koch view, proposed by Maier, accepted by both Stella and Decker, and described above, creates difficulties for Koch's thesis. See for more on this, the discussion of P.T. Stella's thesis, below.

pp. 47-48). Koch concluded from this evidence (p. 48): "So gibt Cod. Par. Nat. lat. 15364 ein lebendiges Bild von der Arbeitsweise des Durandus bei Abfassung der letzten Redaktion. Danach zu urteilen, müßte also beim ersten Buche die Zwischenstufe, eines mittlern Kommentars fehlen; so ist es in der Tat." Because the list corresponded so perfectly to a sheet of planned revisions going from I *Sentences* (A) directly to I *Sentences* (C), Koch thought that it was unnecessary to postulate the existence of a middle redaction.

b) Manuscript evidence: no manuscript has ever been found containing Durand's I *Sentences* (B). Moreover, Koch made much of the fact that there exist several manuscripts containing Durand's II-IV *Sentences* (B) accompanied not – as one would expect – by I *Sentences* (B), but by I *Sentences* (A).<sup>50</sup> Does this not indicate that the B version of I *Sentences* never existed and the scribes or scholars looking for I *Sentences* (B) were forced to resort to I *Sentences* (A)?

c) Lack of contemporary references to a B version of book I. Koch stressed that nowhere in the surviving literature is mention made of Durand's I *Sentences* (B). Durand himself basically ignores his B version, most likely, as Koch suggested, because, having written it under pressure, he never felt it genuinely represented his thought. But, if it had existed, one would think that those who confronted Durand would make mention of the work. Yet, they do not. There is no sign of a I *Sentences* (B) in the list of possibly heretical or erroneous articles from 1314, which so clearly distinguishes between the A and B versions of II *Sentences*. When it comes to book I, Bernard Lombardi, who shows cognizance of the B version of II *Sentences*, only distinguishes between Durand's *novum scriptum* (= C) and his *antiquum scriptum* (= A). Most telling in this regard for Koch was the testimony of Hervaeus Natalis, who in his *Reprobationes excusationum Durandi* does distinguish in book II between the A and B versions of Durand's commentary, but does not do so for Durand's I *Sentences*, where he only uses the A version. Given Hervaeus' great objectivity, asks Koch, would it not seem

<sup>50</sup> We know of three manuscripts that fit this description: Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 12330; Melk, Stiftsbibliothek, 611 (130) and 234 (637); Auxerre, Bibliothèque municipale 26; cf. Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 48-52. In addition, ms. San Marco 440 of the Bibl. Laurenziana in Florence contains I *Sent.* (A) along with II *Sent.* (B) (see the Notes to the Editions below), as does Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek, Cent. III 79.

reasonable that he would have used the B version of Durand's I *Sentences*, had it existed?<sup>51</sup>

This is a remarkable concatenation of various forms of negative evidence, and it is easy to see why Koch arrived at the conclusion that he did. And yet ultimately Koch's arguments do not appear to stand up to scrutiny.<sup>52</sup> Let us look at each one in turn.

Ad a) The basic problem with this list of *additiones et declarationes magistri Durandi* is that we have no idea what it is. We know neither who wrote it or to what end. Koch may be right that this is a first sketch made by Durand on his way from an early version of his *Sentences* commentary to his last version. But it could just as well be that this list was compiled by some later scholar who had access to at least two versions of Durand's I *Sentences*, and wanted to see what Durand added and corrected to get from the one version to the next version (as an aid to study?). We just do not know. In a situation like this, it is hazardous to draw any conclusion on the basis of this list and its explicit (which, again, is written in a fifteenth-century hand), and we certainly should not make our story about the non-existence of Durand's I *Sentences* (B) depend on it.

Moreover, even allowing that the explicit is reliable and can be used in the way that Koch used it, this argument is based on the assumption that Durand could not have used his I *Sentences* (A) as the basis upon which he compiled *both* his I *Sentences* (B) *and* his I *Sentences* (C). Koch himself says when comparing the three versions to each other in II and IV *Sentences* that "Durandus in C an A, nicht an B anknüpft; manche Quästionen sind in C wieder in ihrer ursprünglichen Fassung hergestellt" (*Durandus*, p. 82, also p. 74); this might mean that Durand simply started over by using his A version as a basis for his C version, bypassing completely his B version. If this was true in the case of the other books,

<sup>51</sup> Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 70-72, esp. p. 72. In addition, Koch maintains that, with the exception of one spot (I *Sent.*, d. 44, a. 2) where he used the C version, Durandellus (on whom see n. 31 above) utilized exclusively Durand's I *Sent.* (A); see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 348-49 (although Bakker, *La Raison*, p. 116, n. 223 suggests that in the texts he examined Durandellus may have been using the B version).

<sup>52</sup> It is tempting to see in one of Bruno Decker's only two comments about Durand's I *Sent.* (B) a similar skepticism about Koch's arguments for its never having existed (*Gotteslehre*, p. 78, the other comment is on p. 20): "Die zweite <Redaktion> liegt schon deshalb außerhalb des Rahmens unserer Untersuchung, weil *bisher keine HS. nachgewiesen werden konnte*, die das erste Buch in einer mittleren Redaktion enthielte" (emphasis ours).



why not book I? Then there is nothing at all extraordinary about the list of *additiones*. Alternatively, the reworking represented by the *additiones* might have been towards a I *Sentences* (B) that structurally resembled I *Sentences* (C) at least in terms of the numbers and the titles of the questions dealt with. In any case, the mere existence of this list by no means rules out the existence of a B version of book I.

We will return to this list and its explicit shortly, on account of the use that has been made of it by P.T. Stella.

Ad b) The fact that in manuscripts containing books II-IV of the B version we only ever find book I of the A version might just as well argue for the existence of an extremely limited number of copies of I *Sentences* (B) as for its non-existence. The one or two manuscripts that contained I *Sentences* (B) were simply unavailable for recopying. This also would fit well with Koch's own conclusion that the B version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary meant very little to him, having been a result of compulsion and not a real engagement with the issues.<sup>53</sup> In fact, given the nature of the B version, one might suggest that the more pertinent question is why there are so many copies of Durand's II-IV *Sentences* (B), especially in comparison with the few copies of the same books in the more spirited A version.<sup>54</sup>

Ad c) This is an argument from silence. Koch can adduce no testimony from Durand himself or from any of his contemporaries claiming explicitly that I *Sentences* (B) never existed. Thus, like all arguments from silence, this one is weak. Moreover, for each of the examples that Koch gives of Durand's contemporaries who pass over I *Sentences* (B) in silence, it is possible to adduce "counter arguments." For example, Koch shows that Hervaeus in his *Reproba-*

<sup>53</sup> *Durandus*, p. 82: "... Entstanden ... aus dem Zwang realer Verhältnisse, nicht aus dem Ringen um die Probleme, konnte B für die innere Entwicklung des doctor modernus keine grosse Bedeutung haben..."

<sup>54</sup> The following count modifies that found in Kaeppli: there are two complete copies of II *Sent.* (A) (see above n. 35), none of III *Sent.* (A), and one of IV *Sent.* (A) (=Venice, Bibl. Marciana, Cod. Z. 104 [2004]); there are six of I *Sent.* (A). In comparison, there are seven witnesses to II *Sent.* (B) (including the one contained in Florence, see the Notes to the Editions below), seven to III *Sent.* (B), and nine to IV *Sent.* (B) (Klosterneuburg 346 and Erlangen Univ. Bibl. 256 both contain IV *Sent.* (B) according to Hödl, *Grundfragen*, p. 15. n. 23, as do Paris, BN lat. 12331 and Vat. Borgh. lat. 247; see Ott, *Die Lehre des Durandus*, p. 136). Several of these manuscripts seem to contain middle or mixed versions, however, and thus more research is necessary; cf. esp. Ott, loc. cit.

*tiones excusationum Durandi* distinguishes Durand's A version from his B version *only* in book II; yet we know that an A and B version existed for book IV, and almost certainly for book III (no manuscripts of III *Sentences* (A) have been found, however). Given this, how can we draw any conclusions on the basis of his silence about I *Sentences* (B)? Similarly with Bernard Lombardi: we can only argue that he refers to the B version in book II. The list of errors from 1314 only refers to a B version of books II and IV, yet we have copies of III *Sentences* (B). These examples could be multiplied. In short, there is absolutely no unequivocal evidence here that Durand's I *Sentences* (B) did not exist.

If we were to sum this up, then, Koch's arguments for the non-existence of book I of Durand's B version are not decisive. Any evidence that the book did exist should induce us to rethink them.

But do we have such evidence? As M. T. Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli pointed out, an inventory of the Dominican library in Perugia actually mentions that the library had a copy of Durand's "second work" on I *Sentences*.<sup>55</sup> Further, there is some textual evidence that perhaps Peter of Palude in his I *Sentences* was using Durand's I *Sentences* (B) – although this evidence is by no means straightforward. Let us examine it.

Already in 1960 P.T. Stella had examined Palude's commentary on book I, d. 43, q. 1 and compared it to Durand's extant I *Sentences* (A). Stella found that Palude was not using Durand's I *Sentences* (A), but a version closer to but not identical with the printed text (C).<sup>56</sup> Just a year after Stella wrote, Giuseppe Groppo published a long extract from the Prologue of Palude's I *Sentences*, along with a manuscript study and a review of the literature on Palude's *Sentences* commentary. As he himself noted, Groppo reached a conclusion that was in perfect accord with Stella's: Palude used a version of Durand's I *Sentences* that differs from both of the known versions, but is nevertheless closer to the printed C version.<sup>57</sup>

However, Stella, and following him Groppo, explained the fact that Palude used a version that was not A or C in a way that diverges

<sup>55</sup> *Inventario dei libri della biblioteca di S. Domenico in Perugia* (Rome 1962) ed. T. Kaeppli, p. 252: "Commentum Durandi O. P. super primum librum Sententiarum et est secundum opus suum super dicto primo Sententiarum." The quotation is taken from Fumagalli, *Durando di S. Porziano*, p. xxi.

<sup>56</sup> See the quotation below at n. 58.

<sup>57</sup> Groppo, "La teologia," esp. pp. 294-97.

significantly from the explanation one would have expected Koch to give. Stella's explanation is worth quoting in full:

Oppure per il primo libro del Commento alle Sentenze, nella misura in cui i dati raccolti sono generalizzabili, Pietro da Palude attesta una redazione assai vicina a quella edita. Ciò equivale a dire che, contrariamente a quello che il Koch scrive ad riguardo, il *primum scriptum* di Durando non è quello che i codici E e D [= Paris BN lat. 14454 and 12330] presentano; questo potrebbe essere la *reportatio* della *lectura parisiensis* lettura solidale in misura da determinare con *ambedue* gli *scripta*; l'edizione potrebbe essere di fatto un testo composito.<sup>58</sup>

Thus, whereas Koch had held that Palude used Durand's I *Sentences* (A), which is found in the Paris manuscripts BN lat. 12330 and 14454, and that I *Sentences* (B) never existed, Stella argued that the Paris Durand manuscripts actually contain a *reportatio* of Durand's Parisian lectures (i.e. a middle version), while Palude had access to Durand's original *Scriptum*. In arriving at this conclusion, Stella took as his starting point the explicit, quoted above, to the list of *additiones et declarationes Durandi* contained in ms. Paris, BN lat. 15364.<sup>59</sup> This explicit claimed that the list contained "tituli 61 correctorii, qui sunt additiones et declarationes magistri Durandi ... quos super lecturam suam sentenciarum addidit, quam Parisius copiavit et compilavit." As we have seen, Koch observed that the titles show precisely the questions that were added by Durand to the version of his *Sentences* found in the manuscripts Paris BN lat. 14454 and 12330 – Koch's I *Sentences* (A) – in order to reach the printed C version of his I *Sentences*. Stella emphasized, however, that the explicit says that the corrected titles were added to "lecturam suam sentenciarum ... quam Parisius copiavit et compilavit," i.e. to lectures held at Paris. But whereas Koch had believed that Durand's A version had been redacted in connection with lectures at Paris, Stella accepted Anneliese Maier's suggestion that Durand's version A was redacted in connection with lectures held between 1303 and 1307/8 at a Dominican provincial *studium*. The con-

<sup>58</sup> P.T. Stella, "A proposito," with discussion of the literary relationship between Durand and Palude on 311-17 and the quotation on p. 316 (the quotation is taken, however, from Groppo, "La teologia," p. 235, who corrects a typographical error found in Stella's article).

<sup>59</sup> Both Stella ("A proposito") and Groppo ("La teología") refer in their articles mistakenly to Paris BN lat. 14364, although at later points in their articles they both give the correct shelfmark; Stella: (incorrect) p. 312, (correct) p. 316 n. 80; Groppo: (incorrect) p. 235, (correct) p. 254.

clusion for Stella was that the version of Durand's I *Sentences* found in the manuscripts Paris BN lat. 14454 and 12330 – Koch's I *Sentences* (A) – was in fact a *reportatio* of Durand's *Sentences* lectures held at Paris, since this is the version to which the corrected titles were added. The version that Palude quoted extensively in his own *Sentences* commentary, on the other hand – the version that is closer to but not identical with the printed C version – was, on Stella's theory, the *Scriptum* that Durand mentions in the postscript to the printed version of his *Sentences*, i.e. the work connected with his provincial lectures. Thus, summing up: for Stella, Peter of Palude used the earliest version of Durand's I *Sentences* (that written between 1303 and 1308); the version of Durand's *Sentences* contained in the manuscripts (and identified by Koch as the original version) was in fact, according to Stella, a *reportatio* of Durand's Parisian lectures, i.e. a middle version.<sup>60</sup>

It should be stated that Stella's theory cannot be disproven here – this would require a mammoth effort to “redo” Koch, checking much of his data as well as editing large portions of Palude's I *Sentences*.<sup>61</sup> But, on its face, it seems unlikely. To begin with, Stella's theory rests exclusively on the explicit to the *additiones*; above, in connection with Koch's use of these titles and their explicit, their value as historical evidence was called into question, since we have no idea what this list is and who made it. Moreover, the explicit, written in a fifteenth-century hand in a fourteenth-century manuscript, seems an unreliable foundation on which to base an historical explanation.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>60</sup> See Stella, “A proposito,” pp. 311-17; Groppo, “La teologia” accepts Stella's historical construct without adding any new considerations.

<sup>61</sup> Obvious candidates for editing that would help with determining the literary relationship between Durand and Palude are Palude's I *Sent.* d. 27 (on philosophical psychology) and dd. 30, 31, and 33 (on relations), where Durand received a great deal of criticism. Friedman hopes to edit at least d. 27 with parallel texts in the near future.

<sup>62</sup> Moreover, there is a minor problem of the language of the explicit: Stella held that the wording of the explicit – “lecturam suam sentenciarum ... quam Parisius copiavit et compilavit” – pointed towards a *reportatio* of Durand's Parisian lectures. But the term “lectura” can just as well stand for a text having some relationship to a lecture as for a *reportatio* of the lectures themselves; the term “compilare,” which generally means simply “edited” or “worked through” by the author (and is often used of *ordinationes* in later-medieval theological texts) would seem to clinch this: at the very least, according to the explicit, we are dealing with a *reportatio edita* or *examinata*; a look at the texts edited thus far confirms (parallel to what was argued above n. 9 against Anneliese Maier's view that Durand's B version was a *reportatio*) that we are dealing with an *ordinatio*.

Stella (p. 312, n. 69) cites as evidence for his thesis also the explicit to the copy of Durand's I *Sent.* found in Paris BN lat 12330 (f. 55vb), which claims: “Explicit

Moreover, there are at least two major difficulties that Stella's thesis encounters, over and above this very basic one that it is founded on questionable evidence.

The first difficulty has to do with the texts themselves. Stella gave texts where the version of Durand's *I Sentences*, d. 43, q. 1 that is found only in manuscripts differs significantly from the text that Palude provides in his *Sentences* commentary (for the parallel text from Durand's *I Sentences* [C], see the Venice 1571 edition f. 112vb, nrr. 15-17).

Durand, *I Sentences*, d. 43, q. 1, version contained in Paris BN lat. 14454, 104vb-105ra and 12330, 50ra-b (from Stella, "A proposito," pp. 313-14, n. 76):

Hanc autem rationem impugnant illi idem, qui eam ponunt, dicentes quod producere infinita secundum numerum non arguit sufficienter infinitatem divinae potentiae, ut potentia est, nisi ponatur quod Deus possit producere saltem in potentia et successive infinita secundum speciem, quod probant sic: sicut essentia non esset infinita simpliciter secundum rationem essentiae, si esset determinatam ad aliquam speciem, dato quod esset infinite intensa in illa specie, ut si poneremus calorem infinite intensum; sic nulla potentia est infinita simpliciter, secundum rationem potentiae nisi possit in infinita obiecta, non solum secundum numerum, quia talia limitata sunt ad speciem, sed oportet quod sint infinita secundum rationes specificas. Quia enim frater Thomas tangit praedictam rationem in quaestionibus *De potentia*, quaestione secunda, nec talem distinctionem apponit, videtur dicendum quod praedicta ratio sufficiens est ad probandum infinitatem divinae potentiae, ex hoc quod potest, in singulis speciebus multiplicabilibus quoad individua, infinita producere in potentia successive, dato quod non possent esse infinitam secundum speciem. Quo tamen dato, efficacior esset ratio, quamvis fratri Thomae sufficiat. – Hoc autem declaratur accipiendo contrarium membrum ei quod assumunt sic: sicut se habet infinitas essentiae ...

---

primus Sententiarum secundum lecturam fratris Durandi de Sancto Porciano ordinis fratrum praedicatorum." But the lecture that this explicit refers to might just as well have been in the provinces, as both Anneliese Maier (cited by Stella loc. cit.) and Bruno Decker thought (see above, at and around n. 9). Moreover, there are explicit to, e.g., both (using Koch's terminology) *IV Sent.* (A) (in Venice, Bibl. Marciana, Cod. Z, 104 (2004), f. 196va, cf. Koch, *Durandus*, p. 41) and *IV Sent.* (B) (in St. Omer 336, cf. Koch, *Durandus*, p. 55, 74; and in Melk 234 [637], f. 407v, cf. Koch, *Durandus*, p. 51, 74) that call these works "lectura" – as we would expect from the modified Koch view sketched above on which *both* the A and the B versions were associated with lectures – so there seems little that we can draw from this evidence that supports Stella's thesis.

Durand, I *Sentences*, d. 43, q. 1, version contained in Peter of Palude's I *Sentences*, d. 43, q. 1 (from Stella, "A propositio," pp. 314-15):

Si dicatur quod ista ratio non probat quod potentia Dei sit simpliciter infinita, sed solum secundum quid, quia si esset calor infinite intensus, talis posset, quantum esset de se, simul calefacere infinita, et tamen non esset infinitus simpliciter, sed solum in tali specie; ergo similiter per hoc quod Deus posset infinita producere simul unius speciei, non sequitur propter hoc quod potentia eius sit simpliciter infinita; istud non valet, quia qua ratione Deus potest producere infinita simul actu in una specie, eadem ratione in quolibet multiplicabili. Et ideo, sicut continet infinite perfectionem unius speciei, ita et cuiuslibet. Non sic autem esset de calore, si esset infinite intensus, quia solum contineret perfectionem unius speciei. Et iterum, cum Deus, una simplici natura, contineat omnem perfectionem, et non secundum aliud et aliud, si probatur infinitus in una perfectione, probatur simpliciter infinitus in omni.

If we look at these two texts, the most striking difference between them is that in the text transmitted through Palude's *Sentences* commentary all references to Aquinas – very pronounced in the text from the Durand manuscripts – have been eliminated. In the text from the Durand manuscripts, Durand uses a text from Aquinas against – as both Stella and Decker have shown<sup>63</sup> – Hervaeus Natalis. Durand even says that the argument used by Aquinas could have

<sup>63</sup> Decker, *Gotteslehre*, pp. 264-65 discusses this very passage from the Durand manuscripts, and shows that Durand must have had Hervaeus in mind, and (as Decker maintains all along) most likely from Durand's knowledge of Hervaeus' *Sent.* lectures. Stella discusses this point at length ("A proposito," p. 316, n. 80), writing: "Non vogliamo tuttavia passare qui sotto silenzio il sospetto che l'intera produzione di Durando – *Primum scriptum, Lectura, Novum scriptum* – sia posteriore alle nostra *quaestio ordinaria* ...". Stella then discusses some evidence that shows clearly that in all three versions of the text of Durand, Durand criticizes a point of view that is the same as Hervaeus' in the ordinary question that Stella edited ("Utrum Deum esse infinitum in perfectione et vigore possit efficaci ratione probari"), and ends by writing: "Ora non ci risulta che esistano critiche del genere nella produzione di Erveo anteriore alla nostra *quaestio ordinaria*." Yet Stella dates Hervaeus' ordinary question to between Hervaeus' *Quodl.* II and III; Koch showed (and Decker confirmed) that Hervaeus in his *Quodl.* II used the version of Durand's *Sent.* commentary found in the manuscripts (Koch's I *Sent.* A). Is it not easier to claim with Decker that Durand was thinking of arguments Hervaeus made during his *Sent.* lectures? (Interesting in this regard is the fact that Stella, pp. 317-21 argues that Gerard of Bologna in his *Quodl.* I, q. 9 [disputed in 1305] referred to an early version of Hervaeus' *Sent.* commentary.)

been more effective if he had taken up Hervaeus' suggested line, but that Aquinas' was obviously satisfied without it (*Quo tamen dato, efficacior esset ratio, quamvis fratri Thomae sufficiat*). Not so in the text from Palude's commentary: there is no name-dropping at all there. Now, if we consider the historical situation on the modified Koch view, the A version found in the Durand manuscripts was the version of the text that got Durand into trouble; this fits very well with the character we see above and its explicit use of Aquinas, which would be sure to attract attention (especially inasmuch as Durand is trying to use Aquinas against one of the major Thomists of the day). If we assume for a moment that Palude's *Sentences* transmits the B version – the version that Durand wrote under pressure from his Order to be less independent – then the Palude text above makes sense. Koch, as mentioned above, describes the B version of books II-IV as a work in which the most disputed questions are simply left out and a less independent tone takes over.<sup>64</sup>

To Stella's texts we can add the texts on future contingents and divine foreknowledge that are edited below, for they follow precisely the same pattern that both Stella and Groppo described. The texts below point clearly towards the fact that Peter of Palude was using a version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary that is not identical with Durand's I *Sentences* (A), but rather a version that is closer to but not identical with the text that is carried in the printed C version of Durand's I *Sentences*. In section IV.B below, we have prepared an edition of the only part of Durand's I *Sentences*, d. 38, q. 3 that is contained *exclusively* in Durand's early I *Sentences* (what Koch called the A version). In this text, Durand presents a forceful interpretation of Thomas Aquinas on the issue of the presence of future things to God, and he takes to task competing interpretations of Aquinas on this issue (see on this the doctrinal introduction below). In the presentation of Durand's opinion contained in Peter of Palude's I *Sentences*, d. 38, q. 3 all of this part of the text is dropped – otherwise (with two

<sup>64</sup> See Koch, *Durandus*, p. 74: "Denn hieraus würde sich am besten erklären, daß Durandus die am meisten umstrittenen Quästionen von A und B einfach ausliess und sich auch sonst mehr der sententia communis anschloß." Stella (p. 314, n. 76) considered the text in the manuscripts the more provocative, writing: "Se Pietro da Palude avesse potuto leggere il testo appena trascritto, non si sarebbe lasciato sfuggire l'occasione di dire la sua circa il richiamo di Durando al *De potentia*"; but Palude could have wanted to work through Durand's version B (at least in some places) simply because it was Durand's most recent work, and in spite of the fact that he also had I *Sent.* (A) available to him; see further below, at and around n. 68.

minor exceptions mentioned in the introduction to the editions below) it is identical with the A version, except for a large added section devoid of explicit references to Aquinas. Thus, Palude had access to a version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary that had been "sanitized" for references to Aquinas and for interpretations of Aquinas that were too far off the beaten path. As with the texts that Stella presented, this fits very well with an historical explanation in which Durand was forced by his Order to tone down the independent attitude of his first work (Koch's A version) in a B version of his *Sentences* commentary, to which Peter of Palude had access.<sup>65</sup>

The second problem for Stella's theory is that it makes mish-mash of Koch's work and of his presentation of Durand's career. So positive was Koch that the version of Durand's I *Sentences* found in manuscripts Paris BN lat. 14454 and 12330 was the oldest version (i.e. the one that was parallel to the *antiquum scriptum* of the list of errors of 1314) that he said that a real proof was superfluous (*erübrigt*): Koch had checked to see that all of the articles from both lists of errors, and all of the criticisms of Bernard Lombardi (who distinguished the *antiqua scripta* from his *novum scriptum*) and of Durandellus' *Evidentiae contra Durandum* could be found in this text (*Durandus*, p. 40). Koch was absolutely convinced that this text was I *Sentences* (A). Now, Koch could be wrong; but showing this would require going through all his evidence again.

Stella was aware of this fact. He wrote ("A proposito," p. 316):

Non ci nascondiamo che tali conclusioni non possono non riuscire ostiche a chi sia al corrente del *caso* Durando, giacché, stando al Koch, il testo dei codici UO [= Paris BN lat. 14454 and 12330] sarebbe invece quello della prima redazione, e per di più anteriore al *Qdl. II* di Erveo (Natale 1308). E però, quelli raccolti fin qui sono dati di fatto, e pertanto inoppugnabili. D'altre parte l'aporia, che ne nasce, esige un più che lungo discorso, qui assolutamente fuor di luogo, ragion per cui ne rimandiamo ad altra occasione la soluzione.

If that other occasion ever arose, we are unaware of it. This is a pity: having spent most of his career editing and studying texts from early fourteenth-century Dominicans, Stella was in an unparalleled

---

<sup>65</sup> It should be noted that Groppo's evidence is harder to fit into this pattern, primarily because in the parts of Palude's I *Sent.* that Groppo edits, it appears that Durand added to the text contained in the manuscripts a rebuttal to arguments against his position (see "La teologia," pp. 294-97).



position to work through some of the unresolved issues surrounding Durand and his struggle with the Dominican Order.<sup>66</sup>

Let it be said: Stella's thesis does have its charms. If it were true, then the problem that Koch pointed out of the Durand manuscripts containing the A version for book I and the B version for books II-IV would be solved: they would all contain books I-IV of the B version. Moreover, the disproportionately greater number of witnesses to the A version of book I would disappear, since they would instead be manuscripts of the B version and in a number roughly corresponding to that containing the other books of the B version (see above n. 54). It would also fit a little more comfortably with the *status quaestionis* on the relative dating of Durand and Palude, since Palude, writing from around 1311, would be using a version of Durand's *Sentences* commentary in existence since around 1308 (see below on the dating). Finally – although far less significant – Palude would be using the A version for book I, as Koch claimed, just as he seems to have done for book II, although it would not be the A version Koch knew.

As things stand, however, and in the absence of further work from Stella, it seems best to accept the modified Koch view, and hold that Peter of Palude in his own *Sentences* commentary on at least several occasions used the B version of Durand's I *Sentences*. Stella's theory cannot be refuted, since, as mentioned above, this would require restudying all of Koch's evidence and more besides; thus, Stella's theory should be borne in mind as an (unlikely) alternative to the modified Koch view.

It remains to sort out the possible dating. The best guess for the dating of all four books of Durand's B version is 1310-1312. The 1310 date is arrived at because it is immediately following Durand's Parisian *Sentences* lectures, probably held in 1308-9/10 (following Guimaraes, although possibly as early as 1307, see above n. 9), and these, as we have seen, probably led to the renewal of the Thomistic

---

<sup>66</sup> Besides having edited Durand's 3 Avignonese *Quodlibets* and Hervaeus' answer to the first (see above, n. 23), he laid the groundwork for the ongoing edition of Durandellus (see above, n. 31), and in a series of articles he edited and studied many texts from this period (see, among others, those mentioned in notes 15, 16, 39 above). Stella may have retracted his theory in the Introduction to the edition of Durandellus (on which see above, n. 31), since in the issue of *Revue Thomiste* mentioned above (n. 9) both Henry Donneaud and Gilles Emery (p. 158, n. 4 and p. 173, n. 1 respectively), who had access to Stella's work, claim that Stella edited passages from Durand's A version on the basis of the Parisian manuscripts. We must await the publication of this important work.

legislature at Saragossa in 1309. Thus, Durand, in an effort to do good in the eyes of his Order and achieve the doctorate, began soon after Saragossa (perhaps already in 1309?) to redact a *Sentences* commentary that was very toned down. He was almost undoubtedly finished with this work by 1312, when he received his master's degree, becoming regent master in theology at Paris (the French Dominican chair) from 1312-13. There would be no reason for him to continue with the B version after 1312, and moreover, its completion (and we know it was completed at least for books II-IV) may have been a condition for Durand's receiving the support of the Order in obtaining his doctorate. Thus, during the period 1310-12, Durand would, accepting our hypothesis, have written his I *Sentences* (B).<sup>67</sup>

The dating of Palude's *Sentences* lectures and written commentary is complex, but some order was introduced to the chaos by Groppo in his article of 1961.<sup>68</sup> Groppo arrived at the following: Palude lectured on the *Sentences* at Paris in 1310-12 (following Guimaraes' conclusion). We know that he composed his written *Sentences* commentary in the following order: book I, III, II, IV. Based on work of P.T. Stella ("A proposito," esp. p. 311), Groppo suggested that Palude's I *Sentences*, d. 43 was composed by late 1311; therefore he proposed that Palude began work on his commentary in late 1310 or early 1311. Palude then continued writing the commentary – and there is some evidence that he was finished with III *Sentences* by 22 November 1312 – and he was still working on book IV in 1315, as Valens Heynck later showed (see above). Thus, assuming that Durand composed his I *Sentences* (B) early in the period 1310-12, Palude could certainly have used this version while composing

<sup>67</sup> Koch also dated Durand's *Sent.* (B) to these years, but he argued that Durand in II *Sent.* (B) replied to an argument of Peter of Palude's and therefore that II *Sent.* (B) was composed *after* Peter of Palude's *Sent.* commentary (see *Durandus*, pp. 72-73). Anneliese Maier, however, argues that no such conclusion can be drawn on the basis of Koch's evidence; see her *Ausgehendes Mittelalter* I, p. 466, anm. 26\* (= a later note appended to "Literarhistorische Notizen"). Neither is it possible, as Koch argued loc. cit., for Durand to have used Hervaeus' *Quodl.* IV in his B version, since this was disputed during Hervaeus' second regency at Paris (1316-18).

<sup>68</sup> Groppo, "La teologia", pp. 229-45; Anneliese Maier and Valens Heynck both accept Groppo's reconstruction (although Maier mistakenly claims that Groppo arrived at the years 1311-12 or 1311-13 for Palude's lectures; see *Ausgehendes Mittelalter* I, p. 467, anm. 27\* = a later note appended to "Literarhistorische Notizen"). See for further considerations on the dating of Palude's commentary, the doctrinal introduction below.

his own I *Sentences*; indeed, given that this would have been the latest work from Durand, this may even be likely.

Where does this leave us? Put simply: we cannot take for granted in any of the books of Peter of Palude's commentary on the *Sentences* that he was using exclusively Durand's A version. For book IV we have incontrovertible evidence that Palude made use of both the A and the B version, and further research may reveal that the same is also true for books II and III. Finally, when the evidence from d. 38 offered in this article is added to that of Stella and Groppo, it seems very likely that not only did a B version of Durand's I *Sentences* exist, but that Palude used it on at least some occasions. In sum, the only safe method of proceeding when trying to make claims about which version of Durand's commentary Palude was relying on is to compare Palude's text with Durand's version A, B, or both.

## II

### Durand and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents

In each of the three redactions of Durand's commentary on book I of the *Sentences*, question three of distinction 38 asks, "does God know future contingents?" and the opening arguments against his position are more or less the same (sometimes verbatim) as Thomas Aquinas's own in his *Scriptum* on book I, distinction 38, question one, article five (pars. 1.1-1.4a). The arguments all deal with the apparent implication that foreknowledge necessitates the future, but both Thomas and Durand proceed to other issues before tackling the modal questions involved in these objections. After a brief and common Dominican discussion of the different modal status of various causes in the created world (par. 1.6a, following Aristotle, Averroes, and Aquinas), Durand subdivides each of the three redactions of the question into three sub-questions: first, "can one have certain knowledge of future contingents via their causes?" second, "does God have certain knowledge of future contingents according to their own actual existence?" and third, "how does the certitude of divine knowledge exist along with the contingency of things?" Finally, the refutations of the opening arguments follow, quite logically, Durand's treatment of modal issues in the third sub-question. With the exception of a very brief passage added to the third redaction in the context of the third sub-question, the only differences

between the three redactions of Durand's question are in the second sub-question.<sup>69</sup>

Paragraphs 1.1-1.27 (i.e. ll. 1-436; the paragraphs are labelled according to the Venice 1571 edition of Durand's third redaction) of the edition of Palude's text (text A) are verbatim Durand, except for the occasion change of verb forms and a small *divisio quaestionis* labelled here as paragraph 1.4b (ll. 42-5). Paragraphs 1.1-1.11b (ll. 1-143) and paragraphs 1.18-1.27 (ll. 248-436) are identical in all three redactions. All the differences among the versions, then, occur in paragraphs 1.11c-1.17. The first redaction (on our hypothesis) contains paragraphs 1.11c-1.11e (ll. 144-171), then continues with the 62-line section of text edited as text B, and finally joins text A at the beginning of paragraph 1.18. In composing the second redaction, probably in reaction to criticism, Durand retained all of paragraphs 1.11c-1.11e, but removed the passage edited as text B and replaced it with paragraphs 1.12b-1.17 (ll. 173-247). Finally, sometime during or after 1317 Durand wrote the third redaction of the text, the one extant in Early Modern editions. Here Durand removed paragraphs 1.11c-1.11e and replaced them with a short paragraph (1.12a) quoted in the *apparatus fontium* of text A.

Thus there is no section of text particular to the second redaction; that is, the entire Durand text incorporated by Palude is contained either in the first redaction or the third redaction or in both. Why then do we posit that a second redaction ever existed at all, when Palude could merely have cut and pasted from the extant first and third redactions? Could not Palude have merely omitted paragraph 1.12a and the short passage in sub-question three? In light of the fact that there is good evidence for a second redaction of the other books, this latter suggestion is unlikely (see above). But it would at least be possible, were it not for the dating problem. As we shall see, explicits to Palude's book I give a rock solid *terminus ante quem* of November 1315, and since it is almost certain that on

<sup>69</sup> For previous discussions of Durand's views on divine foreknowledge and future contingents, see G. Leff, *Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of His 'De Causa Dei' and Its Opponents* (Cambridge 1957), pp. 163-4, 179-87 (who, misrepresenting Durand and others as "sceptics" who denied divine omniscience, reads them incorrectly through Bradwardinian glasses); Decker, *Gotteslehre*, pp. 187-8 (who also treats other Dominicans); Fumagalli, *Durando di S. Porziano*, pp. 126-32 (who treats Durand's theory without reference to any other thinker's position); and remarks in M.J.F.M. Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen: Divine Knowledge in Late Medieval Thought* (Leiden 1993), pp. 168-70 (who puts Durand into his historical context).

that date the scribe Hervaeus Jestini Brito finished a full copy from an exemplar completed by Peter Falacha, then we can push the *terminus ante quem* back to at least November 1314 and probably 1313, since Falacha's copy does not seem to have been the archetype. Indeed, Stella and Groppo wish to push the date back to 1311-13. On the other hand, Koch has established a secure *terminus post quem* of 1317 for the third redaction of Durand's commentary. Although Koch argued that a second redaction of book I never existed, Palude incorporated a substantial passage (paragraphs 1.12b-1.17) that is not found in the first redaction but is found in the third redaction. Writing in 1314 at the latest, Palude could not have had access to what was composed in 1317 at the earliest.

Although the differences between the three redactions are small, in many cases we can discern which redaction Durand's Parisian opponents were using, because, like Palude, they often copied or paraphrased much of Durand's text. In the case of the Dominican James of Lausanne (lectured on the *Sentences* ca. 1314-15), one of Palude's students, it is quite clear that he had access to the first redaction, since in James's own second redaction (the first being a mere *lectura litteralis*) he paraphrases and sometimes copies the section of text that only exists in that redaction (i.e. text B; cf. text C, ll. 125-183). Many other sections in James are also paraphrased from Durand, but James also shows the impact of Palude. Now, Palude's text as we have it is clearly a written work, because it incorporates so much of Durand verbatim, which would be impossible if it were a mere *reportatio* or reworked *reportatio* of Palude's Parisian lectures (held ca. 1310-12). If Palude is James's main source throughout, perhaps Palude's oral lectures were based on Durand's first redaction, and James composed his commentary based on his own notes from Palude's lectures as well as Durand's writings. Then Palude, composing his extant written version, incorporated Durand's later (ca. 1310-12) second redaction. Like James, the Franciscan Peter Auriol, writing before the end of 1316, also appears to have used Durand's first redaction.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Compare text B, ll. 45-57, with Auriol, *Scriptum* I, d, 38, a, 1 (ed. C. Schabel, "Peter Auriol on Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents: *Scriptum in Primum Librum Sententiarum*, distinctions 38-38," *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen Age Grec et Latin* 65 [1995], [pp. 63-212], pp. 104-5, ll. 377-380): "Ex quo etiam patet quod vana est interpretatio aliquorum qui dicunt <Thomam> non intellexisse positores istius modi quod res in sua existentia actuali presentes essent eternitati realiter, sed tantum secundum esse cognitum, ita quod intellectus divinus intuetur presentialiter existentiam actualem contingentis futuri."

In this context it will perhaps be impossible to tell with certainty who besides Palude employed the second redaction, because of its similarity with the third redaction. Indeed the second redaction may have never circulated beyond the members of the Dominican commission investigating Durand. The Dominican Bernard Lombardi incorporates much of Durand verbatim (and thus only excerpts are published below). Bernard has been shown to have read the third redaction in other places (and indeed provides a *terminus ante quem* of 1327 for that redaction), but he seems to have been using the second, in this context: paragraphs found only in Durand's first and second redactions are summarized in Bernard, while his text incorporates other sections extant only in the second and third redactions. Alternatively, he may have had Palude's text before his eyes. Dionysius de Burgo, lecturing in 1317-8, may have used any of the three: almost all of Dionysius's text is taken verbatim from Durand (and hence not published here), but only from sections common to all three redactions.

#### *The Background to Durand's Discussion*

In sub-question one Durand will briefly outline his position that God knows future contingents via their causes. This is a theory opposed to the main Dominican tradition which followed an interpretation of Aquinas that stressed that God knows future contingents in their real and actual existence, which is somehow present to His eternity, a tradition that Durand rejects. The issue in sub-question two, where Durand's modifications between the three redactions are located, is not only whether God knows future contingents in their actual existences, but also what Thomas Aquinas's position was. Aquinas discussed the issue in his *Scriptum* on book I, *De Veritate*, the *Summa contra gentiles*, and the *Summa theologiae*, and the slight differences of expression in each version left room for interpretation. For the modern commentator Julian Groblicki, Aquinas holds that "God knows future contingents because He sees them in His eternity as present to Him from eternity in their real being," although He also knows them insofar as He is their first cause, which is not at issue at the moment.<sup>71</sup> The Domini-

<sup>71</sup> The most convenient historical summary of these differences and of the interpretations of Aquinas in the thirteenth century, complete with extensive quotations of texts, is Julianus Groblicki, *De scientia Dei futurorum contingentium secundum S. Thomam eiusque primos sequaces* (Krakow 1938) (quotation from p. 57). See

can Peter of Tarantasia, the future Pope Innocent V, in his *Sentences* commentary based on lectures at Paris in 1257-9, interprets Aquinas (correctly, for Groblicki) as meaning that God knows future contingents as present, speaking of "real and physical" presence. Of course, Tarantasia has only Aquinas's *Scriptum* at that point. The same basic point of view, again using Thomas's *Scriptum*, is found in Tarantasia's successors as Dominican bachelor of the *Sentences* at Paris Hannibaldus of Hannibaldi (1258-60, who mostly wrote verbatim *secundum Scriptum Thomae*) and Roman of Rome (1270-72).<sup>72</sup>

After Aquinas's death, and after some of his ideas were challenged and even condemned in 1277, the disagreement among Dominicans became a heated controversy both within the order and with the Franciscans. The quarrel began with the Franciscan William de la Mare's *Correctorium* of Aquinas, an examination of 118 supposedly erroneous propositions from the Dominican, written between 1277 and 1279, the date when Parisian Dominicans were first forbidden to condemn Aquinas's views.<sup>73</sup> The issue of divine foreknowledge is prominent, for the third proposition of the 118, which de la Mare takes from the *Summa*, is "God knows future contingents as actually present." First, de la Mare eliminates a possible interpretation that Aquinas meant God knew them "as if" they were present, an interpretation favored by some later commentators. No, de la Mare insists (along with Aquinas's immediate Dominican successors), that Aquinas meant that "they are already present really and actually in eternity through their natures, and in this way they are subject to the divine vision." This means, for Groblicki, that God knows future contingents in "real, actual, let us say physical, presentness, not intentional." But this is entirely wrong and contrary to the faith, according to de la Mare, because then they would exist eternally. Thus, the only way they are present to God from eternity is in their "causal ideas or *rationes*." In fact, for de la Mare, God can know future contingents with certitude via their causes, contrary to the normal, interpretation of Aquinas, who claimed in the *Summa* and elsewhere that only conjectural

---

also Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 166-72, for a succinct presentation. For dates, see also R.L. Friedman, "The *Sentences* Commentary, 1250-1320," in G. Evans, ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences* (Leiden 2001), pp. 41-128.

<sup>72</sup> Groblicki, pp. 59-75.

<sup>73</sup> Groblicki, pp. 83-89.

knowledge is possible via that route. Except for de la Mare's reading of Aquinas, Durand would express an opinion remarkably like de la Mare's.

De la Mare's interpretation and critique of Aquinas was to be followed by many Franciscans in the following decades. In fact, the Strasbourg Franciscan General Chapter of 1282 made de la Mare's *Correctorium* (which Groblicki calls the *Corruptorium*, following de la Mare's Dominican opponents) the official commentary on Aquinas, and obligatory reading for Franciscans approaching the Dominican doctor's dangerous work.<sup>74</sup> By 1284, however, the "*Corruptorium*" had sparked several Dominican refutations, called *Correctoria Corruptorii*.<sup>75</sup> These Dominicans did not always agree amongst themselves, some choosing to attack de la Mare's interpretation of Aquinas, others de la Mare's own opinion of "real presence," and still others both elements of de la Mare's stance. The English Dominican Richard Knapwell, author of the *Correctorium "Quare"* (the *Correctoria* are known by their first word), chose to refute de la Mare's interpretation of Aquinas: Aquinas merely meant that things are present to God from eternity as they are known or seen, not in their actual existences. Knapwell agrees with de la Mare that the latter position is erroneous, adding that God's knowledge would in a way depend on things according to that opinion. Durand also employs this argument. Thus Knapwell is free to follow de la Mare in maintaining that the causal ideas or *rationes* of things are present to God in eternity, a position the author ascribes to Aquinas (incorrectly, according to Groblicki).<sup>76</sup>

John of Paris (John Quidort) responded in both his *Correctorium "Circa"* and in his later *Sentences* commentary (early 1290s).<sup>77</sup> Quidort takes the opposite approach to that of Knapwell: de la Mare's interpretation of Aquinas is more or less correct, but de la Mare's arguments against this position are faulty. In fact, Aquinas's position is sound and true, there is "real and physical presentness" of all things in God's eternity. Moreover, Quidort attacks de la Mare's contention that God can have certitude about future contingents via

---

<sup>74</sup> Groblicki, p. 156. Groblicki, however, notes that the important Franciscan Richard of Middleton supported "real presence" in a *Quaestio disputata*, after having taken a neutral stance in his *Sentences* commentary, while Groblicki also tries to prove that Peter John Olivi also followed the "correct" Aquinas line (pp. 137-9).

<sup>75</sup> Groblicki, pp. 90-129.

<sup>76</sup> Groblicki, pp. 91-97.

<sup>77</sup> Groblicki, pp. 97-109.



their causes. In this Quidort was followed by Rambertus de Pramadizzi, who however nuanced Aquinas's positive position. Groblicki summarizes Rambertus as follows<sup>78</sup>:

God knows future contingents as present to Him in the being that they will actually have in their time, but not only according to the being that they have in [their] ideal *rationes*. Nevertheless things cannot be said to be eternally coexisting with eternity, but only present to the divine cognition, according to their real, actual being.

Rambertus's interpretation presages elements of Durand's, while Durand's general position is the polar opposite of Quidort's.

In his *Quodlibet IV* (1299), Peter of Auvergne (†1303) put forth a different solution and interpretation of Aquinas.<sup>79</sup> For Auvergne, "what does not exist, cannot coexist with God in eternity," and so future contingents, which do not exist yet, do not coexist with God. In this way Auvergne agreed with de la Mare. The only way that they can be said to "coexist" with God from eternity is in their "intelligible being," which they have in God's cognition. Thus they "coexist with God from eternity as present and always existing according to cognition," and not according to their own being in their nature. Moreover, against de la Mare, according to Auvergne this is the correct interpretation of Aquinas (incorrect, according to Groblicki): they coexist with God only as cognized, according to *esse intellectum*.

Although the Dominican General Chapter at Paris in 1286 had made the defense of Aquinas obligatory, this did not end theological disagreement within the order.

The Parisian Dominicans William Peter Godinus (read *Sentences* 1299-1300), Hervaeus Natalis, and, in his first redaction at least, Durand would follow Auvergne's view and interpretation of Aquinas, and this represents something of a shift from the earlier Dominican line. The Dominican James of Metz (ca. 1300-03), probably a student of Rambertus, was in open opposition to Aquinas: he explicitly considered Aquinas to have maintained the "real presence" solution, and he considered this to be a real error, even going on to refute all of the famous examples Aquinas employed to illustrate his position. James himself held that God can know future contingents via their causes by knowing everything

<sup>78</sup> Groblicki, p. 124 (on Rambertus, pp. 115-25).

<sup>79</sup> Groblicki, pp. 75-8.

connected with those causes, which was also to be Durand's position. James also opted for the stance whereby future contingents are known in eternity only "as if" present. Thus he leaned in the general direction of de la Mare.<sup>80</sup>

This then is the spectrum of Dominican interpretations and opinions that Durand inherited when he composed his first redaction of his *Sentences* commentary in 1304-08. Some denied that God could have certitude about future contingents via their causes, but others accepted it. Some considered Aquinas to have asserted "real presence," while others disagreed. Some maintained "real presence" in their own theories, and others went a different route. At each point Aquinas's own position might be open to interpretation, which considerably widened the scope of the Dominican debate.

#### *Knowledge of Future Contingents via Causes*

Durand never changed his main assertion that God knows future contingents via their causes. In sub-question one, where Durand inquires about this, he first gives the common Dominican opinion, which followed Aquinas in the *Scriptum* and *Summa theologiae* in claiming that only fallible and conjectural knowledge was possible via contingent and impeditable causes (par. 1.8).<sup>81</sup> Instead Durand agrees with the Franciscan de la Mare and, more closely, James of Metz, but one should note that Durand's (and therefore Metz's) determination is an expanded paraphrase of Aquinas in the *Summa contra gentiles*, where the Dominicans' teach-

<sup>80</sup> See Jacobus de Metz, *I Sent.*, d. 38, a. 3 (ms. Troyes, Bibliothèque municipale 992, ff. 62va-b) for Metz's support of foreknowledge via contingent causes and refutation of Aquinas and his examples, where in conclusion he remarks: "Ideo exponunt quidam dictum opinionis sic: quod Deus cognoscit futura contingentia cognitione presentialitatis non quia sint sibi presentia, quia hoc non videtur intelligibile, ut habitum est, sed quia ea ita certa cognitione cognoscit ac si essent sibi presentia, vel sicut ea cognosco ipsa sunt mihi presentia, et ita expositio est vera. Si tamen sit intentio opinionis, non videtur autem quod hec fuerit eius intentio, sicut hoc est in *Summa contra gentiles*, libro I, capitulo 66." On Metz, see also Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 168-70, following Decker, *Gotteslehre*, pp. 176-7.

<sup>81</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13 (ed. Paulinae, Rome 1962, p. 83a): "Alio modo potest considerari contingens ut est in sua causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum et ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum, quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita. Et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi coniecturalem cognitionem." Cf. Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5 (vol. 1, ed. R.P. Mandonnet, Paris 1929, p. 910).

ing doctor displays a different attitude from that expressed in the *Summa theologiae*.<sup>82</sup> Durand claims:

Just as a necessary effect infallibly follows from a necessary cause, so a contingent effect infallibly follows from an impedible cause, if it is not impeded, although the latter infallibility is *ex suppositione*, but the former is *secundum se* and absolute. And in the same way, an effect infallibly follows from an indifferent and impedible cause, if it is determined and not impeded. Therefore, just as a necessary effect is foreknown in a necessary cause with certain cognition, so when an impedible cause is known and all things that can impede it and in addition those that will impede it or will not impede it, it can be known with certainty which effect will come about or will not come about. And similarly, when an indifferent and impedible cause is known, if along with it are known all things that can determine it and will determine it and all things that can impede and that will impede it, it can be known infallibly which effect will come about. Now, God

<sup>82</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* I, q. 67 (*Opera Omnia* vol. 13, ed. Leonis, Rome 1918, p. 190b, ll. 1-7): "Sicut ex causa necessaria certitudinaliter sequitur effectus, ita ex causa contingenti completa si non impediatur. Sed, cum Deus cognoscat omnia, ut ex supra dictis patet, scit non solum causas contingentium, sed etiam ea quibus possunt impedi. Scit igitur per certitudinem an contingentia sint vel non sint."

Cf. Jacobus de Metz, *I Sent.*, d. 38, a. 3 (ms. Troyes 992, f. 62va, against Aquina's other writings): "Dubitatio prima: circa primum dubitatur in duobus, primo circa hoc quod dicitur quod effectus contingens non habet certitudinem cognitionis in causa sua, quia etsi veritatem habeat respectu aliquorum cognoscentium particularium que impedimenta et disponentia ad cognitionem omnia videre non possunt, tamen si esset dare aliquem qui videret omnia que impedire possunt eam ut ex ea sequatur effectus, qui etiam videret omnia que disponere vel conservare possunt causam ut produca[n]t effectum, non videtur verum esse quin talis possit in causa effectum contingentem certitudinaliter cognoscere." The situation with the various versions of Metz's *Sentences* commentary is chaotic, but in a modified version of the commentary in the same ms. (f. 23rb), which has internal references to the other version, he states: "Sicut a causa necessaria evenit effectus necessario, ita a causa impedibili, non tamen impedita, evenit effectus determinate et cum certitudine. Non dico 'necessario', quia a causa necessaria evenit effectus necessarius necessario cum certitudine et impossibilitate aliter se habendi. A causa tamen impedibili, non tamen impedita, evenit effectus cum certitudine, non tamen necessario, sed cum possibilitate aliter se habendi. Similiter arguitur (?): a causa indeterminata, si determinetur, provenit effectus cum certitudine, non tamen necessario... Modo ad propositum, qui videt causam impedibilem et omnia supervenientia et que impediunt et que non impediunt, talis potest videre effectum determinate et in veritate, licet non necessario. Et ideo, cum Deus sic videat effectum in causis impedibilibus, quia videt impediencia et non impediencia et que inclinabunt et que non, ideo ita determinate potest videre effectum ad utrumlibet in causa impedibili sicut effectum necessarium, non tamen necessario."

not only knows a contingent cause in itself and absolutely – because in this way no effect is known infallibly in self and through itself except only by probable conjecture, as others rightly claim – but He knows all things that can determine and that will determine it, and in addition He knows all things that can impede it and that will impede or will not impede it. Therefore, God can know with certainty a future contingent effect in a cause that is known in this way (par. 1.9).<sup>83</sup>

Durand goes on to say, beyond what James of Metz had claimed, that God also knows future contingents through His essence as their cause, so that it is only via their causes that He knows future contingents (par. 1.10).

Like James of Metz, Durand hereby clarifies some confusing remarks in Aquinas about the origins of contingency. In several works Aquinas had stated, while treating foreknowledge, that even though an effect's remote or first cause (God) could be necessary, the effect could still be contingent because of the proximate cause. Aquinas gives the example of the "flowering of a tree, whose remote cause is the motion of the sun, but whose proximate cause is the generative power of the plant. The flowering, however, can be impeded by an impediment to the generative power, although the motion of the sun is invariable."<sup>84</sup> Durand claims that, taking into account all contingent causes, "the concurrence of causes," the effect will occur infallibly (not by absolute infallibility, but by infallibility *ex suppositione*, which will be treated below in connection with sub-question three), and can be known with certitude. Humans may not be able to know the future because they cannot take all causes into account, but, Durand suggests, perhaps even an angelic intellect can know all natural things, and God can know all things generally (pars. 1.22-23). This is perhaps in reaction to Franciscans like Scotus, who claimed that the chain of natural secondary causation (an instance of which is Aquinas's example) is necessary, and that if the remote, first cause is necessary, so also must be the proximate cause.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>83</sup> Cf. also Hoenen, *Marsilius of Inghen*, pp. 168-9.

<sup>84</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum I*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5 (ed. Mandonnet, p. 909-10): "Ut patet in floritione arboris cuius causa remota est motus solis, proxima autem virtus generativa plantae. Floritio autem potest impediri per impedimentum virtutis generativae, quamvis motus solis invariabilis sit."

<sup>85</sup> E.g. Johannes Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio I*, d. 38, pars 2, et d. 39, qq. 1-5 (*Opera Omnia*, vol. 6, ed. C. Balic, Vatican City 1963, pp. 406-31).

Scotus used his critique to show that, in order for contingency to exist in the world, it must lie in the first cause, God. For Scotus, contingency originates in the contingent acts of the divine will. Scotus's confrère Peter Auriol, and also Thomas Wylton, responded to Scotus that he had side-stepped the main issue: what about knowing the contingent acts that proceed from human free will? How does God know these?<sup>86</sup> Accordingly, Auriol explicitly rejects Durand's argument as well:

Given that through the essence He knows the causes of contingents and what things can impede or not impede, He cannot know what will actually impede or will not impede, because in acts of [human] free will, either side of a contradiction can happen based only on the will's determination; but God is not effectively and determinatively the cause of this determination immediately, but only with the [human] will mediating. But the [human] will is completely indeterminate and is able to do either side [of a contradiction], and so, when God knows it, He does not know to which side it will be determined.<sup>87</sup>

So when Durand says (cf. par. 1.22) that "God knows all things that can determine free will and that will determine it, he begs the question, for although it seems that He knows all that can determine it, it is not clear how He knows what will actually determine it." But these things are contingent *ad utrumlibet*. Moreover, it appears to Auriol that Durand merely spoke of natural causation, and hence avoided the real issue.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Schabel, *Theology at Paris, 1316-1345* (Aldershot 2000), pp. 53-4, 61, 89.

<sup>87</sup> Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, a. 1 (ed. Schabel, pp. 106-7, ll. 393-400): "... dato quod per essentiam cognoscat causas contingentium et que impedire possunt vel non impedire, non tamen potest scire quid impediet actu vel non impediet, quia in actibus liberi arbitrii potest contingere utraque pars contradictionis ex sola determinatione voluntatis; huius autem determinationis Deus causa non est effective et determinative immediate, sed tantum mediante voluntate; voluntas autem penitus indeterminata est et potest ad utramque partem, et sic ea cognita a Deo nescitur ad quam partem contradictionis determinabitur..."

<sup>88</sup> Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum* I, d. 39, a. 3 (ed. Schabel, pp. 187-8, ll. 845-61): "Secundo vero deficit in eo quod ait Deum scire omnia que possunt determinare liberum arbitrium et que determinabunt. Petit enim principium, quamvis enim appareat quod novit omnia que possunt determinare, tamen non patet quomodo novit quod actu determinent. Aut enim hoc novit cognoscendo liberum arbitrium, aut cognoscendo illa que possunt determinare; sed non potest dari primum, quia liberum arbitrium indeterminatum est ad utrumlibet, et ita non potest quantumcumque sit cognitum determinate ducere in notitiam actualis determinationis; similiter etiam non potest dari secundum propter eandem causam, quia omnia determinantia possunt

The example of the Carmelite Guy Terrena shows that Durand was not without defenders against Auriol's critique. In a *Quodlibetal* question of 1318, Guy strove to defend the theory that God has foreknowledge via causes even of future contingents stemming from human free will.<sup>89</sup> Most subsequent thinkers, however, either modified or rejected Durand's stance. Independently of Auriol, Peter of Palude recognized that Durand had not explained this well, and so Palude gives an example of human willing: if one knows that someone wants to do something tomorrow, and that he will be able to do it, then one knows that he will do it. But, says Palude, willing and being able to do something are just as contingent as the action itself (text A, par. 2.2.1). So, as Auriol was also saying, "it is not sufficient for God to know the causes and the impediments that do not impede and so on, because it begs the question, since it is equally doubtful about how He knows that things that can impede will not impede as that these unimpeded things will come about, because each is contingent" (par. 3.1). Palude agrees with Durand that even an angel could know the *natural* future, "not only eclipses, but also rains, droughts, cold spells, and heatwaves, although not astronomers, since they do *not* know all the impediments. Crimes and wars, however, angels do not foreknow with certainty, because they depend on human free will" (par. 2.5.1b).

---

determinare et non determinare; igitur nichil est dictu. Tertio quoque deficit in exemplo quod ponit. Non est enim simile de eventibus naturalibus qui subsunt causalitati celesti et de actibus liberi arbitrii qui non subsunt alicui extrinseco determinanti. Illi quidem sunt necessarii in ordine ad concursum causarum; isti vero semper liberi sunt et contingentes. Quare illi scibiles sunt cognoscenti generaliter totam causalitatem celestem; isti vero scibiles non sunt per cognitionem quarumcumque causarum, cum non determinantur ab aliqua causa, sed immediate procedant ex arbitrii libertate."

<sup>89</sup> Guido Terrena, *Quodlibet* VI, q. 3, a. 2 (ms. Vat. Borghese 39, f. 221va): "Cognoscens causas et ordinem causarum ad effectum cum omni determinatione causarum secundum quod evenit absque omni impedimento, cognoscit determinate effectum; sed Deus ab eterno cognoscit causas et ordinem causarum et determinationem voluntatis tue quod curres cras absque omni impedimento – ipse enim novit cogitationes hominum antequam sint et quomodo et cum qua determinatione et quali remotione impedimentorum, ita quod non solum novit et liberum arbitrium tuum sed etiam novit quod sic voles et sic voluntas habebit effectum; sine dubio ergo, cognoscendo causas cum essentiali ordine et determinatione ad talem effectum, indefectibiliter prout in actu erit cognoscit Deus effectum contingentem futurum. Unde si ego nunc cognoscerem omnem ordinem voluntatis tue cum hiis que concurrent ad cursum tuum quo curres cras determinate, scirem quod tu curreres cras sicut cognoscam cras determinate quod tu curris quando actu curris. Igitur cum Deus hoc cognoscat ab eterno, cognoscit effectum contingentem *pro altera parte determinate*."

Palude maintains that, insofar as God knows future contingents via causes, it is because He knows the first creature, which He freely and contingently created, and He knows that He will create it, so that first He knows and then He causes. Beyond that He also knows that everything depends on His constant cooperation (pars. 2.2.1-2). Palude gives an example: God knows what humans will do by their free will and when they will do it just as someone who gives a bow to a boy who cannot shoot without it, by knowing the boy's will to shoot it and his own will to give it or withhold it (par. 3.1).

This solution would not have satisfied Peter Auriol, who would ask how one can know the boy's free will with such certainty. In reaction to Auriol, however, and perhaps inspired in part by the Carmelite Terrena, Auriol's fellow Franciscan Francis of Marchia would develop Palude's line of argument extensively. Tacitly accepting Durand's contention that God knows future contingents via their causes, Marchia nevertheless took into consideration Auriol's critique, and set about trying to show how human free will is in fact somehow predetermined in the way Palude briefly suggested. The Augustinian Michael of Massa would make Marchia's schema more precise.<sup>90</sup>

Of the other Parisian Dominicans who succeeded Durand, James of Lausanne's distinction 38, question one, first paraphrases Durand's account of the different types of secondary causes in article one (text C, ll. 14-35), then in article two he deals with the issue of God's knowledge of the future via causes (text C, ll. 36-119). Here James's treatment is again a paraphrase of Durand, with whom he is in complete agreement that God can know future contingents with certainty via their causes if one knows all of the causes collectively, contrary to the common Dominican position and the statements of Aquinas in the *Scriptum* and *Summa theologiae*. James does incorporate Palude's qualifications about how exactly God knows the causes, however, modifications to be discussed below.

In contrast to the attitudes of Durand, Terrena, Palude, James of Lausanne, Marchia, and Massa, the Dominican John of Naples sides with Auriol in his brief *Quodlibet* ten, question six, probably

<sup>90</sup> Schabel, *Theology at Paris*, pp. 192-207, 214-20; C. Schabel, "Il determinismo di Francesco di Marchia (Parte I)," *Picenum Seraphicum* 18 (1999), pp. 57-95, and Parte II, 19 (2000), pp. 3-55; and C. Schabel, "Questions on Future Contingents by Michael of Massa, OESA," *Augustiniana* 48 (1998), pp. 165-229.

from after 1317 when he left Paris for Naples. Certain and infallible knowledge being only of what is necessary, a future contingent cannot be known by certain and infallible knowledge with respect to the being it has in its cause, because this is only "contingent being." Only conjectural knowledge is possible via that route, as in the case of Peter's walking, "while it exists only in Peter's will and it is future" (text D, ll. 15-22, 31-42). Meanwhile Hervaeus Natalis, treating angelic knowledge in his *Quodlibet* five, question six, from sometime in the 1310s, leans in the same direction (text E, ll. 104-106), having already rejected divine knowledge of future contingents via their causes as conjectural in his *Sentences* commentary completed in about 1309.<sup>91</sup>

Thus even among the members of the 1314 panel investigating Durand there was much disagreement on this sub-issue, and so Durand was not censured on this topic. Bernard Lombardi (ca. 1327), the last Parisian Dominican to address the issue before the Black Death, demonstrates just how little agreement there was, even among the Dominicans. Although after 1313 they were obliged to follow Aquinas, canonized in 1323, the Angelic Doctor's works could be interpreted in more ways than one, and the theological problem was of course complex in itself. In extremely rapid fashion Bernard interprets Aquinas as opposing the possibility of certain knowledge of future contingents via their causes, and so he maintains that Durand has not refuted "Saint Thomas." Next, perhaps in light of Francis of Marchia's treatment, Bernard realizes that somewhere down the line a contingent effect has to have a determined cause in order to occur. But mindful of Auriol's worries, Bernard wonders whether contingency can be maintained at all if a contingent effect must always have a determined cause. His brief solution retreats to Aristotle and to Aquinas in that the modality of the effect follows the proximate cause, "and because God acts, while free will, which is a contingent principle (*principium*), mediates, therefore the effects are contingent" (text F, ll. 1-17). Nevertheless, Aquinas had not used free will in his examples of first/remote and proximate causes, but rather natural causation. In short, Bernard's brief statements betray the increasing complexity of the problem as seen in the early fourteenth century, and although Bernard's treatment is far from impressive, it at least suggests that he was not necessarily straightjacketed by the requirement to comply with Thomism.

<sup>91</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *I Sent.*, d. 36, pars 1, a. 1 (ed. Paris 1647, p. 151aC-D).



*Knowledge of Future Contingents as Present in Eternity*

In all three redactions Durand opens his discussion of how God (also) knows future contingents in themselves by excluding one possibility (text A: par. 1.11a; ll. 131-3): "God does not know future contingents with respect to their actual existence such that He knows them to actually exist," which perhaps even William de la Mare would not have ascribed to Aquinas. The other possible understanding is that (par. 1.11b; ll. 136-8) "God knows from eternity that distinct actual existence proper [to the things] that they will have in themselves in the process of time," as e.g. Rambertus held. This is because He certainly knows this existence when the things actually exist, and since His knowledge is immutable, He must also know this existence before they exist.

It is here that the three redactions diverge. In the first two redactions, Durand asks how this sort of knowledge of things' actual existences differs from the knowledge that God had of them via their causes, the theory that he supports. Excluding two possibilities (pars. 1.11c-d), Durand concludes that some say they differ in that knowledge via causes is of the thing absent, while knowledge of the thing's actual and proper existence is of the thing present, so that the latter knowledge is of the thing as present to God from eternity according to its actual existence (par. 1.11e). This theory corresponds to Groblicki's "correct" solution and interpretation of Aquinas, i.e. the earlier Dominican line.

In the first redaction Durand followed this with the passage edited below as text B, which he removed in the second and third redactions. Here, writing before the stipulation that he must follow Aquinas, Durand has an explicit discussion of Aquinas's views, complete with lengthy quotations from both Aquinas's *Scriptum* and his *Summa theologiae*. The explicit references to "brother Thomas" and the quotations are completely absent from the second and third redactions. Durand claims certain men say that the above position for "real presence" (in par. 1.11e) is Aquinas's, but Durand asserts that not only is the position false, it is not Aquinas's at all. In this Durand follows Peter of Auvergne.

The first argument against "real presence" agrees with the Franciscan de la Mare and, more explicitly, with Auvergne (text B, ll. 5-7): "what is nothing in itself in reality cannot be really and actually present to anyone, because being present presupposes being, and being really present presupposes being really." The second argument agrees with Knapwell, i.e. the author of "*Quare*" (text B, ll. 15-17): "Knowledge that requires a thing's actual and

real existence in order to be certain and distinct depends on things and their existence," which cannot be the case with God's knowledge.

Now Durand turns to refuting de la Mare's and the older Dominican interpretation of Aquinas. Durand quotes from Aquinas's *Scriptum* (text B, ll.23-31):

"From eternity the divine intellect intuits every singular, not only as it is in its causes, but as it is in its determined being, for unless this were the case, since when a thing exists He sees the thing as it is in its determined being, He would know the thing differently after it exists and before it comes about." Look: he does not say that things in their determined being really exist to God from eternity, but he says that He sees them in their determined being, because from eternity God sees that same determined being that things will have in their own natures in the process of time.

Thus closely echoing Rambertus de Primadizzi, Durand continues somewhat along Rambertus's lines: when Aquinas states that (text B, ll. 35-9) "God's cognition intuits all temporal things, although they succeed each other, as present to it, nor is any of them future with respect to [God's cognition], but with respect to another [of them]," Durand interprets as follows: "He speaks of the presence and futurity of things with respect to God according to His cognition only, for in this way everything is present to Him and nothing is future."

Durand develops this interpretation with quotations from the *Summa* (ll. 40-55). When Aquinas says that "all things that are in time are present to God from eternity, not only because He has the *rationes* of things present within Him, as some say, but because His *intuitus* is carried from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality,"<sup>92</sup> Durand maintains that others "claimed that [Aquinas] understood that things would be present from eternity to God not only in *ratione* of the thing known (because this is having within Him only the *ratio* of the thing), but according to the being of its proper nature. But it is not necessary to say this, first because either the '*rationes* of things' means the *ratio* through which a thing

<sup>92</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, trans. A.C. Pegis, *The Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* I (New York 1945), p. 155, where *rationes* and *intuitus* are also translated.

is known" specifically and quidditatively, as the definitive *ratio*, which is not enough to know singulars (text B, ll. 55-62):

Or the '*rationes* of things' means 'cognized being', and God not only knows this of things, but He knows their real and proper being. And [Aquinas] explains himself in this way in the *Scriptum*, speaking thus: "From eternity God sees presently all contingents in diverse times, not only as they have being in His cognition — for God from eternity did not only know concerning things that He knows them, that is, their being in His cognition — but also from eternity He saw in one *intuitus* each single time and that such a thing exists in this time and is absent in that time."

Thus avoiding the real present existence of things in eternity, Durand's overall conclusion remains the same in all three redactions (text A, par. 1.18): God knows future contingents "with respect to their proper and determined actualities that they *will* have, not that they are from eternity really present to Him" (ll. 249-51). As will be discussed below, Durand does hold that God can and does know future contingents through their causes, but insofar as God knows them as present to eternity, "the divine essence, as a cause, is the sufficient *ratio* of representing singulars determinately to the divine intellect," and the cognition of future contingents depends on the cognition of the divine intellect (ll. 252-3, 256-7). This builds on what Durand had said earlier, that God knows things other than Himself through knowledge of His essence, not as their exemplar, but as their cause (text A, par. 1.10).

Often Peter Auriol reflects Durand's positive and negative influence in silent ways, for example accepting that God knows the 'actualities' of future contingents via the divine essence (although the divine essence played such a role for many thinkers), but rejecting the role of divine causation and opting for knowledge via exemplar or similitude. But whenever the Franciscan Auriol makes *explicit* mention of the Dominican Durand in his *Scriptum*, it is to criticize. Auriol thus judges that Durand's interpretation of Aquinas in the first redaction, that God knows the 'actual existence' of future contingents presently only according to their 'cognized being', is in vain. For one thing, according to Auriol, Durand must provide a specific alternative medium, if they are not known in themselves, for example via divine Ideas or, as Scotus holds, via the determinations of the divine will. Besides, although as we have seen Auriol realizes that Durand holds that God knows future contingents in their causes as reflected in the divine essence, this is not Aquinas's posi-

tion. In short, for Auriol, Durand's interpretation of Aquinas is both unfaithful to the original and untrue in its own right.<sup>93</sup>

The Dominican James of Lausanne, however, agrees with Durand on this point. In fact, most of the passage extant only in Durand's first redaction (text B) is included, sometimes verbatim, in James's own second redaction of his *Sentences* commentary (text C, ll. 128-48, 161-83). The following passages in James's text are colored by Palude's treatment, however, so that James's Durandism here is given a dose of Paludism. Whether James's entire discussion reflects an oral version of Palude is impossible to say, but the details of the nuances of James's interpretation of Durand will be treated below via Palude's reaction.

Following the 1309 Dominican General Chapter at Saragossa's strengthened order to defend Thomism, in ca. 1310-12 Durand removed all explicit mentions of Aquinas and all of the direct quotations, i.e. text B, and inserted paragraphs 1.12b-1.17 in text A. Although Durand's interpretation of Aquinas was becoming more popular, it still opposed the more common one among Aquinas's early Dominican successors, and perhaps Durand decided to play it safe. His new, anonymous presentation of the opposing stance (par. 1.12b) is a more carefully expressed and sophisticated explanation of how time relates to eternity, and how future contingents are present to God from eternity, according to one view of Aquinas's position. In fact, Durand's new portrayal closely resembles Hervaeus Natalis's exposition in his *Sentences* commentary. If we assume that the final written version of Hervaeus's commentary was completed in 1309 or so, then Durand modified his own commentary in light of Hervaeus's, although he did not do so in the case of God's certitude via contingent causes.<sup>94</sup>

Whatever the General Chapter's or Hervaeus's role in this change was, however, Durand did not have to abandon his own criticism of the position itself. First he repeats the objection of Peter of Auvergne that he gave in the first redaction, that what is nothing in itself, cannot coexist with anything according to its actual

<sup>93</sup> See above, n. 70, and continuing in Peter Auriol, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, a. 1 (ed. Schabel, pp. 105-6, ll. 380-401).

<sup>94</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *I Sent.*, d. 36, pars 1, a. 1 (ed. Paris 1647, p. 151bC-D). Stella's alternative theory about the sequence of the three redactions would have to explain why Durand, under pressure from Hervaeus, would have actually departed from Hervaeus in the second redaction. Likewise, the *addition*, on Stella's scheme, of references to Aquinas in the B redaction would have to be explained.

being (par. 1.13; cf. text B, ll. 5-12). But Durand adds a new objection (par. 1.14), again very similar to and probably based on Hervaeus's own, although something similar is already present in James of Metz:<sup>95</sup> if all things that exist at some time really coexist with God from eternity, then they must also coexist with each other from eternity, because if X and Y both coexist with Z so that it is never true that X coexists with Z without it also being true that Y coexists with Z, then X and Y necessarily coexist with each other. This however entails that yesterday and today, which both coexist with God from eternity, coexist with each other, which is "impossible," just as the fact that both Easter and Pentecost coexist with Durand's "duration," does not mean that Easter and Pentecost coexist, because it is not even possible for them to coexist. Therefore the whole notion of real eternal coexistence must be rejected.

Second, Durand reiterates the difficulty that, even if future contingents were present from eternity, this would not affect the certitude of divine knowledge of them, otherwise God's knowledge would depend on things. God's knowledge does not differ depending on which things actually come about. "Therefore, since it is the same in divine knowledge whether or not the presence of things is posited, then it is in vain that future contingents are posited to be present to God from eternity in order that they are determinately known" (par. 1.16; cf. text B, ll. 13-19).

As with the rest of his commentary, Peter of Palude's article two is a point by point analysis of Durand's treatment (in this case in his second redaction), foreshadowing Palude's participation in 1314 on the examination commission for Durand's works. But in the context of the issue at hand in Durand's second sub-question, Durand's doctrine was apparently not in great need of correction. Palude agrees that "future contingents do not coexist with God before they exist" with respect to really existing, which would imply a contradiction that perhaps not even William de la Mare would have attributed to Aquinas. Palude then has to explain in what way

---

<sup>95</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *I Sent.*, d. 36, pars 1, a. 1 (ed. Paris 1647, p. 152aC); Jacobus de Metz, *I Sent.*, d. 38, a. 3 (ms. Troyes 992, f. 62vb): "Quecumque uni et eidem coexistunt inter se et simul coexistunt, quia quecumque uni et eidem sunt eadem inter se, sunt eadem saltem illa ydemptitate que sunt idem in tertio; modo per te, presens, preteritum, et futurum coexistunt conspectui divino, quia futurum cognoscit, ut dicit opinio, certitudine presentialitatis; ergo ille partes temporis simul inter se coexistunt, quod est impossibile, quia tunc presens tempus esset preteritum et e converso, et per consequens presens non esset presens nec futurum futurum."

future contingents do coexist: with respect to their "cognized and represented being." Interestingly, in his first redaction Durand approvingly gave the 'cognized being' interpretation of Aquinas's theory, as noted above, but he shied away from it in the second redaction. As for 'represented being', Palude explains that "all things that are to come (*sunt futura*) are reflected (*relucent*) in God's *essence*, not only as they exist in their causes... but also with respect to the being they *will* actually have in themselves" (par. 2.3.5). It is hard to see how this is very different from Durand's own position as expressed in paragraph 1.18.

Palude responds to Durand's second line of attack, which is not present in Hervaeus, in sensible fashion. When Durand claims that God's knowledge would depend on things, Palude does not think this is a serious problem, as there must be some difference on the part of what is known, because something that can exist but does not or will not is different from something that does or will actually exist. And so just as actual existence adds something to a thing's entity, it also adds something to its knowability. There is more that is represented in one case than in the other (par. 2.3.6). Of course Durand does not require this distinction in the first place, because knowledge through causes is enough to know what will and will not exist. For Palude, however, this knowledge via causes "would be sufficient for cognition of them, since it suffices for the cognition of things that are possible that will not exist. [But] they cannot be represented with respect to the being that they will have, but to the being that they would have if they existed." So for Palude, it is knowledge via causes which is insufficient for distinguishing between what will *actually* come about and what will not. Nevertheless both knowledges should be attributed to God, because He would know future contingents that much better (par. 2.3.5).

Palude's overall conclusion for this issue is worth quoting:

God knows that [future contingents] exist according to their real, proper being, because it belongs to perfection to have each way of knowing a thing that has a cause, namely in itself and in its cause. Nor is it sufficient for an astronomer to demonstrate an eclipse without his eye seeing it, nor for someone to see it without finding the cause. Whence because of their wonder they began to philosophize thus: if God did not know a future contingent in itself and in its cause, He would not know it perfectly. But this is not because the future which is not currently existing is actually present, but because it is actually represented. Thus just as Caesar was accustomed to watching the fights of gladiators in an emerald and in a mirror are seen two boxers fighting each other, in this way the divine essence is the mir-

ror in which all things are reflected from eternity more than they are reflected when they exist. And because a thing is knowable in itself before [it is knowable] in a disposition toward another, first the divine essence represents things with respect to their quiddities, and thus God knows them and they are actually represented and thus actually known. Next, because things are related to being known as to being, the divine essence represents future contingents according to the being that they have in it and in other causes, although they can be impeded and not impeded, and [it represents] how they will be impeded and will not be impeded. Last it represents them according to their actual being in themselves, because a thing has being in its cause before it has it in itself, for because God is going to make an effect, therefore it is future, not vice-versa. And in this order it is represented by God's essence and known by God's intellect (par. 3.2).

Palude is careful to stress that God first knows that He will cause, so that knowledge comes first (par. 2.3.7). John of Naples would agree: "God's doing, willing, and knowing with respect to creatures relate in a certain order, because doing presupposes willing and knowing, and willing presupposes knowing" (text D, ll. 80-2). James of Lausanne, more accepting of Durand than Palude, absorbs much of what is contained in Palude's quotation into his own presentation, in effect a mixture of Durand and Palude (text C, ll. 184-223).

Bernard Lombardi, however, who was reading either Durand's second redaction or Palude's presentation which repeats it, took a much less favorable approach to Durand. Bernard seems to think that Durand believed Aquinas to have held that God knows future contingents to actually exist, i.e. the first understanding Durand presented and rejected. But it is clear from his first redaction that Durand did not think this was Aquinas's stance, and even in the third redaction it should have been apparent to Bernard. When Bernard states that Durand argues thus: "what is nothing cannot be present or coexists etc.," and continues, "where it is plainly obvious that he says the Holy Doctor claims that future contingents actually exist, which the Holy Doctor never dreamed," one is tempted to reply that Durand never dreamed that Aquinas believed that either (text F, ll. 24-32).

The reason behind Bernard's anger, however, is his opinion that Aquinas meant that "God knows their determinate entities and quiddities *as if* they existed." Bernard explains that this is because God's intellect "ends" not at things but in the essence "where all possible things are reflected." Bernard continues his discussion for another few paragraphs, but as in the case of his refutation of knowledge of

future contingents via causes, one is left with the impression that he is an eclectic theologian who juggles too many ideas in too small a space. However well informed Bernard may have been on other issues, and whether or not he was independent and even leaned toward Durand elsewhere, the one thing that is consistent here is Bernard's explicit opposition to Durand in defense on Aquinas (text F, ll. 33-84).<sup>96</sup>

In Durand's third redaction he did not reinstate his explicit discussion of Aquinas. Rather he cut out more of what had been in the first redaction, i.e. the discussion of the three ways in which cognitions can differ (pars. 1.11c-e), and replaced it with a short statement (par. 1.12a) that some maintain that for knowledge of future contingents "it is required that created things be present to God with respect to their proper and actual existences," paraphrasing the last part of par. 1.11e. Inasmuch as the section removed involved areas of general agreement, its expulsion can be seen as a trimming down of unnecessary verbiage. Durand's critique appears to have had little effect on John of Naples, who, stressing that knowledge is of the necessary, claims that God must future contingents as they are present, because only in that way are they necessary, albeit necessary *ex suppositione* and not absolutely (text D, ll. 34-56).

No matter how the Dominicans expressed their position, however, it probably would not have convinced the Franciscans. Writing ca. 1319 Landulph Caracciolo would object:

When it is said that all things are present to God, either you understand it in real being, and this is impossible from eternity, or only in intelligible being. And I ask whether this being is some positive being distinct from the knower and knowledge. And it is certain that it is not, because it would also be real. But if it is not distinct from the knowledge itself, then it begs the question: God knows all things infallibly because He has all things in His knowledge.<sup>97</sup>

<sup>96</sup> One interesting side-issue is a little debate over the nature of eternity. See Durand, text A, par. 1.17, and Bernard, text F, ll. 51-64.

<sup>97</sup> Landulphus Caraccioli, *I Sent.*, d. 39, a. 2 (ed. C. Schabel, "Landulphus Caracciolo and a Sequax on Divine Foreknowledge," *AHDLMA* 69 (1999), pp. 324-5): "Cum dicitur quod omnia sunt in Deo presentia, aut intelligis in esse reali, et hoc est impossibile ab eterno, aut in esse solum intelligibili. Et quero si istud esse est aliquod esse positivum distinctum a cognoscente et cognitione? Et certum est quod non, quia etiam esset reale. Si autem non est distinctum ab ipsa notitia, tunc petitur principium: Deus novit omnia infallibiliter quia habet omnia in notitia sua."



*Necessity ex suppositione*

The one issue on which there was broad agreement among the Parisian Dominicans Durand addresses in his third sub-question, virtually unchanged in the three redactions: does God's knowledge (or foreknowledge) impose necessity on things? Although Durand goes to great length to explain the answer, his position can be summed up rather briefly. God wills things outside Himself contingently, and so He knows things outside Himself contingently, but because He is immutable, supposing that He wills something, He wills it necessarily *ex suppositione*, by that supposition. This is not absolute necessity, for He is able not to will it, and so absolute contingency is compatible with necessity *ex suppositione*. Durand also appeals to the composite and divided senses of propositions, in order to show how things can appear necessary in one way when they are really contingent (text A, pars. 1.19-27). These logical devices, just as the issue itself, stretched back to Boethius, became even more prevalent with Peter Lombard, and were further reinforced for the Dominicans through their use in the works of Thomas Aquinas. They were the common property of all later-medieval theologians, moreover, from Bonaventure to John Duns Scotus to Gregory of Rimini.<sup>98</sup>

It is not surprising, then, that Palude's reaction to this element of Durand's exposition is more fine-tuning than refutation (text A, pars. 2.4.1-3, 2.6.1a-3, 3.3). James of Lausanne's efforts in this regard are particularly impressive, article two of his distinction 38 being a lengthy explanation of the different types of necessity, benign and malignant, one might say, and how they apply to the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents (text C, ll. 264-422). John of Naples resorts to this solution in article four of his quodlibetal question (text D, ll. 57-92), and in article three of his distinction 38, Bernard Lombardi ceases his criticism of Durand to express his tacit agreement (text F, ll. 85-102). For whatever differences remain between these thinkers, these texts provide the interested scholar with some of the raw material for a study of modal theory and theology among the Dominicans at Paris, 1310-1330.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>98</sup> It is in his discussion of this issue, however, where Leff's analysis in *Bradwardine and the Pelagians*, pp. 179-87, breaks down, making Durand out to be an adherent of radical contingency.

<sup>99</sup> Although it would not be as interesting as H. Gelber's *It Could Have Been Otherwise: Modal Theory and Theology among the Dominicans at Oxford, 1310-1340*, forthcoming.

Only one Parisian thinker in these decades really took issue with this common solution: Peter Auriol. Among his attacks on the generally similar solutions of Peter Lombard, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Scotus, and Henry of Harclay, Auriol devotes considerable space to Durand. No Parisian Dominican after Auriol seems to have taken notice of Auriol's critique of the common approach for another century, when, after a long Dominican slumber, John Capreolus awoke to try to refute Auriol point by point. The history of the fourteenth-century Dominican role in the problem of divine foreknowledge and future contingents at Paris, and their role Parisian theology generally, virtually ceases in 1328.<sup>100</sup>

### Conclusion

Hester Gelber sees a certain "stodginess" in Parisian theology after Scotus, and she turns to the fresh air of Oxford for her studies.<sup>101</sup> But her emphasis on Dominican theologians may have led her to that assessment of Paris. We have seen that there was some latitude among the Dominicans with respect to their choice of position and their interpretation of Aquinas. Still, the Dominicans' early proclamation of Thomas Aquinas as the teaching doctor of the order may have served to stifle innovation at Paris, as the existence of the internal inquests in the order discussed above make clear. Durand's statements on the problem of divine foreknowledge were apparently not found to be suspect, but it is clear that, even on this topic, the energies of Dominican theologians at Paris tended to be channelled toward the defense and correct interpretation of Aquinas, rather than to independent thinking. Tellingly, the treatments of foreknowledge in the *Sentences* commentaries of James of Metz, Hervaeus, Durand, Palude, James of Lausanne, and Bernard Lombardi exhibit a uniformity of (Thomist) content – knowledge via causes, eternal presence, necessity *ex suppositione* – not seen in the more free-spirited Franciscans Auriol, Caracciolo, and Marchia, whose discussions are much longer than those of the Dominicans. Moreover, Dominican theology seems to have become ever more insulated, to the extent that on an issue like foreknowledge, even the leading Dominicans could completely ignore radically different formulations developed

<sup>100</sup> For Auriol's critique, see Petrus Aureoli, *Scriptum I*, d. 39, a. 3 (ed. Schabel, pp. 180-9, ll. 687-875), and Schabel, *Theology at Paris*, pp. 79-85 (on Capreolus and Auriol, pp. 305-8).

<sup>101</sup> Interview: <http://www.svtoday.com/svt/dec97/120797.htm>.

outside the order, those of John Duns Scotus and Peter Auriol. Thus while the Franciscans like Auriol kept up with Dominicans on the issue, the reverse is not true. Meanwhile Carmelites like Gerard of Bologna and Augustinians like Gerard of Siena were aware of trends in both of the two main mendicant orders, even though the Carmelites appear to be little more than bystanders, and the Augustinians had chosen their own teaching doctor in Giles of Rome.

Curiously, the Parisian Augustinians were to shake off their shackles in the 1330s with Michael of Massa and in the 1340s with Gregory of Rimini, Alphonsus Vargas of Toledo, and Hugolino of Orvieto, taking the lead from the Franciscans. Conversely, and perhaps paradoxically, the canonization of Aquinas in 1323 may have been the final nail in the coffin for Dominican theological innovation at Paris. It appears that, in their relative isolation at Oxford, the British Dominicans like Robert Holcot, Arnold of Strelley, and William Crathorn exploited their position to explore new intellectual paths, paths that figures such as Bernard Lombardi found closed at Paris.

### III

#### Notes to the Editions<sup>102</sup>

A: *Peter of Palude*, I Sent., distinction 38, question 3.

Contrary to an erroneous tradition, Peter of Palude's commentary on book I (and book II) of the *Sentences* has never been printed, but it survives in four more or less complete manuscripts, and another manuscript contains selected abbreviated questions. In 1961 Giuseppe Groppo published a critical edition of question 3 and article 1 of question 5 of the Prologue,<sup>103</sup> and we use his sigla:

<sup>102</sup> Unless noted, all editions are based on microfilms, and orthography is classicized.

<sup>103</sup> I.e. Groppo "La teologia," who argues convincingly for the non-existence of the printed edition for books I-II on pp. 222-3. Book IV was printed in Venice in 1493, books III-IV in Paris 1517-18 and in 1530. Groppo discusses the known manuscript witnesses for all four books on pp. 224-9, and on pp. 223-4, n. 25, Groppo lists modern printings of excerpts from book I and editions of questions from book II; this should be used to clarify and supplement R. Schönberger and B. Kible, *Repertorium edierter Texte des Mittelalters aus dem Bereich der Philosophie und angrenzender Gebiete* (Berlin 1994), #16575-80. Stella's article "A proposito de Pietro da Palude (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1)," does not contain an edition of Palude's question. On the mss. for Palude's commentary, see also Kaeppli, *Scriptores* III, # 3286.

B = Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, B II, 21


L = Barcelona, Archivio del Cabildo Catedral, 35

M = Bergamo, Biblioteca Civica Angelo Mai, γ, 7, 4

P = Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine, 898

R = Barcelona, Archivio de la Corona de Aragon, Ripoll 77 bis  
(selected qq.)

For physical descriptions of the manuscripts see Groppo ("La teologia," pp. 224-9) and the literature cited there. R does not contain the question edited below. B and L date from the first half of the fourteenth century, M from the later fourteenth century, and P is post-medieval. Based on this temporal sequence, the colophons in B and L (see below), and his edition, Groppo posited the following stemma (p. 250-3):



Although we cannot speak for R, and although Groppo has edited sections of the very beginning of the commentary whereas our text comes from near the end, we think that Groppo's stemma is highly unlikely. First, the question of the colophons. L ends with the following (Groppo, p. 224):

f. 204vb: "Explicit compilatio super primum Sententiarum fratris Petri da (Groppo's Italianism!) Palude, scripta per fratrem Petrum Falacha, completa in vigilia beatae Katerinae. Laus sit Trinitati et triclinio Trinitatis Virgini Mariae et sponsae Christi Katerinae et beato Dominico, cuius ordinis sunt compilorator et scriptor. Amen.

then immediately afterwards: "Hervaeus Jestini Brito complevit istud opus [*in margine*: Parisius] die sabbati in vigilia beati Andreae Apostoli fratri Geraldo de Ponte, praedicti ordinis, anno MCCC quintodecimo, quos Deus ducat ad gaudia paradisi. Amen."

f. 209vb: "Expliciunt tituli super primum *Sententiarum* fratris Geraldi de Ponte, Ordinis Praedicatorum, completi per Hervaeum Britonem. Deo gratias."

Joseph Koch thought that Peter Falacha completed a manuscript of book I on 24 November 1315, and five days later, on 29 November 1315, Hervaeus Jestini Brito finished copying the witness (for his confrère Gerald de Ponte) by adding the index. Since the three explicits and the text itself in the Barcelona (L) witness are all in the same hand, Koch logically concluded that Barcelona is merely a copy of the witness containing Falacha's text and Hervaeus's index.<sup>104</sup>

P.T. Stella later responded that it is more likely that Hervaeus was the scribe for the Barcelona (L) witness, which he completed on 29 November 1315 based on another, earlier witness that Falacha finished. It turns out that the Basel manuscript (B) includes the first colophon, i.e. that of Falacha, but not the second and third, and so Basel appeared to be Falacha's own witness and Barcelona is Hervaeus's copy. Moreover, since five days is hardly enough for Hervaeus to have copied the Barcelona manuscript, Falacha had to have completed the Basel witness in November 1314 at the latest.<sup>105</sup> Groppo agrees with Stella's assessment.

As Stella and Groppo point out, however, the Basel (B) witness has a explicit for the index that is different from that of Barcelona (L), and the text, index, and explicits in Basel (B) are all in the same hand. Since Barcelona does not contain all of Basel's explicits, this left open the possibility that both Hervaeus (of L) and the scribe of the Basel witness were copying the same *common* exemplar, perhaps the archetype, composed by Falacha. Thus Hervaeus and the Basel scribe both copied Falacha's colophon, but only Hervaeus (of L) chose to identify himself, and both Hervaeus and the Basel scribe added their own different colophons to the index. Since is it often — in fact, usually — the case that scribes of scholastic texts do not identify themselves, the stemma should have been based mainly on the variant readings in the critical edition, i.e. solid philological criteria.

Groppo recognized this possibility (p. 251), but he could not bring himself to accept it. Instead he preferred (p. 252) the scenario that Gerald de Ponte, for whom Hervaeus was copying B, pointed out to Hervaeus where the Falacha manuscript (which Groppo thought was B) erred, using the lost witness X. So in order to accommodate his stemma and account for the fact that Barcelona (L) often reads better than Basel (B), which has many omissions *per*


<sup>104</sup> J. Koch, "Zu Codex 35 des Archivo del Cabildo Catedral de Barcelona," AFP 13 (1943), pp. 101ff.; cf. Groppo, "La teologia," pp. 224-5.

<sup>105</sup> Stella, "A proposito di Pietro da Palude," pp. 245ff.; cf. Groppo, p. 225.

*homeoteleuton*), and that Bergamo (M) sometimes reads better than Barcelona, Groppo had to posit a separate tradition, to which the scribes of Barcelona and of Bergamo's lost exemplar had access, and from which the selected and abbreviated questions in R stem. Although as we have said, R does not contain the present text, we see no reason to posit this separate tradition. The following table contains a rough count of variants:

Sigla	A	B	C	
B	23	18/80	62	
L	15	9/56	43	A = unshared one-word omissions
M	17	5/26	55	
P	16	2/5	44	B = unshared large om. vs. total words omitted
BL	4	0	5	
MP	29	11/82	58	C = other unshared variants

The fact that B, L, and MP all have many unshared large omissions immediately suggests that there are three independent traditions. Indeed, L appears slightly superior to B, although on occasion B's scribe shows himself to be adept at interpolation (L's scribe does so as well, to a lesser extent). Since it is very rare that BL share a clear *error* vs. MP, it is not necessary to posit a common exemplar for BL different from that of MP: they probably all stem from the manuscript copied by Peter Falacha, which may be the archetype, although this is unlikely since there are a few common errors in BLMP and a large omission *per homeoteleuton* at l. 318. Either M and P share a common exemplar stemming from Falacha's manuscript, or P is based on M. The lack of large unshared omissions in M suggests the latter, as Groppo had surmised. M does have quite a few minor unshared variants, but it is obvious that P's scribe was very careful and very intelligent, based on its small number of significant unshared errors and on the many obvious and clever interpolations where M errs, but where P's sensible reading nevertheless disagrees with B and L. Thus in the cases of M's 70+ unshared variants and one-word omissions, P could be making a correct interpolation. This is Groppo's interpretation (p. 250), and he cites in support some 16<sup>th</sup> or 17<sup>th</sup> century corrective marginalia in M. Thus this appears to be the simplest possible stemma, although M and P may share a common exemplar:



In the edition we have almost always gone with the majority reading, except in cases of obvious error. Sometimes in cases of doubt we appealed to D3, the Venice 1571 edition of Durand's commentary, or D1, the first redaction, from Friedman's edition. In certain instances we have gone with the interpolation of B or P, or even L. In a few cases (e.g. ll. 344 and 412) all manuscripts (and even D3) are in error. In the apparatus criticus we ignore the differences between *iste/ille*, *igitur/ergo*, *illud/id*, and *illum/eum*; we also ignore most corrections.

B: *Durand of St Pourçain, I Sent., distinction 38, question 3 (first redaction):*

Durand's first redaction is the same as the second redaction, except for ll. 173-247, replaced by text B, which is edited here. The edition, as far as we know the first for any of this redaction of book I, is based on five of the six manuscripts known to survive: Auxerre, Bibliothèque municipale 26, f. 42vb (A); Firenze, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 440, ff. 68va-b (F, see below); Melk, Stiftsbibliothek 611, ff. 154va-155ra (M); Paris, Bibliothèque nationale lat. 14454, ff. 96vb-97rb (Y); and Paris, Bibliothèque nationale lat. 12330, ff. 45vb-46ra (Z). Due to library modifications the sixth witness, Nürnberg, Stadtbibliothek III 79, is temporarily unavailable, and according to Decker, although it carries a good text, it is missing several quires.<sup>106</sup> Perhaps one or both of Saint-Omer, Bibliothèque municipale 332 and 338, carry the first redaction as well. (The Paris and Florence manuscripts were examined *in situ*.) Based on this small section of text, YZ have many common errors; Y is rather poorer, and could but probably does not stem from Z. AF have common readings, and they are both better witnesses. M also carries a good text, but appears to be independent of AF and YZ. There seems to be general confusion in l. 6, and perhaps an interpolation by A and M in l. 15. The edition almost always follows the majority of the manuscripts. All variants are recorded with the exception of some transpositions of words, corrections, and such minor things as *igitur/ergo*. A more substantial manuscript study will accompany the publication of a critical edition of distinction 11 in the near future.

<sup>106</sup> Decker, *Gotteslehre*, p. 20. For modern editions of a few questions of book II from the first (and second, in one case) redactions, see Schönberger and Kible, *Repertorium*, #12468-71.

Friedman was able to consult several manuscripts of Durand's *Sentences* commentaries, in which the version of the work had not been confirmed:

(F) Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 440  
Parchment, mm 304 x 226, ff. i + 148 + i, coll. 2; late 14th or early 15th century hand, text often corrected in the margins with same hand.

1) Durand of St. Pourçain, I *Sentences* (A)

f. 1ra: Circa primum Sentenciarum primo queritur utrum theologia sit sciencia. Et arguitur quod non: sciencia est virtus intellectualis...; f. 86vb: ... qui non vult illud quod Deus vult, scilicet eum velle. Explicit primus liber Sentenciarum secundum (new hand over erasure) fratrem Durandum de ordine fratrum predicatorum; ff. 87r-88v: blank

2) Durand of St. Pourçain, II *Sentences* (B)

f. 89ra: Circa secundum librum Sentenciarum queritur primo utrum Deus potuerit aliquid creare ab eterno. Et videtur quod non ...; f. 148va: ... idem, scilicet ipse Deus, qui est benedictus in secula. Amen. Explicit secundus (erasure follows, difficult to read) ... compilatus a fratre ...; there follows on f. 148va a list of the first eight questions of book I.

Occasional marginal notation: Herveus (23vb), Godefridus (34ra), Egidius (42va), Scotus (44ra), Herveus Brito (47rb), Godefridus (49ra), Scotus (f. 50vb), ratio Hervei (f. 52va), Egidius (f. 60ra, f. 61ra), Herveus (f. 65va), Herveus (f. 84va), Scotus (f. 101ra), Egidius (f. 103va).

To confirm that the copy of II *Sentences* found in San Marco 440 is the B version, the text of d. 3 was investigated. The B version is unique because it has only two questions in this distinction, whereas both the A and the C versions have eight (for the B version of this distinction, Durand dropped all of the material on individuation and angelic psychology contained in the A and C versions). The text of distinction 3 in San Marco 440 has two questions that correspond completely to those found in the Melk manuscript (mentioned above n. 39): "Ecce ostensum est." Circa distinccionem istam primo queritur utrum angelus sit compositus ex materia et forma. Arguitur quod sic ... (94ra-vb = A & C, d. 3, q. 1); Postea queritur utrum angeli sint in aliquo magno numero. Et videtur quod non ... (94vb-95rb = A & C, d. 3, q. 4). The question immediately following belongs to d. 4: "Post hoc videndum." Circa distinccionem istam primo queritur utrum omnes angeli fuerint creati in gratia (?). Et videtur quod non ... (95va).

Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, San Marco 442  
Parchment, mm 292 x 203, ff. i + 120 + i, coll. 2; late 14th or early 15th century hand.

1) Durand of St. Pourçain, I *Sentences* (C):

f. 1ra: (red ink) Incipit prologus super Scriptum primi Sentenciarum secundum magistrum Durandum de Sancto Portiano ordinis fratrum predicatorum (end red). Est Deus in celo revelans misteria ... Bene-



dictus Deus veritatis. Amen. (red ink) Prologus super secundum librum Sentenciarum secundum eundem. Est Deus in celo revelans misteria. etc. Sicut dictum fuit a principio ... This text ends abruptly halfway down f. 2rb, rest of folio 2 is blank; f. 3ra: (red ink) Incipit novum scriptum super primum Sentenciarum compilatum a venerabili patre et domino fratre Durando ordinis fratrum predicatorum (end red). Cupientes aliquod de penuria etc.; f. 118rb: ... qui est Deus benedictus in secula seculorum. Amen. Explicit novum scriptum super primum Sentenciarum compilatum per venerabilem patrem fratrem Durandum de Sancto Portiano ordinis fratrum predicatorum; ff. 118va-19va: tabula quaestionum; f. 120 blank.

To confirm that the version of the text contained in this manuscript is indeed C, d. 38, q. 3 was checked against the printed edition.

*Durand of St Pourçain, I Sent., distinction 38, question 3 (third redaction):*

Durand's third redaction is the same as the second redaction, except for ll. 144-71 (and therefore it is also substantially the same as the first redaction, aside from the section mentioned just above). In three cases the third redaction has material not found in the Palude edition, at ll. 172, 318, and 400. We print this material in the *apparatus fontium*, from the Venice edition of 1571.<sup>107</sup> In the case of the material at l. 172, it is clear that Durand added this section to the third redaction, because it corresponds with the section of text where the changes occur between the first and second redactions. The passage at l. 400 is also extant in the first redaction, so either Palude omitted it (erroneously or on purpose) or, less likely, Durand removed it for the second redaction and reinserted it later. At l. 318, however, the surviving witnesses of Palude's text share an omission *per homeoteleuton* of 22 words. Minor variants between Durand's printed third redaction and Palude's rendering of Durand's second redaction are, with few exceptions, not noted, since we do not possess a critical edition of the third redaction.

C: *James of Lausanne, I Sent., distinction 38 (second redaction):*

James of Lausanne's *Sentences* commentary for book I, of which nothing seems to have been edited, is extant in two redactions, but the first one is merely an *expositio textus* summarizing

<sup>107</sup> This edition is widely available on microfilm from the Vatican and in a 1964 reprint by The Gregg Press. There are, of course, many other editions.

what the Magister *Sententiarum* had to say. For the second redaction, distinction 38 survives in two witnesses: Praha, Metropolitan Kapituly 446 (C 27) (P), which contains books I-II and IV; and Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, lat. 1542 (W), containing books I-II.<sup>108</sup> P contains the present text on ff. 51rb-53va, W on ff. 44ra-46ra. Based on this section of text it appears that P was W's exemplar. With insignificant exceptions (an erroneous addition of "ex" in l. 40, and a "quae" in l. 265 later corrected to "qua" in W), all of the errors are W's. In many cases W's scribe was probably confused by P's abbreviation (e.g. ll. 56, 101-2, 241-2, and 294) or correction (ll. 112, 367, and 401). At one point (l. 267) P gives an alternative phrase from Durand in the lower margin, but W inserts it in the text itself and thereby destroys the sense. The text is often corrupt.

D: *John of Naples, Quodlibet X, question 6:*

According to Glorieux, John of Naples's *Quodlibet X* survives in two manuscripts: Napoli, Biblioteca nazionale VII. B. 28 (N); and Tortosa, Archivo de la Catedral, Codex 244 (T).<sup>109</sup> It is labelled "decimum quodlibet" in N, but it is not in the correct sequence in that witness. The present question is labelled number six in both manuscripts, although it is number five in Glorieux's list. N contains the text on ff. 15ra-va, and T on 152rb-vb. The text that both N and T supply is excellent, and the number of variants is extremely low, which suggests that both manuscripts are close to the archetype and that the tradition never included very many manuscripts. Indeed, either one of the manuscripts could be based on the other. All the variants, including corrections, are included in the apparatus.

<sup>108</sup> Cf. Frederick Stegmüller, *Repertorium commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi I* (Würzburg 1947), pp. 185-6. Ms. Maihingen, Fürstl. Bibliothek II Lat. 1, Fol. 1 (now in Augsburg's Universitätsbibliothek), which contains the first redaction (books I-IV) on ff. 1-45ra, preserves the material up to and including d. 19 of book I of the second redaction on ff. 46-75vb (and not ff. 46-86, as Stegmüller claimed). Cf. Günter Hägele, *Lateinische mittelalterliche Handschriften in Folio der Universitätsbibliothek Augsburg* (Wiesbaden 1996), pp. 95-6. Like Wien, ÖNB lat. 1468 and 4593, Krakow, Cathedral Chapter Library 111 (books I-IV) contains the *expositio textus* of book I and not the second redaction, contrary to Stegmüller and Kaeppli, *Scriptores III*, # 2084-5. On the two redactions and fragments, see Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 279-85. Martin, *La controverse sur le péché originel*, pp. 287-306, edited dd. 30-2 of book II from Wien 1542.

<sup>109</sup> Cf. P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique de 1260 à 1320 II* (Kain, Belgium 1925), pp. 159-73; Kaeppli, *Scriptores III*, # 2528. For previous editions of questions from John's *quodlibeta*, see Schönberger and Kible, *Repertorium*, 14557 and 14566-73, to which we add Mauro Mantovani's edition of *Quodlibet I*, q. 13, and *Quodlibet*

E: *Hervaeus Natalis, Quodlibet V, question 6:*

Fragments of Hervaeus's *Quodlibet V* survive in Venezia, Biblioteca Marciana 139 (2010), ff. 203r-204r (qq. 12-13), and Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine 435, ff. 140-143 (qq. 9-11) but neither manuscript contains question 6. Thus the only witness appears to be the Venice 1513 edition, which contains question 6 on ff. 119vb-120rb.<sup>110</sup> Since the text is brief and is the only known published Parisian Dominican question on future contingents dated to the 1310s, we reproduce it here.

F: *Bernard Lombardi, I Sent., distinction 38 (excerpts):*

According to Frederick Stegmüller, only three manuscripts preserve this particular distinction: Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, C.A. 2° 368 (E), containing books I-II; Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 542 (L), books I-III; and Napoli, Biblioteca nazionale VII. G. 98 (N), book I.<sup>111</sup> This is the first edition to use all three witnesses. Only the text original to Bernard is given in the edi-

II, q. 5, in "Due questioni inedite di Giovanni di Napoli su temi gioachimiti," *Florensia* 13/15 (1999-2000), pp. 259-80.

<sup>110</sup> Cf. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique* I, pp. 200-208; and Kaeppli, *Scriptores* III, # 1895. Glorieux II, p. 139, expresses doubts about the authenticity of some of the *Quodlibeta* published in the Venice 1513 edition, and thinks *Quodlibet V* may belong to Yves of Caen (1312-13).

<sup>111</sup> Cf. Stegmüller, *Repertorium* I, pp. 52-3; Kaeppli, *Scriptores* I, # 640. Contrary to Stegmüller, Leipzig does not contain book IV (and book III is incomplete). A few other distinctions from book I (and books II-IV) are contained in apparently reworked form (especially for books III-IV) in München, Staatsbibliothek Cfm 13501, from which ms. Ludwig Ott, *Die Lehre des Durandus*, pp. 137-47, published parts of Bernard's book IV, lects. 21-22. As Victorin Doucet notes (correcting Stegmüller), *Commentaires sur les Sentences. Supplément au Répertoire de M. Frédéric Stegmüller* (Florence 1954), p. 18, the book II contained in the Naples ms. belongs to Durand and not Bernard. Finally, Milano, Ambrosiana H 44 contains book III, although it is missing two of the questions contained in Leipzig. On Bernard's mss., see also Koch, *Durandus*, pp. 318-22. Stanislaw Andrzej Porebski, "La question de Bernard Lombardi concernant la différence réelle entre l'essence et l'existence," *Mediævalia Philosophica Polonorum* 17 (1973), pp. 157-85, prints Leipzig's *tabula quaestionum* for books I-III of the *Sentences* commentary and for Bernard's *Quodlibet*, and publishes a transcription of book I, q. 21, from Leipzig (reprinted in *Opera philosophorum medii ævi* 2 [1978], pp. 103-20). As in the case of d. 38, Bernard borrowed heavily from Durand in q. 21, but also from Peter Auriol. Cf. Chris Schabel, "Parisian Commentaries from Peter Auriol to Gregory of Rimini, and the Problem of Predestination," in Evans, ed., *Medieval Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences*, pp. 221-65.

tion. The remainder corresponds to material in the Palude edition, which could have come from any of the three versions of Durand's commentary (or, indeed, from Palude's itself), since Bernard does not copy any of the section that Durand changed from redaction to redaction. In the edition, the paragraphs of the text in Palude that are copied by Bernard are supplied in the required places.

E contains distinction 38 on ff. 118vb-120rb, L on ff. 69ra-70vb, and N on ff. 47vb-49rb. All three manuscripts are quite good, but N appears to carry a reworked version of the text contained in EL. There are frequent significant variants where both versions make equally good sense, but in cases when EL refer to Thomas Aquinas as "Doctor," N says "Sanctus Doctor." Whether this means that the text in EL was originally prepared before Aquinas's canonization in 1323 is unknown, but it is an interesting question which affects our *terminus ante quem* for Durand's third redaction.

Because of its apparent maturity, and a few superior readings, N is used as the base manuscript. In some cases, for the sake of clarity, text is included that was elided or abbreviated in N as unnecessary, as in ll. 72-3, ll. 87-9, and ll. 95-6. In the latter instance, only E contains the text, but it is uncertain whether it is E's interpolation, an omission of LN, an elision of LN, or something else. In ll. 62-63 it seems that E did attempt to modify the text, probably unnecessarily. In any case, both E and L are good witnesses. In the apparatus all variants are quoted, but corrections are ignored.

*Dionysius de Burgo Sancti Sepulchri, OESA, I Sent., distinction 38, q. 3*

Dionysius's commentary survives in only one witness: Erfurt, Wissenschaftliche Bibliothek, C.A. 2° 131,<sup>112</sup> the present question being on ff. 89va-91rb. Since Dionysius borrowed most of his material from Durand (or Palude), his *entire* 'original' contribution can be quoted here. First Dionysius has pars. 1.1-3 in full, and parts of 1.4a, 1.5-6a, and 1.11a-b. Then, continuing from Durand's "futura" (cf. Durandus, ed. Venice 1571, p. 104va, para. 11; hic infra, par. 11b, l. 138), Dionysius adds: "Quod patet tripliciter..." the first way being in agreement with Durand, then "... Secundo sic: illa Deus cognoscit quorum est causa; sed est causa futurorum contingen-

<sup>112</sup> Cf. Stegmüller, *Repertorium* I, pp. 78-9. For a question list and other information, see Damasus Trapp, "The Quaestiones of Dionysius de Burgo O.S.A.," *Augustinianum* 3.1 (1963), pp. 63-78.

tium; ergo etc. Maior supponitur, cum sit causa per intellectum et voluntatem. Minor probatur, quia nihil habens aliquam entitatem Dei subterfugit causalitatem; ergo etc. Tertio sic: eternum non concernit tempus; ergo omnia, sive futura sive presentia sive preterita, sunt presentia eternitati; sed Deus est eternus et eternitate mensuratur; ergo etc." (cf Durand 1.23). Afterwards Dionysius continues with most of par. 1.19; all of par. 1.20; part of par. 1.21; and all of pars. 1.22-23. Since therefore Dionysius omits all of pars. 11c-17, where there are the differences between the three Durand redactions, it is impossible to tell which redaction Dionysius employs in this particular case.

---

\* Balcoyiannopoulou and Schabel were responsible for text A; Friedman for part I of the introduction and text B; Friedman and Schabel for part III of the introduction; and Schabel for part II of the introduction and texts C-F.

**Petri de Palude *In primum librum Sententiarum*  
Distinctio 38, quaestio tertia**

**<Pars prima: Durandi distinctio 38, quaestio tertia>**

[*Durandi redactiones prima, secunda, et tertia*] Tertio quaeritur utrum Deus sciat futura contingentia.

[1.1] Et videtur quod non, quia omne scitum a Deo de necessitate eveniet; sed nullum futurum contingens de necessitate eveniet; ergo nullum  
5 tale est a Deo scitum. Minor patet ex proprijs rationibus terminorum. Probatio maioris: accipiamus aliquod futurum scitum a Deo, puta quod Sortes curret cras. Aut igitur necessario curret, aut possibile erit [B 220vb] eum non currere. Si necessario curret, habetur propositum. Si non necessario curret, sed possibile est eum non currere, ponatur in esse, quia secundum  
10 Aristotelem, "possibili posito in esse," et cetera. Ponatur ergo in esse quod Sortes non curret; sed Deus scit quod curret; ergo scientia Dei fallitur, quod est impossibile.

[1.2] Item, omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium et consequentia necessaria, et consequens est necessarium; sed haec est quaedam  
15 conditionalis: 'si Deus praescivit ·a· fore, ·a· erit', cuius antecedens est necessarium, tum quia aeternum, tum quia praeteritum, et consequentia necessaria, quia oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedente; ergo consequens est necessarium. Et eodem modo arguam de quolibet futuro contingente.

[1.3a] Item, ex maiore de necessario et minore de inesse sequitur  
20 conclusio de necessario, primo *Priorum*. Inde sic: omne scitum a Deo necessario est verum; sed ·a· fore est scitum a Deo; ergo necessario est verum quod ·a· erit, et sic idem quod prius.

[1.3b] Si dicatur quod haec est duplex: 'scitum a Deo necessario est  
25 verum', quia potest esse de dicto, et sic est vera et composita sub hoc sensu: scitum a Deo, in quantum scitum, necesse est esse verum; vel potest esse

---

3-34 Sunt argumenta principalia Thomae, aliquando verbatim: Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, argumenta 3-6 (ed. R.P. Mandonnet, vol. 1, Paris 1929, pp. 907-08).

9-10 Aristoteles, *Analytica priora* I, c. 13: 32a19-20 (AL III.1, p. 26.14-15).

13-14 Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica priora* I, c. 2: 25a5-26 (AL III.1, p. 7.3-25).

20-21 Cf. Aristoteles, *Analytica priora* I, c. 9: 30a15-23 (AL III.1, p. 21.3-11).

---

1 deus *om.* M    5 tale *om.* MP    7 curret!] currat L    10 ponatur] pone-  
tur P    14 consequentia... et *om. per homeo.* MP    17 antecedente] quod<->te  
*add.* L    18 futuro] futura P    21 inde] dicendo P    21-22 necessario est *inv.* B  
24 haec est duplex] hic est duplex sensus P || necessario est] necesse est esse P

de re, et sic est divisa et falsa sub hoc sensu: illud, quod est scitum a Deo, necesse est esse verum. Sed contra hoc arguitur, quia ista distinctio locum solum habet in formis separabilibus sine quibus potest esse subiectum, non autem in formis inseparabilibus (nullus enim distinguit hanc, 'cignum album possibile est esse nigrum', quia albedo non est separabilis a cigno, nisi secundum rationem; unde quod non potest simul esse cum albo, non potest simul esse cum cigno); sed esse scitum est conditio inseparabiliter se habens ad omne futurum; ergo illa distinctio non habet hic locum.

[1.4a] In contrarium est quia illa quae fiunt ab agente libero et habente dominium sui actus, possunt non fieri, est enim haec natura liberi arbitrij; sed multa fiunt ab agente libero et habente dominium sui actus, ut merita et demerita nostra; ergo possunt non fieri. Fiunt ergo contingenter; sed Deus talium habet cognitionem, cum remuneret merita et puniat demerita, et ab aeterno cognoscit ea antequam fiant, alioquin scientiae eius aliquid accresceret; ergo Deus cognoscit futura contingentia.

[Additio Petri] [1.4b] Responsio: hic sunt tria facienda, quia primo recitabuntur circa hoc dicta aliorum, secundo inquiretur de ipsis dubitative et sine assertionem, tertio concludetur quid tenendum est probabilius [Finis additionis Petri].

#### <Articulus primus Petri>

[1.5] Quantum ad primum, ad solutionem quaestionis duo praemittenda sunt: primum est quid vocamus futurum contingens et quot sunt modi futuri contingentis; secundum est de modo cognoscendi contingentis.

#### <Articulus primus Durandi>

[1.6a] Quantum ad primum sciendum quod res, antequam sit in actu secundum esse suae existentiae, solum habet esse in causis suis et dicitur futura. Causarum autem invenitur triplex gradus: quaedam enim sunt necessariae in se et in ordine ad effectus, sicut est motus coeli in comparatione ad eclipses et ad alios effectus qui ex motu orbium necessario [M 302ra] eveniunt. Et effectus praeeistentes in talibus causis sunt quidem futuri, sed non contingentes, immo sunt [P 528a] necessarij. Quedam autem aliae sunt causae quae non sunt necessariae, saltem in comparatione ad effectus, ut eos

35-41 Cf. Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, sed contra (ed. cit, pp. 908-09).  
49-76 Cf. e.g. Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 910).

30 inseparabilibus] separabilibus P || enim] autem L 31 separabilis] separabili P 32 unde om. B || quod] nigredo P || simul esse inv. P 32-33 albo... cum om. per homeo. MP 33 scitum] a deo add i.m. B || conditio] cum deo MP 35 contrarium] contra M || quae om. L || agente] agent L 36 habente] etiam add. M 40 cognoscit] cognoscat L 43 aliorum] aliquorum L 44 tenendum est inv. L; tenendum sit P 48 modo] non L 49 in om. B 50 habet esse] est MP

- necessario producant, immo possunt non producere. Et effectus praeexi-  
 stentes in talibus causis sunt futuri et contingentes. Et horum triplex est  
 differentia, quia quaedam causae contingentes determinatae sunt ad pro-  
 60 ducendos suos effectus ut frequenter, nec deficiunt nisi raro, ut quod homo  
 generetur cum quinque digitis solum. Hoc enim evenit ut in pluribus, raro  
 autem evenit ut generetur cum pluribus vel paucioribus quam quinque.  
 Effectus igitur talium causarum, dum praeexistunt in eis, sunt futuri et con-  
 tingentes, sed quidam eorum sunt contingentes ut frequenter, quidam raro.  
 65 Aliae vero sunt causae quae de se nullam habent determinationem ad pro-  
 ducendum hunc effectum vel non producendum, sed indifferenter se habent  
 ad utrumque, sicut est liberum arbitrium, ut Sortem currere vel non cur-  
 rere. Et effectus praeexistentes in talibus causis sunt futuri et contingentes  
 ad utrumlibet. Ergo sunt in universo futura contingentia quaedam fre-  
 70 quenter, quaedam raro, quaedam ad utrumlibet. Patet etiam quod contin-  
 gens ad utrumlibet numquam dicitur per comparisonem ad causam agen-  
 tem ex necessitate naturae, illa enim semper determinata est ad unum, nisi  
 impediatur, quod fit raro. Sed dicitur per comparisonem ad causam agen-  
 tem libere, quae potest agere et non agere, quae, ut sic, numquam aliquid  
 75 producit [L 174rb] determinate, cum sit aequae indifferens ad opposita,  
 propter quod qua ratione produceret unum, et alterum.

<Articulus secundus Durandi>

- [1.6b] Quantum ad secundum, de modo cognoscendi contingens, sciendum  
 est quod contingens et quaelibet res alia potest cognosci dupliciter [B  
 221ra]: uno modo in causa sua, alio modo in sua existentia, alio enim modo  
 80 cognoscitur de milite quod debeat pugnare quando video illum armari et  
 alio quando video eum actu pugnare.

- [1.7] His suppositis, descendunt ad quaestionem, circa quod primo  
 inquirunt utrum de futuris contingentibus possit haberi certa cognitio  
 solum ex causis suis; secundo, utrum Deus habeat certam cognitionem de  
 85 futuris contingentibus secundum propriam et actualem eorum existentiam;  
 et tertio, quomodo stat certitudo divinae scientiae cum contingentia rerum.

<Quaestio prima articuli secundi Durandi>

- [1.8] Quantum ad primum dicunt quidam quod de contingente non

---

87-96 Cf. Aquinas, *Scriptum I*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 910); *Summa  
 theologiae I*, q. 14, a. 13 (*Opera Omnia IV*, ed. Leonis, Rome 1888, p.186b).

---

59 contingentes... sunt] determinatae sunt contingentes B 61 hoc enim *inv.*  
 P 62 autem] aut M 66 habent] habet MP 71-72 agentem] et *add.* L  
 75 producit] determinate *add.* B 78 quod] est *add.* L || res alia *inv.* M  
 79 causa sua *inv.* P || alio<sup>2</sup>] ergo M; primo (?) P 82 circa *om.* M; et P  
 83 inquirunt] est *add.* P 87 quidam *om.* L



potest haberi certa scientia ex causa sua, sed solum coniecturalis, quod probant sic: quicumque cognoscit rem aliquam per talem causam, qua posita, potest poni res, vel effectus, vel non poni, non habet de illa re certam cognitionem, sed fallibilem et coniecturalem; sed qui cognoscit futurum contingens solum per causam suam, cognoscit ipsum per causam talem, qua posita, adhuc effectus potest poni vel non poni, cum sit impedibilis; ergo et cetera. Et ideo dicunt quod, si Deus haberet cognitionem solum de futuro contingente per causam suam contingentem et impedibilem, non haberet de eo certam cognitionem. 90 95

[1.9] Sed istud non videtur verum, quia sicut ex causa necessaria sequitur effectus necessarius infallibiliter, sic ex causa impedibili, si non sit impedita, sequitur effectus contingens infallibiliter, nisi quod haec infallibilitas est ex suppositione [M 302rb], prima autem secundum se et absolute. Et eodem modo, a causa indifferente et impedibili, si determinetur et non impediatur, sequitur effectus infallibiliter. Igitur sicut in causa necessaria praecognoscitur effectus necessarius certa cognitione, sic cognita causa impedibili et omnibus quae eam impedire possunt et insuper eis quae eam impediunt vel non impediunt, certitudinaliter potest cognosci quis effectus eveniet vel non eveniet. Et similiter, cognita causa indifferente et impedibili, si cum ea cognoscuntur omnia quae et eam determinare possunt et determinabunt et omnia quae eam impedire possunt et quae eam impediunt, potest infallibiliter cognosci quis effectus eveniet [P 528b]. Nunc autem Deus non cognoscit causam contingentem solum in se et absolute, quia sic in ea et per eam non cognoscitur aliquis effectus infallibiliter, nisi tantum coniectura probabili, ut bene dicunt alij. Sed cognoscit omnia quae eam determinare possunt et quae determinabunt, insuper cognoscit omnia quae eam impedire possunt et quae eam impediunt vel non impediunt. Ergo Deus in causa contingente sic cognita potest certitudinaliter cognoscere effectum futurum contingentem. 105 110 115

[1.10] Item, Deus non cognoscit alia a se nisi per cognitionem suae essentiae. Futura ergo contingentia, si novit, novit per naturam suae essen-

---

97-116 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 67 (*Opera Omnia* XIII, ed. Leonis, Rome 1918, p. 190b).

---

89 rem aliquam] aliquid P 95 contingente] contingentem P || et om. L 98 effectus necessarius *inv.* MP || impedibili] impediendi M || si non] sive M 101 eodem] eo L || indifferente] differente M 105 potest] possunt B 106 vel non eveniet *om. per homeo.* MP || indifferente *mg.*<sup>2</sup> B; *om.* LM; indifferenti P 107 si] sic BL || cum ea *inv. Bac*; non ea L || eam] ea L 108 eam<sup>1</sup>] ea L 109 potest infallibiliter cognosci] infallibiliter cognoscitur B 111 nisi] non M; sed P 112-113 omnia quae eam] eam quae omnia B 113-114 determinabunt... quae<sup>2</sup> *om per homeo.* L 114 eam<sup>1</sup> *om.* M 118 naturam] notitiam D3

120 tia. Aut ergo per hoc quod essentia sua est eorum causa, aut per hoc quod est eorum exemplar. Non per hoc quod est eorum exemplar, ut probatum fuit supra distinctione 36. Ergo per hoc quod est eorum causa. Ergo prima, immo tota, cognitio quam habet Deus de futuris contingentibus, est per eorum causam. Et sic patet primum.

<Quaestio secunda articuli secundi Durandi>

125 [1.11a] Quantum ad secundum, utrum Deus cognoscat futura contingencia quantum ad eorum actualem existentiam, sciendum quod istud potest habere duplicem intellectum: unum, utrum Deus cognoscat futura contingencia quantum ad suam actualem existentiam, id est ea actu existere. Et sic constat quod non, quia intellectus dicens esse quod non est, est falsus; sed futura contingencia nondum sunt actu, alioquin non essent  
130 futura, sed praesentia; ergo, si Deus intelligeret ea actu existere, intellectus eius esset falsus, quod est impossibile. Deus ergo non cognoscit futura contingencia quantum ad actualem existentiam sic quod cognoscat ea actu existere.

135 [1.11b] Alius potest esse intellectus, scilicet quod Deus cognoscat futura contingencia quantum ad eorum actualem existentiam, non quod Deus cognoscat ea iam existere, sed quia Deus novit ab aeterno illam propriam et distinctam existentiam actualem quam habebunt processu temporis in se ipsis. Et hoc modo Deus praecognoscit futura contingencia quantum ad eorum actualem existentiam, cuius ratio est: constat enim quod  
140 Deus cognoscit futurum contingens dum est praesens, puta Sortem currere, alioquin ego cognoscerem quod Deus ignoraret. Si igitur non cognoscebat hoc prius quando fuit futurum, sequitur quod aliquid accrevisset scientiae suae, quod est impossibile.

145 [Durandi redactiones prima et secunda] [1.11c] De hac ergo cognitione videndum est quomodo [B 221rb] differat a prima, qua Deus cognoscit futura contingencia per suas causas. Possunt enim aliquae cognitiones differere tripliciter: uno modo ex parte primarum potentialium cognitivarum, quia una est intellectiva, alia est sensitiva, iuxta quem modum differt cogni-

---

120-121 Cf. Durandus, *I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 3, a. 3 (ed. Venice 1571, f. 99rb, par. 25); Palude, *I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 2, opinio 6 (L 160ra).

---

119 aut<sup>1</sup> om. MP 123 patet] ad add. P 125 actualem om. P 128 est s.l. B; om. M 129 est falsus inv. B 131 eius] enim M 134 scilicet] secundum BM (et exp. B) 134-135 quod... existentiam om. B 135 non mg. B 136 quia om. BM 142 quod] quin M 144 de] praeterea (?) M; pro P || ergo] autem B 145 videndum] notandum MP 147 primarum om. P || cognitivarum] cognitivarum LB; cognoscitivarum P

tio quam habeo de eclipsi futura per causam [L 174va; M 302va] <ab illa> quam habeo de eclipsi dum est et eam actualiter intueor, quia prima est intellectiva et secunda sensitiva. Et hoc modo non possunt divinae cognitiones differe, cum in Deo non sint plures virtutes cognitivae. 150

[1.11d] Alio modo possunt differe ex parte cognitorum quia sunt de diversis cognitis, ut cum una est de eclipsi, alia est de terrae motu. Et hoc modo non differt cognitio quam habet Deus de futuro contingente per suam causam ab illa quam habet de eo quantum ad actualem existentiam. Cuius ratio est quia eadem actualis existentia est quam habet futurum contingens in se dum est effectus praesens et quae est effectus causarum ipsius contingentis. Et ideo idem realiter est cognitum de contingente quando cognoscitur ut effectus per causam et quando cognoscitur per suam actualem existentiam. 160

[1.11e] Tertio modo differunt aliquae cognitiones ex parte modi vel medij cognoscendi, sicut cognoscimus Deum nunc ex creaturis, et sicut postea cognoscemus eum in patria [P 529a] tamquam immediate praesentem intellectui nostro. Et hoc modo dicunt quidam quod differt cognitio quam habet Deus de futuris contingentibus per eorum causas ab illam quam habet de eis quantum ad suas proprias et actuales existentias, quia prima cognitio est rei secundum se absentis ut sic, secunda est rei praesentis. Omnia autem futura contingentia sunt ab aeterno praesentia Deo secundum suam actualem existentiam, et ideo, secundum eam, sunt ab aeterno a Deo cognita. 170

[1.12a: *Durandi redactionis tertiae additio in apparatu fontium*]

[*Durandi redactiones secunda et tertia*] [1.12b] Hoc autem declarant sic: aeternitas est duratio indivisibilis tota simul existens, et ideo quidquid coexistit aeternitati, coexistit toti. Constat autem quod omnia quae tempo- 175

172 Durandus addit in redactione tertia (ed. Venice, f. 104va): "Quidam tamen dicunt quod quantum ad istam cognitionem requiritur quod res creatae sint praesentes Deo quantum ad suas proprias et actuales existentias, quia prima cognitio, quae est per causam, est vel esse potest rei absentis, ista autem secunda cognitio est tantum praesentis. Qualiter autem futura contingentia possint esse Deo praesentia ab aeterno secundum suas proprias et actuales existentias..."

173-185 Cf. Aquinas, *Summa contra gentiles* 1, c. 66 (ed. cit., p. 185a-b); *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 911). Cf. etiam expositio Hervaei Natalis, *I Sent.*, d. 36, pars 1, a. 1 (ed. Paris 1647, p. 151bC-D).

149 futura] dum est [L 174va] quam habeo *add.* L || <ab illa> D1] et BL (*om.* MP) 149-150 per... est<sup>1</sup> *om.* M; a cognitione P || per... eclipsi *mg.* B (<ab illa>) et B) 150 de eclipsi *om.* L || et] qua P || actualiter] totaliter (?)B; *lac.* L; essentialiter M 152 cognitivae] cognoscitivae P 155 non *om.* M || deus *om.* MP 157 est<sup>2</sup> *om.* M 158 praesens... effectus<sup>2</sup> *iter.* MP (quae] qua P 2x) 162-163 ex... medij] modo vel medijs MP 166 eorum] earum BLM 167 habet] deus *add.* P 168 secundum] per B || secunda] secundo L 170 actualem] actualitatem B || et *om.* MP || eam] ea B 173 autem *om.* B 175 quod omnia *om.* B

raliter sunt, aeternitati coexistunt, eo quod ipsa semper existit. Propter quod quidquid quandoque coexistit aeternitati, coexistit ei semper. Igitur quaecumque sunt per differentias temporum, toti aeternitati coexistunt. Sed non coexisterent toti nisi ab aeterno coexisterent ei; ergo quaecumque sunt  
 180 secundum differentias temporum ab aeterno coexistunt Deo, cuius esse et cognitio sunt in aeternitate. Et hoc est quod consuetum est dici, quod aeternitas tota simul existens ambit totum tempus. Sic igitur dicunt quod futura contingentia sunt ab aeterno Deo praesentia secundum suam actualem existentiam, ac per hoc sunt ab aeterno determinate cognita, quia ut actu sunt  
 185 non sunt ad utrumlibet, sed sunt determinata ad unum.

[1.13] Sed hic videtur esse duplex defectus. Unus est de hoc quod dicitur, quod futura contingentia sunt ab aeterno Deo praesentia secundum suum esse actuale: quia quod nihil est in se, nulli potest realiter et actualiter coexistere, coexistere enim supponit existere; sed futura, non solum  
 190 contingentia sed quaecumque generaliter, ab aeterno nihil fuerunt in se secundum esse actuale, sed solum in potentia Dei creantis; ergo non potuerunt ab aeterno Deo coexistere secundum praesentialitatem suae actualis existentiae.

[1.14] Item, quaecumque coexistunt uni et eidem sic quod numquam  
 195 est verum de uno eorum quod coexistat illi quin sit verum de altero, illa necessario coexistunt sibi; sed si omnia coexistunt Deo ab aeterno, numquam est verum dicere quod dies hodierna coexisteret vel coexistat Deo quin illud idem sit verum de die hesterno; ergo dies hodiernus et hesternus sibi invicem coexistunt vel coexisterent. Hoc autem est impossibile [M  
 200 302vb]; ergo illud ex quo sequitur, scilicet quod omnia ab aeterno realiter coexistant Deo. Maior patet, quando enim duo coexistunt tertio sic quod uno eorum coexistente, aliud non coexistit, tunc non oportet quod illa duo coexistant sibi invicem, sicut durationi meae coexistunt Pascha et Pentecostes, sed uno coexistente, aliud non coexistebat. Et ideo non oportet quod  
 205 illa sibi invicem coexistant. Sed si numquam coexisteret unum mihi quin aliud coexisteret mihi, similiter et pro tunc necesse esset quod illa sibi invi-

---

194-209 Cf. Hervaeus Natalis, *I Sent.*, d. 36, pars 1, a. 1 (ed. cit., p. 152aB-C).

---

177 coexistit<sup>1</sup>] existit LMP, *Bac i.m.* || ei] et MP 178 sunt] sint MP || toti aeternitati *inv.* B (toti *mg.*) 179 ei *om.* BMP 180 deo *om.* B; ei *add. i.m.* B 181 sunt] est BLM || in] ab B 185 non sunt *om. per homeo.* B || sed *om.* B || sunt<sup>2</sup>] semper (?) L 186 defectus] effectus M 187 deo *om.* MP 188 in se *om.* B || potest] in se *add.* M 189 coexistere<sup>2</sup> *mg.* B; *om.* M 191 esse actuale] esse actuali L; rem actualem MP 195 sit] sint P 196 aeterno] nunc *add.* M 197 dicere *om.* B || dies hodierna coexisteret] (de *add.* P) die hodierno (quod *add.* P) coexisterit MP || coexistat] coexistunt M 198 hesterno] hesterna B 204 coexistente] coexistebit (!) M; existente P || coexistebat] existet P 205 coexistant] coexistunt B || mihi] tertio P 206 mihi] tertio P

cem coexisterent simul. Et haec fuit maior. Minor autem de se est manifesta. Si enim semper et ab aeterno omnia coexistunt Deo, numquam unum coexistit quin aliud coexistat. Sequitur ergo [B 221va] conclusio.

[1.15] Item, simultas, cum sit relatio, requirit extrema in actu, si sit actualis simultas; sed creaturae non fuerunt ab aeterno in actuali existentia; ergo non fuerunt simul cum Deo. 210

[1.16] Alius defectus est quia, dato quod futura contingentia essent ab aeterno hoc modo Deo praesentia, istud tamen nihil faceret ad hoc quod determinate et certitudinaliter cognoscerentur ab ipso, propter quod tamen illud ponitur, quia cognitio rerum a Deo in nullo dependet ab existentia rerum. Unde dato quod Deus nihil produxisset aut producturus esset, nihilominus habuisset ita perfectam et determinatam cognitionem de rebus, quantum ad earum quidditates et quantum ad earum existentiam actualem quam habere possent, sicut [P 529b] nunc habet, alioquin futuritio rerum, secundum aliquam differentiam temporis, esset causa distinctae cognitionis in Deo, quod est inconueniens [L 174vb]. Et tamen, si nihil fuisset aut futurum esset, tunc res non essent Deo praesentes ab aeterno realiter secundum esse actuale aliquod, quia nullum habiturae essent in tempore, et illa praesentia non ponitur nisi quia aeternitas ambit totum tempus. Propter quod quidquid ponitur in esse secundum aliquam differentiam temporis, ponitur semper esse praesens aeternitati. Cum igitur idem sit apud cognitionem divinam posita praesentia rerum vel non posita, frustra ponuntur contingentia futura ab aeterno esse Deo praesentia ad hoc ut sint ab eo cognita determinate. 215 220 225 230

[1.17] Ad rationem in oppositum, cum dicitur, "quidquid coexistit aeternitati coexistit toti et quidquid coexistit toti coexistit ei ab aeterno," dicendum quod, cum aeternitas sit duratio non habens partem et partem intra se, nec habens principium et finem quibus claudatur, ideo totalitas aeternitatis potest accipi dupliciter: uno modo excludendo partem, alio modo excludendo principium et finem. Et secundum hoc aliquid dicitur dupliciter coexistere aeternitati toti: uno modo quia non coexistit uni parti tantum, et sic quidquid coexistit aeternitati, coexistit toti, quia non coexi-

231 Cf. par. 1.12b supra.

208 enim semper *inv.* B 209 coexistit] coexistet P 210 si] simul M  
 213 quia] quod MP 215 et *om.* B 219 et] sed L || existentiam] naturale *exp.*  
 BL 220 habet] habent L 222 nihil] ? (*s.l.*) M 225 tempus] potest M  
 226 quidquid] de *add.* L 228 ponuntur] ponitur B 229 contingentia] sed *add.*  
 M; seu *exp.* P || esse deo *inv.* L || ad hoc] adhuc M 231 coexistit] existerat M  
 232 aeternitati *om.* B || toti *om.* P || quidquid] aeternitati *add.* P || coexistit<sup>2</sup>] exi-  
 sterat M || ei] et MP 234 claudatur] a deo *add.* M 235 aeternitatis] aeterni-  
 tati P || partem] et partem *add.* P 235-236 partem... excludendo *om. per homeo.*  
 M 236 aliquid *om.* LMP 237 dupliciter] aliquid *add.* P

stit parti tantum, quia aeternitas non habet partes; alio modo dicitur ali-  
 240 quid coexistere toti aeternitati quia coexistit ei ut non habet principium nec  
 finem, et sic quidquid coexistit toti aeternitati, coexistit ei ab aeterno sine  
 principio, et coexistit in aeternum sine fine. Sed hoc modo non quidquid  
 coexistit aeternitati, coexistit toti, quia temporalia – quae quandoque sunt,  
 et pro tunc coexistunt aeternitati quia sunt dum aeternitas est – licet coexi-  
 245 stant toti aeternitati prout coexistunt ei non secundum partem, tamen non  
 coexistunt ei toti ut est non habens principium [M 303ra] nec finem, et ideo  
 non coexistunt ei ab aeterno.

[*Durandi redactiones prima, secunda, et tertia*] [1.18] Sic igitur patet  
 qualiter Deus cognoscat futura contingentia, quia cognoscit ea determinate  
 250 quantum ad suas proprias et determinatas actualitates quas habebunt. Nec  
 cognoscit ea per hoc quod sint ab aeterno ei praesentia realiter, sed per  
 hoc quod essentia divina, ut causa, est sufficiens ratio repraesentandi intel-  
 lectui divino determinate singularia modo quo dictum est prius de ceteris  
 255 singularibus. Licet etiam essentia divina sit prima et sufficiens ratio intel-  
 ligendi ea, nihil tamen prohibet quod Deus ea cognoscat in causis creatis  
 contingentibus. Cognitio tamen utrorumque dependet a cognitione divinae  
 essentiae.

<Quaestio tertia articuli secundi Durandi>

[1.19] Quantum ad tertium, an scientia Dei imponat necessitatem  
 rebus scitis, notandum quod scientia Dei comparatur ad res dupliciter: uno  
 260 modo ut causa, alio modo ut cognitio infallibilis et certa. Et neutro istor-  
 um modorum imponit necessitatem rebus. Quod non ut causa patet primo  
 sic: aliqua futura dependent a Deo solum sicut a causa, alia vero depen-  
 dent ab eo mediantibus causis secundis; sed scientia Dei neutris imponit  
 necessitatem; ergo et cetera. Minor probatur quantum ad utramque par-  
 265 tem. Quod enim scientia Dei ut causa non imponat necessitatem futuris  
 quae dependent a solo Deo, probatur sic: scientia Dei non est causa eorum  
 quae fiunt a Deo nisi mediante voluntate, ut patet ex supradictis; sed volun-  
 tas Dei non necessario vult quidquid Deus scit, sed libere vult et potest non

---

258-286 Cf. e.g. Aquinas, *Scriptum* 1, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., pp. 909-910); *Summa contra gentiles* I, c. 67 (ed. cit., p. 190b).

---

239-240 aliquid] ad M 241 quidquid coexistit] quicquid existit B || coexi-  
 stit<sup>2</sup>] coexit P || ei om. MP 242 fine] finem L 243 aeternitati coexistit toti  
 inv. Bac 244 quia] sed L 249 ea] eam M 250 proprias om. MP 251 ea]  
 eas M 252 sufficiens ratio inv. P 253 determinate om. L 255 creatis]  
 causatis BLM 256 utrorumque] utrorum L 261 primo om. P 262 sicut  
 exp. (!) B || a causa om. B; causa L 263 dei] divina M, Lac 264 quantum om.  
 M; quo P 267 fiunt] sunt MP 268 dei om. B || deus om. MP

velle omne aliud ab ipso; ergo scientia Dei ut causa non imponit necessitatem futuris contingentibus. Unde coelum et angeli, qui inter omnes res creatas videntur esse effectus necessarij, non sunt necessario producti, sed libere, nisi forte necessitate suppositionis. Supposito enim quod Deus voluerit ea producere, necessarium est quod producantur, non necessitate absoluta, sed praedictae suppositionis. 270

[1.20] Item, idem patet de his [B 221vb] quae producuntur a Deo mediantibus causis secundis sic: omnis effectus est contingens, et contingenter eveniens, cuius aliqua causa [P 530a] per se est impedibilis; sed eorum quae fiunt a Deo mediantibus causis secundis, multa sunt quae praeter scientiam Dei habent causas impedibiles, vel per actionem contrarij, vel per indispositionem materiae; ergo talia, non obstante causalitate divinae scientiae, contingenter eveniunt. Minor de se patet. Sed maior probatur, quia evenire contingenter est evenire cum possibilitate deficiendi; sed effectus qui dependet ex pluribus causis, quacumque earum existente impedibili et ita potente deficere, potest non evenire, et ita cum evenit, evenit cum possibilitate deficiendi; quare et cetera. Scientia igitur Dei ut causa non imponit necessitatem rebus aliquam. 275 280 285

[1.21] Item, nec prout est cognitio infallibilis et certa, quod est difficilius. Non enim videtur posse stare simul quod res possit aliter evenire quam praescita sit, et quod scientia non possit falli. Propter quod est sciendum quod in Deo ponimus duplicem cognitionem: unam qua apprehendit absolute rerum quidditates et essentias, quae potest vocari indivisibilium intelligentia; alia qua apprehendit habitudines rerum secundum quas possunt ad invicem componi et dividi, et componentur et dividuntur pro aliquo tempore. Et hae [M 303rb] duae cognitiones, licet non differant ex parte Dei, qui omnia uno [L 175ra] simplici intuitu cognoscit, tamen differunt ex parte cognoscibilium. Prima autem harum cognitionum nulli rei necessitatem imponit, et tamen non potest falli, quia sub prima cognitione non cadit rem evenire vel non evenire, sed solum natura rei quantum ad suum quiddid est. Et ideo, sive res eveniant sive non, talis cognitio non fallitur. 290 295

[1.22] Item, nec secunda cognitio imponit necessitatem, nec tamen fallitur. Cuius ratio est, quia circa eandem rem stant simul necessitas suppositionis et contingentia simpliciter; sed de eo quod est necessarium ex suppositione potest haberi certa et infallibilis cognitio; ergo infallibilis et certa cognitio de aliqua re potest stare cum contingentia eius simpliciter. Maior patet, quia Sortem currere, dum currit, necessarium est ex suppositione, et 300 305

---

270 contingentibus *om.* MP 274 suppositionis] supponit M 275 idem patet] idem M; *om.* P 276 secundis] patet *add.* P 277 eveniens] veniens M 279 vel<sup>1</sup> *om.* L 281 sed *om.* MP 282 possibilitate] possidente M 283 dependet] dependent P || earum existente *om.* MP 287 infallibilis] impedibilis B 288 non enim *om.* L || videtur] videretur L; videntur M 290 qua] quam LM 301-302 suppositionis] supponit M 304 cum *om.* M 305 necessarium est *inv.* L

- universaliter "omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse," non simpliciter, sed ex suppositione. Sortem tamen currere est simpliciter contingens, libere enim currit. Ergo circa eandem rem stant simul necessitas suppositionis et contingentia simpliciter, et haec fuit maior. Minor similiter patet,
- 310 quia de cursu Sortis, dum est, potest haberi infallibilis et certa cognitio, quia necessarium est Sortem currere, supposito quod currat, ita quod pro illo tempore non potest non currere. Et sicut est de praesenti cursu Sortis quod potest infallibiliter cognosci propter suam determinationem et necessitatem suppositionis, sic est de omni futuro quantumcumque simpliciter
- 315 contingente, si respectu eius possit inveniri aliqua necessitas suppositionis. Haec autem invenitur respectu cognitionis divinae, quia sicut prius dictum fuit, a causa impedibili et simpliciter quo ad hoc contingente, supposito quod non sit impedita, sequitur infallibiliter determinatus effectus. Intellectus ergo cui notae sunt praedictae suppositiones potest infallibiliter
- 320 quodcumque futurum cognoscere, sicut visus meus, qui videt Sortem currere, infallibiliter novit cursum Sortis. Talis autem est intellectus divinus, qui non solum novit causam futuri contingentis secundum se, sed novit perfecte omnem concursum omnium causarum quae possunt impedire vel non, et quae impediunt vel non impediunt, et quae determinabunt liberum
- 325 arbitrium nostrum et angeli, et quae non. Propter quod infallibiliter cognoscit omne futurum.

- [1.23] Causa autem horum est universalitas divinae cognitionis, quam nihil subterfugit. Sicut enim est de causa in causando, sic est de cognitione ut fallatur in iudicando de productione effectus per causam suam. Causa
- 330 autem cuius ordinem nihil subterfugit non potest impediti vel deficere in causando, quia omnis causa quae impeditur, impeditur per aliquid quod subterfugit ordinem suae causalitatis. Et ideo una causa particularis impedit aliam. Sed nulla impedit causam universalem, sub cuius ordine utraque continetur. Verbi gratia, ponamus quod sit aliqua [P 530b] constellatio quae

306 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, c. 9:19a23-24 (AL II.1, p. 17.3-4).

318 Post "sequitur" Petrus omittit per homeoteleuton haec verba quae sunt in Durandi redactionibus prima (M ff. 155vb-156ra) et tertia (ed. Venice, f. 105ra): "... effectus infallibiliter et necessario necessitate praedictae suppositionis, et similiter a causa indifferente et ad utrumlibet (supposito quod determinetur et non impediatur) sequitur..."

306 universaliter] universatur L; universitate MP || omne] causae MP || est<sup>3</sup> om. MP 307 sortem tamen] sortem L; inv. MP 308 enim] secundum L 312 non<sup>2</sup> mg.<sup>2</sup> B; om. M || sicut] sic M 315-317 si... contingente om. per homeo. L 316 haec autem] hoc B (om. L) || cognitionis divinae inv. B (om. L) 317 a om. M 320 meus] medius M 321 autem est] est aut M; inv. P 322 solum novit inv. MP 323 concursum] cursum MP (+D3) 324 non<sup>1</sup>] impedire add. MP 328 enim est] enim M; est P || causa] ut deficiat add. i.m.<sup>2</sup> B (+D3) 331 quae om. P || impeditur<sup>2</sup> om. MP 334 sit aliqua] aliqua B; inv. MP



facit hanc herbam florere propter suam caliditatem. Ex motu autem super- 335  
 caelestis corporis [B 222ra] supervenit alia constellatio quae propter suam  
 frigiditatem impedit floritionem huius herbae ne ultra floreat, sed potius  
 facit florem decidere. Hic una causa particularis impedit aliam, quia una  
 non continetur sub alia. Sed numquid propter hoc impeditur [M 303va]  
 effectus corporis caelestis quod continet utramque constellationem? Non, 340  
 sed impletur, quia effectus eius fuit ut usque ad hoc floreret, et postea deci-  
 deret. Et ideo adhibuit contrarias causas particulares, quarum una aliam  
 impediret, utraque tamen subveniret causae universali. Et est simile in  
 agente <apposito>: volo comburere medietatem alicuius ligni. Adhibeo  
 ignem, qui, quantum est de se, combureret totum lignum nisi impediretur. 345  
 Sed cum iam combussit medietatem, appono aquam extinguentem ipsum.  
 Impeditur ergo effectus ignis, sed non meus, immo impletur omnino. Sic  
 est de qualibet causa quod non potest impediri nisi per illud quod subter-  
 fugit ordinem suae causalitatis. Et sicut est de causalitate producente effec-  
 tum, sic est de cognitione in iudicando de productione effectus, quia si 350  
 aliquis cogitat particulariter et solum causam effectus futuri contingentis,  
 potest decipi in iudicando, sicut causa impediri in producendo. Et sic nos  
 decipimur. Sed intellectus qui novit hanc et alias quae eam impedire pos-  
 sunt, et universaliter totum concursum causarum provenientium ex ordine  
 superioris causae, quaecumque sit illa, talis intellectus non potest decipi, 355  
 sicut nec ordo ille impediri. Et talis est intellectus divinus respectu omnium  
 generaliter, et forte intellectus angelicus respectu omnium, scilicet natu-  
 ralium.

<Durandus ad argumenta principalia>

[1.24] Ad argumenta ad quaestionem, respondent ad primum: cum dicitur,  
 "omne scitum a Deo de necessitate eveniet," dicendum quod falsum est, 360  
 loquendo de necessitate absoluta et simpliciter, immo sicut scitum est eve-  
 nire, sic eveniet. Et ideo, quod scitum est evenire necessario, eveniet neces-  
 sario, et quod scitum est evenire contingenter, eveniet contingenter, alio-  
 quin scientia Dei falleretur, quae non solum est de eventu rerum, sed de  
 modo eventus. Et quod dicitur ulterius, "si non necessario eveniet, potest 365  
 non evenire, ponatur ergo in esse," dicendum quod, si ponatur in esse eo

359 Cf. par. 1.1 supra.

339 non *om.* MP || numquid] numquam P 341 quia] sed MP 344 <appo-  
 sito>] a proposito *ms.* (+D3) 347 omnino *om.* B; et *add.* P 348 est *s.l.* B; *om.*  
 LM 349 sicut] sic M || producente] in producendo MP 351 cogitat *Bac*; cogno-  
 scit *Bpc* || effectus futuri *inv.* MP 352 in<sup>1</sup> *om.* B 354 concursum] cursum MP  
 || provenientium] provenientem P 356 est intellectus divinus] intellectus divinus est  
 M 357 scilicet *om.* P 359 respondent] respondendent L 362 sic... evenire *om.*  
*per homeo.* B || eveniet necessario *om. per homeo.* M; *inv.* P 363 eveniet contin-  
 genter *om. per homeo.* M; *inv.* P 365 non necessario *inv.* BLM || eveniet] sed *add.* P

modo quo est possibile, non sequitur aliquod impossibile. Est autem possibile non evenire loquendo simpliciter et absolute, sed stante suppositione [L 175rb] non est possibile, et ideo, sic non est ponendum. Si enim praescitum est evenire, praescitus est ordo causarum talis, quo posito et stante, non potest illud non evenire, sed necessario eveniet necessitate suppositionis praedictae, quae stat cum contingentia simpliciter. Et est similiter de contingente praesente. Sortes enim, dum currit, non necessario currit simpliciter et absolute, immo libere currit potens non currere. Et tamen non potest poni in esse quod non currat, stante suppositione quod currat, alioquin contradictoria simul verificarentur de eodem, quod est impossibile.

[1.25] Ad secundum, cum dicitur quod "omnis conditionalis cuius antecedens est necessarium et consequentia est necessaria, et consequens est necessarium," concedatur, si tamen antecedens sit necessarium ut ex ipso inferatur consequens. Et cum dicitur quod haec est necessaria: "Deus praescivit .a. fore," dicendum quod est ut sic, et est ut non. Si enim est necessarium, adiuncto modo necessitatis erit vera, dicendo sic: 'Deus praescivit necessario .a. fore'. Haec autem est duplex, quia si modus necessitatis determinet compositionem verbi ad subiectum, vera est et composita sub hoc sensu: 'necessarium est Deum praescire .a. fore'. Et adhuc necessitas non est nisi ex suppositione, et non simpliciter, quia, ut infra videbitur, Deus potest nescire quod scit, et scire quod nescit [M 303vb]. Et ideo non necessario scit [P 531a] talia, sed libere, sicut libere vult ea fore vel non fore. Si autem determinet materiam verbi, scilicet '.a. fore', sic est falsa et divisa sub hoc sensu: 'Deus praevidit a fore necessario', quod non est verum, immo praevidit .a. fore contingenter. Modo sic est quod consequens non inferatur ex antecedente ratione compositionis verbi ad subiectum, quae est necessaria, sed solum ratione materiae verbi, quae est contingens. Quod patet, quia si separaretur materia verbi a compositione, inferret consequens, ad .a. enim fore, sequitur quod .a. erit. Sed compositio principalis sine materia verbi [B 222rb] non inferret consequens, non enim sequitur, 'Deus scit .a., ergo erit', scit enim non solum quae erunt, sed multa quae non erunt. Cum ergo consequens non inferatur ex antecedente ut est necessarium, sed potius ut est contingens, non oportet consequens esse necessarium, sed contingens.

377 Cf. par. 1.2 supra.

400 Petrus omittit haec verba quae sunt in redactionibus prima (M f. 156vb)

367 non... impossibile *om.* per *homeo.* L 368 simpliciter] singulariter M  
 371 necessitate *om.* M 372 est *om.* B || similiter] simile P 378 est<sup>2</sup> *om.* L  
 381 sic] sit MP || non] sic *add.* P 382 necessarium] necessaria P 383 a] ea  
 M 388 scit] sint M; sunt P 389 autem determinet] a determinatione (?)L ||  
 fore] et *add.* M; et *exp.* P 394 quia *om.* L 398 non *om.* MP || antecedente]  
 non *add.* P 399 esse] est M

[1.26] Ad tertium, potest responderi sicut in arguendo responsum est. Et quod obicitur, quod illa distinctio non habet locum nisi in formis separabilibus, dicendum quod esse scitum non comparatur ad rem scitam sicut forma ad subiectum, sed solum sicut actus ad obiectum. Quia tamen omne quod denominat aliud quandoque vocatur forma, ideo loquamur de scientia Dei tamquam de forma denominante rem scitam. Et tunc possumus dicere quod aliqua forma vel actus potest dupliciter dici inseparabilis: uno modo ex naturali et per se habitudine formae vel actus ad rem, et e converso, et sic anima est forma inseparabilis ab homine; alio modo ex suppositione, sicut si supponeremus quod Sortes, quamdiu vivit, esset infirmus, infirmitas esset ab eo inseparabilis. Inseparabilitas ergo prima tollit praedictam distinctionem, sed non secunda, vel potius <inseparatio> quae est ex suppositione non tollit quin absolute oppositum potuerit inesse. Unde dato quod Sortes semper esset infirmus, adhuc ista esset distinguenda: 'Sortem infirmum impossibile est esse sanum', secundum sensum compositum et divisum. Et in sensu composito esset vera, in divisio autem esset falsa, quia significaret impossibilitatem sanitatis inesse Sorti ex natura sua, quod non est verum, sed ex suppositione, qua ponitur semper infirmus. Similiter in proposito, quia ·a· fore et esse scitum non sunt inseparabilia, nisi ex suppositione. Absolute enim ·a· potuit non fore, et non esse scitum fore. Sed supposito quod sit scitum, impossibile est non esse scitum, et inseparabile est ab eo esse scitum ex suppositione iam dicta. Et ideo adhuc in tali actu potest locum habere praedicta distinctio sicut et in formis inseparabilibus ex suppositione.

[1.27] Vel dicendum ad principalem rationem quod, si maior est de necessario simpliciter et absolute et minor de inesse, conclusio erit de

et tertia (ed. Venice, f. 105va): "Vel dicendum secundum praecepta quod hoc antecedens (ed.: accedens), 'Deus praescivit A fore', non est necessarium simpliciter, sed contingens eo modo quo liberum arbitrium dicimus esse contingens. Quod patet, quia impossibile est illud esse simpliciter necessarium quod coexigit (M: praeexigit) contingens; sed Deum praescire A fore coexigit (M: praeexigit) Deum velle A fore, quod est contingens (id est, liberum); ergo illud antecedens non est simpliciter necessarium, quare nec consequens."

401 Cf. par. 1.3b supra.

425 Cf. par. 1.3a supra.

404 obiectum] etiam (?) *add. i.m.*<sup>2</sup> B || tamen *om.* B 405 loquamur] loquimur P 407 aliqua *om.* P 410 si *om.* M || quamdiu vivit] quod dei M; conti + *lac.* P 411 inseparabilis] inseparabiliter M 412 sed *om.* P || <inseparatio> D3] separatio BLM; inseparabilitas P 413 oppositum] suppositum B 414 semper esset *inv.* B 415 esse sanum *inv.* P 422 eo] non *add.* B 423 praedicta *om.* B 425 principalem rationem] principale MP 426 simpliciter et *inv.* M || de<sup>1</sup>] dicitur M

- necessario simpliciter. Si autem maior sit de necessario ex suppositione, non absolute, conclusio erit de necessario non simpliciter et absolute, sed de necessario ex suppositione. Modo, cum dicitur. "omne scitum a Deo  
 430 necessario est verum," si intelligatur de necessario simpliciter et absolute, non est verum. Necessarium enim ex suppositione, quod stat cum contingencia simpliciter, potest esse scitum infallibiliter, non solum a Deo, sed a nobis, ut cum scio Sortem actu currere, ut prius satis deductum fuit. Propter quod sequitur quod conclusio ex maiore sic necessaria conclusa sit  
 435 necessaria necessitate suppositionis solum, et non simpliciter, quod concessum est.

<Pars secunda: responsio et determinatio Petri>

<Articulus secundus Petri>

- [2.1] Quantum ad secundum principale, inquirendo de praedictis utrum Deus [M 304ra] cognoscat futura contingentia, primus articulus istorum, scilicet qui effectus sint futuri contingentes et quomodo, totus ab omnibus  
 440 conceditur, hoc excepto: quod per comparisonem ad Deum [P 531b] nulla causa est necessaria, nec in esse, nec in agere, nec est effectus necessarius, cum ipse possit omnia adnihilare et futura impedire de potentia absoluta; et e converso nullum futurum respectu eius est contingens, sed necessarium et determinatum, ex suppositione scilicet, sed non simpliciter.  
 445 [2.2.1] An autem possit certitudinaliter cognosci in sua causa, dicit bene quod sic, cognito quod non impediatur et quod causabit. Si enim scio quod Sortes cras volet currere, item scio quod tunc poterit currere, scio quod tunc curret, quia quicumque vult et potest currere [L 175va], statim currit. Sed velle et posse currere et non impediri sunt aequae contingentia  
 450 sicut et ipsum currere. Est ergo quaestio de primo contingente futuro quod

438 Cf. par. 1.6a supra.

445 Cf. par. 1.8 supra.

427 maior sit de necessario] sit de necessario maior B (om. M; interpolatio P)  
 427-428 si... simpliciter om. per homeo. M; et absolute si vero maior est de necessario non simpliciter et absolute sed de necessario ex suppositione conclusio erit de necessario non simpliciter P 428 conclusio] non add. i.m. B (om. M; interpolatio P) || non om.<sup>2</sup> B (om. M; interpolatio P) || et] non add. M 429 de necessario om. P 434-435 sit necessaria om. M 439 qui] est add. M || sint] sunt B || futuri contingentes] contingentes et futuri L || quomodo] cum modo M; qui non P 441 est om.<sup>2</sup> BL 444 scilicet om. MP 445 autem mg. B; om. LM 445-446 dicit bene inv. P; dicit quod bene M 446 sic] si sit add. P || cognito] cognitio MP || impediatur] impediretur L || et om. B 447 sortes... currere<sup>2</sup>] sortes (vult currere mg.) cras B || scio<sup>1</sup>] tertio M; secundo P 450 est] quaestio exp. B || quaestio de primo] de primo quaestio B

Deus cognovit, utrum illud in sua causa potuerit certitudinaliter cognoscere. Et certum est quod sic. Primum enim contingens futurum erat prima creatura quam immediate producturus erat, quia poterat non producere, et illam certitudinaliter cognoscere poterat, cognoscendo se scire, velle, posse eam producere. Et per consequens, quia nihil potest causare vel impedire aliquid nisi eo causante et impediante, quia novit quando causabit et quando impedit, per consequens novit quis et quando effectus contingens eveniet [B 222va]. Unde prima ratio eius est bona. 455

[2.2.2] Secunda ratio etiam videtur bona per id quod modo dictum est, licet supra fuerit probatum, quod non per causalitatem, sed per similitudinem repraesentationis cognoscit. Et hoc verum est quantum ad cognitionem quidditatis rerum, cui tamquam exemplato respondet divina essentia ut exemplans. Sed cognitio qua cognoscit eas tali modo et tempore futuras, cum illud esse non sint tunc et taliter habiturae nisi per efficientiam divinam, videtur quod per illam efficientiam cognoscat effectum et non e converso. Nec potest dici quod utrumque aequae primo secundum rationem, cum in cognitione causae et causati cognitio causae sit prior vera. Unde sicut dicitur in *Libro de causis*, intelligentia cognoscit res quae sunt in illa quoniam illis est causa. Si ergo futura contingentia cognoscuntur in se ipsis et in suis causis, prius tamen cognoscuntur in suis causis quam in se ipsis, sicut prius sunt in eis, quam in se ipsis. Nam sicut res se habet ad esse, sic ad cognosci, nisi sit defectus ex parte cognoscentis. Quia igitur res pro aliqua differentia temporis existentes, quae omnes sunt, respectu Dei, et contingentes simpliciter et necessariae conditionate, per hoc sunt vel erant futurae quia erant causandae, prius repraesentabantur in divina essentia secundum quod causandae quam secundum quod futurae, cum creatio esset causa futuritionis, non e converso. Et ideo prius cognoscebantur in causis quam in se, et maxime in prima causa, quae Deus est, in qua cognoscebantur et secundum quod in se et secundum quod in Deo et 460 465 470 475

458 Cf. par. 1.9 supra.

459 Cf. par. 1.10 supra.

468-469 Cf. *Le Liber de causis*, c. 7(8) (ed. A. Pattin, Louvain 1966, p. 64. 6-13).

451 illud] deus MP || potuerit] ipsum *add.* P 454 illam] illa B 459 ratio etiam] ratio M; *inv.* P 460 fuerit probatum *inv.* MP 461 verum est *inv.* L 462-463 divina essentia *inv.* L 463 exemplans] exemplaris M; exemplar P 466 nec] non B || quod *om.* MP || in *om.* B 467 prior] prima L || vera *om.* L 469 illis] illius P 471 sicut... ipsis<sup>2</sup> *om. per homeo.* MP || res] rem M 472 nisi] non M 473 temporis] operis LM 474 et<sup>1</sup> *om.* P || et<sup>2</sup> *om.* BM || necessariae *om.* M || sunt] sicut B; *om.* MP || vel *om.* P 475 causandae] creandae MP || prius] enim *add.* MP 476 essentia] essentiam B || causandae] creandae MP || quam] quod L 477 causa] sed succurritionis (?) *exp.* M; suae *add.* P || non e converso *om.* MP || et *om.* P 479 et<sup>1</sup> *om.* B || in<sup>2</sup> *om.* L

- 480 in alijs suis causis, quia omnem entitatem divina essentia repraesentat in se, licet non aequo primo.
- [2.3.1-3] Tertius articulus [M 304rb]. De cognitione actualis existentiae, prima conclusio et secunda ab omnibus conceduntur. Tertia conclusio similiter, quod non differunt ex parte cognoscentis quo ad genus cognitionis, quia non agimus de cognitione animae Christi, sed solum deitatis.
- 485 [2.3.4] Quarta etiam conclusio, quod idem est cognitum realiter et in se et in causa et formaliter quo ad cognitionem Dei, quae non mutatur, est vera, sed quo ad nos non est idem formaliter, quia sub alia et alia ratione cognoscitur et perficitur cognitio prius habita per causam et per cognitionem experimentalem supervenientem.
- 490 [2.3.5] Quinta conclusio, qua dicit futura contingentia non coexistere Deo antequam sint, vera est ut bene probat et bene respondet quantum ad existere in re extra, sed quantum ad esse cognitum et repraesentatum non. Omnia enim quae sunt futura relucent ab aeterno in Dei essentia, non solum secundum quod sunt in suis causis [P 532a] (quod tamen sufficeret ad eorum cognitionem, cum hoc sufficiat ad cognitionem possibilium quae non erunt; unde non possunt repraesentari quantum ad esse quod habebunt, sed quantum ad esse quod haberent si essent—sed de hoc postea videbitur), sed etiam quantum ad esse quod in se ipsis actualiter habebunt. Et
- 500 ita perfecte relucent in Dei essentia sicut relucebunt quando actu erunt. Cum enim perfectius sit cognoscere rem prout est in causa et prout est in se ipsa quam cognoscere eam altero modo tantum, utrumque est Deo attribuendum et utrumque ab aeterno et neutrum de novo. Et sic cognoscit futura tamquam sibi praesentia, non in se, sed in similitudine sua perfecta.
- 505 [2.3.6] Sexta conclusio, quod praesentia rerum nihil faciat ad Dei cognitionem, vera est sic intelligendo quod aequo perfecte cognoscit rem numquam praesentem sicut praesentem ex parte Dei, quia utrumque cognoscit quantum cognoscibile est. Sed ex parte cogniti est differentia, quia quod plus habet de entitate, plus habet de cognoscibilitate. Unde si Deus non
- 510 plus cognosceret de rebus futuris quam cognoscat de rebus possibilibus non

482 Cf. pars. 1.11a-c supra.

486 Cf. par. 1.11d supra.

491 Cf. pars. 1.13-15 supra.

505 Cf. par. 1.16 supra.

480 repraesentat] reputat M 482 tertius] secundus L 486 etiam conclusio *inv.* B || idem est *inv.* MP || et *om.* L 488 et alia *om.* B 491 qua] quae P || contingentia] et ideo est *add.* M 492 sint] sit M 494 omnia enim *inv.* M; nam omnia P || essentia] scientia B 497 possunt] alia (?) *add. i.m.* P || repraesentari] sed etiam *add. s.l.* P 497-499 habebunt... quod *om. per homeo.* MP 501 prout est<sup>1</sup>] praesentem L 504 sua *om.* B 507 quia utrumque cognoscit *om.* P 508 quantum] quam M || cognoscibile] cognoscibilis LM 508-509 quod... entitate *om. per homeo.* B 510 plus] non *add.* M; etiam *add.* P

futuris, imperfecte eas cognosceret, quia ignoraret eas futuras esse quae futurae sunt. Unde res possibles non futurae ab aeterno fuerunt ei praesentes in esse repraesentato et scito quantum ad entitatem in suis causis actualem et quantum ad entitatem in se ipsis potentialem, sed res futurae erant ei presentes illis modis et etiam quantum ad esse in se ipsis actualiter. Dico "secundum esse repraesentatum et scitum," non aliter. Non enim sufficiebat ad perfectam cognitionem futurorum illud quod sufficiebat ad perfectam cognitionem possibilium non futurorum, quia plus erat repraesentandum [B 222vb] ubi plus erat [L 175vb] fiendum. 515

[2.3.7] Septima conclusio, quam saepe replicat, quod divina essentia est ratio cognoscendi ut causa, non videtur vera propter ea quae supradicta sunt, quantum saltem ad primam rationem cognoscendi: quia sicut artifex potest cognoscere domum quam faciet vel fecit per hoc quod cognoscit se causam eius – quia nihil est in ea vel erit nisi quod in ea causavit vel causabit, unde sciendo quid causavit vel causabit, scit quid in ea est vel erit – tamen, cum causa praecedat effectum, si non est causa domus nec alicuius quod sit in ea nisi per suam artem, prius cognovit quam causavit, ex quo sciendo causavit – non ergo per causare scit primo causatum, sed per scire causatum causavit ipsum, per aliquid ergo aliud prius causalitate scivit ipsum quod per scientiam causavit, puta per similitudinem quam ab alia domo accepit; et sic videtur quod prima cognitio Dei [M 304va] quam habet de suis effectibus non sit per essentiam suam ut est causa, sed magis ut est similitudo, cum etiam similitudo sit prior causalitate, in quantum omne agens est simile. Sed non convertitur, quia nihil cognoscitur secundum quod est in potentia, sed secundum quod est in actu. Unde cum res, antequam sint, non sint in causalitate divina nisi potentialiter, non possunt in ea cognosci actualiter nisi per actualem similitudinem. Ideo antequam sint, possunt cognosci in ea non ut earum est causa, sed ut est earum similitudo actualis et expressa. 520 525 530 535

[2.4.1] Quartus articulus. Prima conclusio, quod scientia Dei ut causa non necessitat absolute suos effectus immediatos, sic est modificanda: quod 540

520 Cf. par. 1.18 supra.

540 Cf. par. 1.19 supra.

512 aeterno] non *add.* MP 513-514 suis... in *om. per homeo.* B  
 514-515 potentialem... ipsis *om. per homeo.* MP 516 non<sup>2</sup>] quod P; in originali: non enim sufficiebat ad imperfectam cognitionem *add. i.m.* P 517 perfectam] imperfectam MP || illud quod *om.* MP 518 perfectam] praesentem M || quia] ibi *add.* P 519 ubi] ut B 520 divina essentia *inv.* MP 524 eius] esse *add. s.l.* B || causavit] creavit M (*et etiam ll. 525, 527-9*) 525 quid<sup>1</sup>] quod MP || causavit vel causabit *inv.* L || est *om.* M 527 sit] fit B || prius] plus M 528 primo *om.* MP 532 est<sup>1</sup> *om.* M 534 convertitur] secundo (?) *add.* P 537 similitudinem] et *add.* P 538 non *om.* M 540 ut] est *add.* B 541 absolute] causalitate B

imponit necessitatem illis quos vult esse necessarios per respectum ad cursum naturae et agentia naturalia, quae illa non possunt facere non esse, sicut de angelis et coelis. Sed de effectibus quos vult esse contingentes, 545 imponit solam necessitatem suppositionis, vult enim suam voluntatem non impediri. Et sic respectu cursus naturae sunt absolute contingentes, respectu autem sui nulli imponit necessitatem nisi conditionatam. Unde non est dicendum quod nulli effectui proprio imponit necessitatem, quia alias nullus esset necessarius, cum nihil habeat effectus Dei nisi quod [P 550 532b] Deus sibi imponit.

[2.4.2] Secunda etiam conclusio est intelligenda de effectibus medietatis per causas impedibiles. Et ratio supplenda est quia, quamvis altera causarum sit impedibilis, si tamen alia sit non impedibilis, et possit effectum per se producere et velit, effectus est necessarius; sed Deus sic agit cum 555 causis impedibilibus earum effectus quod non vult agere sine eis, quamvis possit - vult etiam eas agere cum potentialitate suae impeditiois, et tamen non impediri; ideo et cetera.

[2.4.3] Tertia conclusio videtur subdivisio cuiuslibet notitiae, et simplicis et visionis. Potest enim res non futura sicut et futura cognosci quo 560 ad quidditatem absolute et quo ad compositionem cum esse actuali tali vel tali tempore, secundum potentiam vel actum. Et verum est quod ex parte cognoscentis Dei non est differentia, ex parte vero cognitorum est differentia, non quod res sit aliquando alia vel aliter quam erat futura vel possibilis, sed quando est, ex natura differt ab essentia, vel saltem non excludit 565 multa differentia, quia aliud est rem esse actu, aliud rem esse in potentia.

[2.4.4] Quarta conclusio est vera, quia cognitio ista est pure speculativa quae non est causa entitatis rei, nec per consequens necessitatis, quia talem habet Deus de se, et nos de rebus naturalibus; et haec est cognitio 570 rerum, quae est speculativa, etiam secundum Thomam.

[2.4.5] Quinta conclusio est vera, sed si quaeratur, 'per quid Deus cognoscit quod ista causa determinabitur et non impediatur, cum hoc

551 Cf. par. 1.20 supra.

558 Cf. par. 1.21 supra.

567 Cf. par. 1.22 supra.

542 illis] simul M; simpliciter effectibus P || per] idem *add.* M 543 et] ad *add.* P 544 de<sup>2</sup> *om.* P 548 effectui] effectum L 551 est] erit MP 553 si] sic LM, *Bac* || tamen] non M || sit<sup>2</sup> *om.* B || et *exp.* (!) B 554 est] erit L 555 quod] quia M 556 potentialitate] possibilitate L; *compo->te* M; potestate P 559 et<sup>1</sup> *exp.* (!) B 560 absolute] absolutam L || cum esse actuali] ad esse actuale B 561 et] etiam L 562 ex... differentia<sup>2</sup> *om. per homeo.* B 563 sit] fiat L || alia] etiam aliter B; vel alia L 564 sed] quia *add.* P 565 aliud<sup>2</sup>] est B 567 quia] quod L || ista *om.* B || pure] vere B 569 est *om.* MP 570 quae *om.* P || etiam] et M 572 impediatur] impediatur P



ipsum sit contingens sicut effectus?' dicendum quod, sicut in speculo materiali relucet res corporales et earum motiones ad invicem in iuvando, veniendo, recedendo, impediendo, ut homo in speculo videt pugnam duorum avorum, et quis vincit et quis vincitur; sic in Deo omnia relucet eo modo antequam fiant sicut quando actu fiunt, et ibi relucet quomodo voluntas volet, et quid eam movebit ad volendum, et quid intelligitur impedire, et quare non impediet, et omnes modi quibus res procedet ad esse, et his mediantibus etiam ipsa res in se. Et hic est [B 223ra] unus modus. 575  
 Secundus modus [M 304vb], qui est etiam supra tactus: quia ipse novit quid ipse vult se facturum et impediturum, sine quo factum est nihil, ex hoc ipso novit quid fiet, et quid omittetur, et quid non. Et ex hoc apparet quod omnis cognitio creaturae de re, quantumcumque videatur necessaria futura, tamen falli potest, quia Deus potest impedire quod nulla creatura potest impedire, nescit autem creatura quod Deus non impediet, nisi sibi hoc Deus revelaverit. Propter quod omnis naturalis cognitio creata mendax est et fallax, secundum potentiam Dei. E converso Dei cognitio de re, quantumcumque contingente, est infallibilis, quia bene videt quod id quod posset eam falsificare impediendo rem, non erit; ideo et cetera. 580  
 585

[2.5.1a] Quintus articulus. De causa huius bene dicit. Et quod dicit Thomas, quod contingentia in suis causis nullo modo possunt cognosci, verum est respectu illarum causarum quae possunt impediri, si solae causae cognoscuntur [L 176ra]. Sed sola illa causa quae non potest impediri ab alio, licet ipsa possit non causare, si vult, ex quo est effectus contingens, ex hoc solo quod cognoscit se velle causare quod potest non causare, scit se non impediendam et per consequens determinate effectum futurum. 590  
 595

[2.5.1b] Item, si cognoscuntur causae impedibiles, et cum hoc cognoscuntur omnia quae nata sunt impedire, et cum hoc cognoscitur quod nullum impediet, determinate scitur quod effectus eveniet. Et sic angeli, non solum eclipses, sed pluvias, siccitates, frigora, et calores [P 533a] praecognoscunt, non autem astrologi, qui non omnia impedimenta sciunt. Sterilitates autem et guerras non pro certo angeli praesciunt, quia ex libero arbitrio humano dependent. 600

591 Cf. par. 1.23 supra. Cf. Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 910); *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a.13 (ed. cit., p. 186b).

573-574 materiali] naturali MP 576 avorum om. BL || vincitur] et add.  
 MP 576-577 eo modo mg.(?) P 577 sicut] modo add. MP || relucet] relucet  
 B 578 et<sup>1</sup>] quis add. M; quando add. P || et<sup>2</sup> om. B 579 procedet] procedet  
 B 580 his] habens B 581 secundus modus om. B; secundus etiam modus P  
 || tactus] est add. P 582 et om. MP || impediturum] impeditur B || sine] usum B  
 || hoc] enim add. P 583 et<sup>3</sup> om. L 584 videatur om. L || necessaria] necessa-  
 rio P || tamen exp. (!) P 590 non erit om. B 597 impediendam] impediendo  
 B 598 causae] esse MP 601 pluvias] pluvies B 602 autem om. MP  
 602-603 sterilitates pro sceleritates?

- 605 [2.6.1a] Sextus articulus. De difficultatibus. Prima non videtur evadi,  
quia aliud est de cognitione creata, cuius infallibilitatem sufficit esse ex sup-  
positione (unde ad hoc quod videam vel sciam Sortem currere, sufficit quod  
ipse currat, licet contingenter, quia ex quo currit necesse est eum currere),  
aliud de cognitione increata, quam oportet esse necessariam simpliciter et  
610 absolute, et non solum ex suppositione. Non enim scientia Dei potest falli,  
nec simpliciter, nec ex suppositione, cum sit necessaria simpliciter et abso-  
lute. Si ergo scitum a Deo potest poni non esse simpliciter, ergo scientia  
Dei potest falli simpliciter, licet non possit falli facta quadam suppositione,  
quod videtur absurdum.
- 615 [2.6.1b] Propter quod dicendum quod scientia Dei, secundum illud  
quod est et in comparatione ad obiectum increatum, habet necessitatem  
absolute, sed in comparatione ad obiectum creatum vel creabile, quantum  
ad esse actu habet necessitatem solum conditionatam propter quod sim-  
pliciter respectu illius potest non esse, sicut supra dictum est quod Deus  
620 absolute potest nescire quod scit. Sed aliud est scientiam non esse, et aliud  
est scientiam falli. Potest enim Deus absolute nescire antichristum futurum,  
quia hic non implicatur quod sciat eum futurum. Sed scientia quam habet  
de antichristo futuro nullo modo falli potest, quia in hoc quod dico 'scien-  
tiam Dei falli' implico contradictionem, quia implico scientiam et per con-  
625 sequens scitum futurum, in hoc autem quod dico 'falli' implico scitum non  
futurum, et sic est contradictio. Unde per hoc quod ponitur illud contin-  
gens absolute non futurum, ponitur scientiam non esse, non autem esse et  
falli. Sed [M 305ra] si poneretur praescitum, et non esse, poneretur bene  
falli; ideo et cetera.
- 630 [2.6.2a] Secundam difficultatem non solvit bene propter duo. Primo  
deficit in hoc quod, ex quo consequentia est necessaria et antecedens est  
necessarium, necesse est consequens esse necessarium, sive sequatur ex ea  
parte qua est necessarium, sive ex ea qua est contingens, dum tamen sequa-  
tur nunc et necessario. Ut, si dicam, 'si ·a· est ·b·, ·a· est ·c·', si consequen-  
635 tia est necessaria et antecedens necessarium, tunc maior et minor possunt

---

605 Cf. par. 1.24 (ad par. 1.1) supra.

630 Cf. par. 1.25 (ad par. 1.2) supra.

---

605 prima] primo LM, Bac 607 ad hoc] adhuc M 608 ipse currat inv. B  
 || quia om. M 609 increata] in causam M 612 ergo<sup>2</sup> om. P. 612-613 ergo<sup>2</sup>...  
 simpliciter om. per homeo. B 616 et om. MP || increatum] creatum M  
 616-617 increatum... obiectum om. per homeo. B 617-619 quantum... esse om.  
 L 618 conditionatam] conditionata M 622 quia... futurum om. per homeo.  
 MP || scientia] scientiam B 625 scitum<sup>2</sup>] et add. M 627 absolute non futu-  
 rum] non futurum absolute B || scientiam] scientia BM || esse<sup>2</sup> om. MP || et om. P  
 628 sed om. M || et om. BM 633 ea om. MP 634 nunc et] sic et M; sic P  
 || si<sup>2</sup>] li B || a est<sup>1</sup> om. B || si<sup>3</sup>] sed B

formari de necessario sic: omne ·b· necessario est ·c·; sed omne ·a· necessario est ·b·; ergo sequitur conclusio 'omne ·a· necessario est ·c·'.

[2.6.2b] Secundo deficit in minore, quia licet ad Deum scire ·a· non sequatur ·a· fore, tamen ad Deum scire ·a· futurum sequitur ipsum ·a· fore, sive illius ·a· Deus sit causa, quia posita causa sufficiente, ponitur effectus, et tunc sequitur a priori, sive illius ·a· scientia Dei non sit causa, ut quia est malum culpae, quia scientia Dei non potest falli. Et sic oppositum consequentis non stat cum antecedente, ergo consequentia bona. Dicendum quod consequens est necessarium, sed tali necessitate quali antecedens, scilicet suppositionis, ut, 'si Sortes currit, Sortes movetur; sed Sortes necessario currit, quando currit; ergo et tunc necessario movetur', et tamen motus infertur ex cursu [B 223rb], non ex ea parte qua est necessarius, puta ex hoc quod est in actu, immo absolute ex natura cursus quae inest contingenter. 640 645

[2.6.3] Tertiam difficultatem male evadit in secunda solutione, quia quantumcumque maior sit de necessario simpliciter et absolute, si tamen minor sit de inesse, non de tali necessario, numquam sequitur conclusio de necessario simpliciter, sed solum de necessario conditionate, quia non plus inest maior extremitas minori quam medium, quia propter quod unumquodque tale et illud magis. Unde defectus cuiuscumque praemissarum redundat in conclusione. Verbi gratia, 'omnis homo est necessario rationale; aliquod album est homo; ergo aliquod album est rationale' [P 533b], necessario verum est, supposito quod sit homo, non autem absolute, quia nec simpliciter aliquod album est homo, immo potest esse omnis homo niger, et sic nullum album erit homo. Dicendum est ergo quod ex maiori de necessario quocumque, et minori de inesse, sequitur conclusio de necessario conditionate, non autem simpliciter. 650 655 660

### <Articulus tertius Petri>

[3.1] Quantum ad tertium, quid tenendum est de praedictis, videntur tenendae tres conclusiones probabiles: prima quod Deus cognoscit futura contingentia in suis causis. Non tamen sufficit dicere quod cognoscit causas et 665

650 Cf. par. 1.27 (ad par. 1.3) supra.

636 omne<sup>2</sup>] esse L 637 ergo sequitur *inv.* B || conclusio] quod P || omne] esse M 638 deum *om.* P 639 sequitur] sequatur M || ipsum *om.* MP 640 sit] scit B 641 a<sup>2</sup> *om.* L 644 antecedens] consequens M 646 quando currit *om. per homeo.* L 647 cursu] cursum B 648 quae] non *add.* B; qua P 651 si tamen] non *exp.* B; sit non M 653 simpliciter *om.* L || conditionate] conditionato B 654 medium] medio BLM 656 conclusione] conclusionem M || est necessario *inv.* P 658-659 non... homo<sup>1</sup> *om. per homeo.* L 661 quocumque... necessario<sup>2</sup> *om. per homeo.* MP 661-662 conditionate] conditionato B 662 simpliciter] et cetera *add.* P 663 tenendum est] sit tenendum B; est *exp.* B || videntur tenendae *inv.* MP 665 cognoscit] cognoscat P

impedimenta non impediencia et huiusmodi, quia est petitio principij, cum sit aequae dubium quomodo cognoscit quod potentia impedire non impedi-  
 670 cognoſcendo ſe. Quia enim [L 176rb] ſcit quod primam creaturam poterat  
 producere, et quod volebat, et quod nullus poterat impedire quia nec erat,  
 adeo quae ab ipſo ſolo immediate fuerunt, cognovit ab aeterno quando  
 futura erant, quae, mediantibus alijs, procedunt bona vel mala, cognoscit  
 675 quia ſcit nihil poſſe fieri eo impediente, nec niſi eo iuvante vel conſervante,  
 nec poſſe omitti niſi eo omittente, qui ſolus poteſt facere per ſe. Unde ſicut  
 qui tenderet arcum puero, ſine quo non poteſt iacere, ſciſet quando puer  
 iaceret vel [M 305rb] non iaceret, ſciens voluntatem pueri iacendo et ſuam  
 detendendo et non tendendo, puta ex quo eſt certus quod hodie non ten-  
 det arcum, per conſequens ſcit quod ipſe non iaciet, ſic in proſposito, quia  
 680 ſcit quando operabitur et quando non, et quando prohibebit et quando non,  
 ideo ſcit quando creatura operabitur et quando non.

[3.2] Secunda conſuſio, quod cognoscit ea eſſe ſecundum eſſe  
 actuale proprium, quia perfectionis eſt habere utrumque modum cognos-  
 cendi rem quae habet cauſam, ſcilicet in ſe et in ſua cauſa. Nec ſufficit  
 685 aſtologo demonſtranti eclipſim niſi oculus videat, nec videnti niſi cauſam  
 inveniat. Unde propter admirari coeperunt philoſophari ſic: niſi Deus  
 cognoceret futurum contingens in ſe et in ſua cauſa, non perfecte cognos-  
 ceret ipſum. Sed hoc non eſt quia futurum quod non eſt actu ſit actu  
 praesens, ſed quia eſt actu repraesentatum. Unde ſicut Caesar gladiatorum  
 690 pugnas ſmaragdo aſpicere conſueverat et in ſpeculo videntur duo pugiles  
 quomodo mutuo ſe impugnant, ſic divina eſſentia eſt ſpeculum in quo relu-  
 cent omnia ab aeterno plus quam alicubi reluceant quando ſunt. Et quia  
 res prius eſt cognoscibilis in ſe quam in habituſine ad aliud, primo divina  
 eſſentia repraesentat res quo ad ſuas quidditates, et ſic Deus eas cognoscit  
 695 et ſunt actu repraesentatae, et ſic actu cognitae. Rurſus, quia res ſe habet

689-691 Cf. Plinius ſenior, *Historia naturalis* XXXVII, c. 16 (*Pliny l'Ancien, Histoire naturelle Livre XXXVII*, ed. et trans. E. de Saint-Denis, Paris 1972, p. 61, § 64).

666 quia] quod MP 668 quia] et L 669 ſed... contingens *om. per homeo.* B 670 cognoſcendo *om. M;* in P 671 impedire *om. M* || erat] erant P 672 adeo] ideo L; adhuc P || cognovit] cogniti (?) B; cognoscit L 673 cognoſcit *om. P* 674 ſcit nihil] ſimul B 676 tenderet] teneret B 677 pueri] de *add. P* || iacendo] faciendo B 678 detendendo] de tenendo P || et non tendendo *om. per homeo.* B || puta] et P || eſt certus] certus M; *inv. P* 678-679 tendet] tenet B 679 arcum] et *add. M;* etiam *add. P* || ſic in] ſi cum M || ſic... quia] ideo B || quia] deus *add. P* 682 conſuſio] eſt *add. P* || quod] enim *add. M;* deus *add. P* || ea eſſe] eſſe M; futura contingentia P 685 demonſtranti] demonſtrare B; demonſtrant L 686 inveniat] inveniet B 691 mutuo *om. B* 693 habituſine] ordine P 695 quia] ſic *add. i.m. P*

ad cognosci sicut ad esse, divina essentia repraesentat futura secundum esse quod habent in ea et in alijs causis, quamvis possint impediri et non impediri, et quomodo impedientur et non impedientur. Ultimo repraesentat secundum esse actuale in se, quia prius habet esse res in sua causa quam in se, quia enim Deus est effectum factururus, ideo est futurus, non e converso. Et hoc ordine repraesentatur ab essentia Dei et cognoscitur ab intellectu Dei. 700

[3.3] Tertia conclusio est quod scientia Dei non imponit necessitatem rebus. Scientia enim Dei quae non est causa rerum, sicut malorum culpae, non imponit necessitatem, quia nec entitatem. Sed scientia etiam quae est causa non imponit necessitatem quo ad se absolutam, sed contingentiam absolutam et necessitatem conditionatam. Omnia enim comparata ad divinam potentiam habent necessitatem conditionatam, quia Deus est immutabilis, et supposito quod velit, non potest non velle, et habent contingentiam [P 534a] absolutam. Nec ipse etiam potest eis dare necessitatem absolutam. Et omnia huiusmodi habent a Deo sicut a causa primaria [B 223va]. Sed quomodo scientia Dei non possit falli, supposito quod futurum ab eo scitum non sit necessarium nisi conditionate, est dubium, quia humanam cognitionem esse fallibilem simpliciter et certam secundum quid, ut illam qua video Sortem currere vel sedere, nullum inconueniens est, sicut nec illam esse falsam simpliciter. Sed scientiam Dei falli posse simpliciter et certam esse secundum quid videtur absurdum. Quod tamen sequitur, si eius scitum potest non esse simpliciter. Et dicendum quod scientiam Dei in se vel respectu primi obiecti impossibile est falli, sicut non esse, et simpliciter et secundum quid. Sed respectu secundarij obiecti, sicut est possibile [M 305va] eam non esse, ita non est inconueniens forte eam posse falli, vel, sicut supra dictum est, potest non esse, non autem falli. 710 715 720

Argumenta soluta sunt in primo articulo.

---

723 Cf. pars. 1.24-27 supra.

---

697 causis quamvis] quomodo P    699 quia] quod M    700 quia enim om.  
 B || futururus] factururus (?) B; effecturus M; effectus P    707 et om. BL || conditionatam] conditionata L    711 a deo om. L    713 scitum mg. B; om. LMP    714 ut] et B    715 illam] illa L || sicut] sic M    717 certam esse inv. P    718 scientiam] scientia MP    719 est om. LM    720 et om. M

**Durandi de Sancto Porciano *In primum Sententiarum*, redactio  
prima, distinctio 38, quaestio tertia, articulus secundus**

Hoc autem dicunt quidam esse de intentione fratris Thomae, hic in *Scripto* et in *Summa*, parte prima, quaestione 14, articulo 13, propter quaedam verba quae ibi dicit. Quod non puto verum esse. Et primo ostendo quod dictum non est in se verum, secundo quod non fuit de mente eius.

- 5 Primum patet dupliciter. Primo sic: illud quod nihil est in se realiter, nulli potest realiter et actualiter praesens esse, quia praesens esse supponit esse, et praesens esse realiter supponit esse realiter; sed futura – non solum contingentia sed quaecumque generaliter – nihil fuerunt realiter ab aeterno; ergo non fuerunt realiter praesentia Deo ab aeterno secundum esse reale
- 10 suae existentiae. Et hoc expresse dicit Augustinus, *Super Genesim ad litteram*, libro V [Y 97ra], capitulo 18, quod haec visibilia antequam fierent, et erant et non erant: erant in Dei scientia, et non erant in sua natura.

- Secundo sic: quia ista realis praesentia non ponitur nisi ad hoc ut futura contingentia distincte cognoscantur a Deo et certitudinaliter. Hoc
- 15 autem non potest esse [M 154vb], quia cognitio quae requirit actuaalem et realem existentiam rei, ad hoc ut sit certa et distincta, dependet a rebus et ab earum existentia; sed scientia Dei nullo modo dependet a rebus, nec ab earum existentia, secundum omnes; ergo ad hoc ut sit certa et distincta [F 68vb] non requirit realem existentiam rerum.

- 20 Quod autem hoc non sit de mente fratris Thomae apparet ex verbis quae dicit in *Scripto* et *Summa*, ex quibus tamen aliqui sumunt occasionem hoc sibi imponendi.

---

1-3 Cf. Aquinas, *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., pp. 910-911), et *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, responsio (ed. cit., p. 186a-b).

10-12 Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram* V, c. 18, 36 (PL 34, col. 331; CSEL 28.1, p. 161).

---

1 quidam om. Y 2 14] 9 YZ || 13 om. M || propter om. Z 3 verum esse inv. A || et om. M 4 est om. Y 5 illud] quia YZ 6 nulli] et Y; et non Z || potest... esse<sup>1</sup>] realiter et actualiter potest esse praesens A; potest esse realiter et actualiter praesens M; actualiter esse praesens non potest Y; potest actualiter praesens esse Z 6-7 esse<sup>2</sup>... supponit om. Y; esse non potest realiter supponit Z 8 quaecumque] futura add. M 9 realiter praesentia deo] praesentia deo realiter AF 11 haec] in Y || visibilia] in visibilia Z 12 erant in dei scientia] in dei scientia erant A || et<sup>2</sup> om. FM 13 sic om. AFYZ || ut] quod M 14 distincte om. Y 15 actuaalem et om. FYZ, Aac (16 rei] et actuaalem add. i.m. Apc) 16 dependet] aliquo modo add. i.m. F || a rebus et om. A 20 hoc om. A 20-21 verbis quae] verbo quod YZ 21 dicit] dicitur Z || et] et in FY

In *Scripto* enim dicit sic: "Intellectus divinus intuetur ab aeterno unumquodque singularium, non solum prout est in causis suis, sed prout est in esse suo determinato; nisi enim hoc esset, cum, re existente, rem ipsam videat prout est in esse suo determinato, aliter cognosceret rem postquam est et antequam fiat, et sic ex eventu rerum aliquid accresceret eius cognitioni." Ecce non dicit quod res in suo esse determinato realiter existant ipsi Deo ab aeterno, sed dicit quod videt eas in suo esse determinato, quia Deus videt ab aeterno illud idem esse determinatum quod res habiturae sunt in propriis naturis processu temporis. Et hoc clare subiungit post praedicta verba, dicens sic: "quod Deus ab aeterno non solum vidit ordinem effectus contingentis ad causam suam ex cuius potestate erat futurus, sed ipsum esse rei contingentis intuebatur." Et sub hoc sensu intelligendum est quod postea subdit, quod: "cognitio Dei intuetur omnia temporalia, quamvis sibi succedentia, ut praesentia sibi, nec aliquid eorum est futurum respectu ipsius, sed respectu alterius." Loquitur enim de praesentia et futuritione rerum respectu Dei quo ad cognitionem tantum, sic enim quaelibet est sibi praesens et nulla futura.

In *Summa* vero dicit sic quod "omnia quae [M 155ra] sunt in tempore sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia, non solum ea ratione quia habet rationes rerum apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus fertur super omnia ab aeterno prout sunt in sua praesentialitate." Occasione huius quod dicit quod "ab aeterno omnia sunt Deo praesentia, non solum quia habet rationes eorum apud se," dicunt eum intellexisse quod res essent ab aeterno Deo praesentes non solum in ratione cogniti (quia hoc est habere [Z 46ra] apud se solum rationem rei), sed secundum esse propriae naturae. Hoc autem non oportet dicere, primo quia aut 'rationes rerum' vocat rationem per quam res cognoscitur secundum esse specificum et quidditativum, secundum quod debetur ei ratio definitiva, et non secundum esse singularis existentiae; et hoc modo res non solum sunt praesentes Deo secundum quod habet tales rationes, quia sic non cognosceret res nisi quantum ad

23-28 Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., pp. 910-911).

32-34 Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 911).

35-37 Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 911).

40-45 Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, responsio (ed. cit., p. 186b).

24 suis *om.* YZ    25 est *om.* A    25-26 rem ipsam *inv.* AF    26 esse suo *inv.* AF.    27 aliquid accresceret] aliquod accidit YZ    28-29 existant] coexistent AF  
30 esse] scilicet *add.* A    31 propriis] suis propriis formis et A    32 verba *om.* YZ  
33 causam suam *inv.* F    34 contingentis *om.* YZ    35 quod<sup>1</sup> *om.* Y    36 sibi *om.*  
M    38 quaelibet] res *add. i.m.* F    40 omnia] vero *add.* A    43 huius] eius F  
44 sunt deo *inv.* F    45 apud] apostolus (!) Y || eum] se Y    46 habere] dicere A  
47 secundum *om.* YZ    48 quia] quod Y || aut *om.* YZ    49 specificum] specificam  
(!) Y    50-51 esse singularis existentiae] se similiter essentiae Y    51-52 secundum  
quod] quia AF, Mac; quamquam Mpc    52 habet] habent MYZ

esse specificum et quidditativum, quod non est verum, sed fertur intuitus eius super res ut sunt in sua praesentialitate, quia novit rem secundum esse  
 55 suae singularitatis. Vel 'rationem rerum' vocat esse cognitum, quod non solum novit Deus de rebus, immo novit earum reale [Y 97rb] esse et proprium. Et sic exponit se ipsum in *Scripto*, dicens sic: "Omnia contingentia in temporibus diversis ab aeterno praesentialiter videt Deus, non tantum ut  
 60 rebus tantum se cognoscere eas, quod est esse in cognitione, sed etiam ab aeterno vidit uno intuitu singula tempora et rem talem esse in hoc tempore, et in hoc deficere."

---

57-62 Aquinas, *Scriptum I*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 911).

---

55 rationem] rationes F; ratione Y    56 deus om. YZ    59-60 sua... cognoscere om. per homeo. Y    61 talem] realem M



**Jacobi de Lausanne *In primum librum Sententiarum,*  
redactio secunda**

Distinctio 38

Utrum in Deo sit scientia futurorum contingentium.

Videtur quod non, quia illorum non potest esse scientia quorum non potest esse veritas determinata; sed futura contingentia sunt huiusmodi; ergo etc. Maior patet sexto *Ethicorum*: "Scientia est habitus determinatus et verus conclusionis deductae ex principiis." Minor patet primo *Peri Hermeneias*. 5

Contra: Deus scit cogitationes hominum; sed cogitationes sunt maxime contingentes; ergo etc.

Videnda sunt duo: primum, qualiter futura contingentia possint cognosci in suis causis, et de hoc erit prima quaestio; et secundum, qualiter in sua actuali existentia. 10

<Quaestio prima>

Quantum ad primum, dico primum quid sit contingens et secundo quod quaeritur.

<Articulus primus>

Quantum ad primum, pono duas distinctiones, ex quibus patebit propositum. Prima est quod res habet duplex esse, unum in actuali existentia, aliud in sua causa tantum. Ex hoc secundo habet esse tale quod sit futurum. 15

Secunda distinctio est quod causae possint se habere in duplici habitudine, quia quaedam sunt necessariae non in se tantum, sed in ordine ad effectum, sicut motus coeli eligendo suos effectus cuius sunt eclipses etc. Et tales effectus sunt bene futuri, sed non contingentes, immo sunt necessari. Aliae sunt causae non necessariae, saltem in ordine ad effectus suos, immo possunt eos non producere. Et effectus praeexistentes in talibus causis sunt quidem futuri, non quomodocumque, sed contingentes. Huius autem contingentis sunt tres modi, quia quaedam sunt futura contingentia 20

---

5-6 Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, c. 3: 1139b31-32 (AL XXVI.1-3, 4, p. 480.25-6).

6-7 Cf. Aristoteles, *De interpretatione* I, c. 9: 18a29-19b4 (AL II.1, pp. 13.12-18.4) 17-35 Cf. Durandus, A 1.6a.

---

1 distinctio 38 *add. i.m.* PW    5 deductae] de decem W    12 du<randus>  
*add. i.m.* P    15 prima est] primum Wac; prima Wpc *s.l.*

- 25 ut frequenter, quaedam ut raro, quaedam autem ut ad utrumque. Verbi gra-  
 tia, primus et secundus modus est cum causa determinata sit ad produ-  
 cendum effectum intentum, saltem ut in pluribus, nec deficit nisi in pau-  
 cioribus, et hoc propter inordinationem aliquam vel defectum, sicut homo  
 cum quinque digitis productus ut in pluribus, et est modus contingentiae  
 30 et frequenter, productus vero cum pluribus vel paucioribus propter inordi-  
 nationem aliquam est alius modus dictus contingentiae raro. Tertius vero  
 modus est cum causa indeterminata est ad producendum effectum hunc vel  
 non producendum, sed indifferenter se habet ad utrumque, sicut est libe-  
 rum arbitrium in me ad currendum cras vel non currendum. Et iste est  
 35 modus contin[W 44rb]gentis ad utrumlibet. Et sic pate<n>t tres modi dicti.

<Articulus secundus>

Secundum principale est qualiter ista contingentia futura cognoscantur in  
 suis causis. Ad quod praemitto distinctionem satis notam, et est quod res  
 potest cognosci in sua causa dupliciter: uno modo res actu existens in se  
 ex consideratione suae causae, sicut eclipsis actu presens cognoscitur ex  
 40 aliqua interpositione terrae etc. Alio modo non ut est actu, sed futura res  
 cognoscitur in sua causa tantum, sicut astrologus futuram eclipsim cogno-  
 scit ex consideratione suae causae. Et isto modo intelligitur articulus.

Hoc supposito, dicit antiqua opinio quod effectus contingens non  
 potest sciri infallibiliter in sua causa, sed solum per coniecturam. Et hic  
 45 ponuntur tria: primum est illud quod statim dictum est; secundum est  
 arguere contra istam positionem; tertium concordare.

Primum patet per talem rationem: effectus non potest infallibiliter  
 cognosci in causā qua posita effectus potest poni et non poni; talis autem  
 effectus, scilicet contingens, habet talem causam, cum sit impedibilis; ergo  
 50 non potest infallibiliter cognosci per talem causam. Maior patet. Etiam da  
 oppositum, quod si posita contingente etc., non posset effectus non poni,  
 iam est effectus necessarius, non contingens. Minor etiam patet, quia effec-  
 tus contingens reducitur in causam contingentem et im[P 51va]pedibilem.  
 Unde dicunt isti quod etiam Deus non potest infallibiliter effectum cogno-  
 55 scere contingentem in sua causa tali per coniecturam. Ratio: impossibile  
 esset quod conclusio posset per medium cognosci aliter quam in medio con-  
 tintetur; quare etc.

36-42 Cf. Durandus, A 1.6b.

43 Cf. e.g. Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 910); *Summa  
 theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13 (ed. cit., p. 186b).

47-57 Cf. Durandus, A 1.8.

26 primus] prius W    32 est<sup>1</sup> om. W    35 patent] patet PW    36 secun-  
 dum principale iter. i.m. P    40 aliqua] ex add. P    43 opinio prima add. i.m. P  
 56 aliter quam] alicui quod W    57 conclusio secunda add. i.m. P

Secunda conclusio: contra opinionem istam arguitur. Dicit primo quod saltem a Deo possit haberi infallibiliter cognitio de futuro contingente per causam suam. Ratio: effectus contingens potest cognosci non ex coniectura, sed cognitione certa, cognitio illis in quibus infallibiliter et determinate continetur; sed isto modo cognoscit Deus effectus contingentes in causa sua; ergo etc. Maior patet de se. Probatio minoris: quia sicut ad causam necessariam sequitur effectus necessarius, ita ad causam impedibilem, non tamen impeditam, sequitur necessario effectus contingens. Differt autem necessitas ista a praecedente, quia praecedens est absoluta, sed ista secunda est conditionata. Verbi gratia, ita necessario currit Sortes volens non impeditus sicut sol, quamvis Sortis cursus sit contingens, cursus vero solis necessarius. Modo certum est quod Deus cognoscens causam impedibilem cognoscit infallibiliter omnia media quae possunt impedire vel promovere ad hunc effectum vel alium, vel etiam modum quo impediunt vel non impediunt. Ita causa illo modo cognita potest cognoscere certitudinaliter quis effectus eveniet vel non eveniet.

Idem etiam dicunt de causa et effectu contingente ad utrumlibet, et isto modo cognoscitur a Deo in agente libero; ergo etc. Maior patet supra. Minor patet: cognita indifferente et impedibili cuiusmodi est liberum arbitrium, similiter si cognoscuntur omnia quae causam huiusmodi determinant vel quae impediunt vel promovent ad effectum producendum, potest cognoscens huiusmodi causam, concurrentibus dictis cognitio, cognoscere effectum certitudinaliter in ea, quamquam etiam contingens; certum est autem quod Deus non cognoscit solum liberum arbitrium, sed cum hoc quaecumque possunt determinare ipsum, promovere, vel impedire ad agendum; et ideo effectum contingentem sic qui dicitur ad utrumlibet potest cognoscere et cum hoc certitudine in sua causa.

Secundo sic ad idem: Deus cognoscit distincte et determinate omnia alia a se contingentia per cognitionem suae essentiae; sed non cognoscit nisi sicut in causa perfecte omnium productiva; ergo in causa potest Deus cognoscere omnia perfecte quaecumque contingentia. [W 44va]

Tertia conclusio: dico quod prima conclusio et secunda sunt verae, tamen cum propriis intellectibus. Habet enim veritatem prima conclusio loquendo de causis proximis praecise et immediatis, quia nec Deus nec homo cognoscens conclusionem per medium potest eam aliter cognoscere quam in medio continetur. Et ita intelligitur prima opinio. Loquendo tamen de omnibus ad hunc effectum concurrentibus, ut dicit secunda opinio,

58-84 Cf. Durandus, A 1.9.

85-88 Cf. Durandus, A 1.10.

89-115 Cf. Petrus de Palude, A 2.2.1-2.

- 95 potest sciri effectus certitudinaliter in causa contingente vel, ut verius dicamus, in causis ab eo qui omnes causas novit. Deus autem cognoscit connexiones causarum omnium futurorum contingentium sicut necessariorum eo quod relucet omnia in essentia. Et ideo, cognoscendo omnia quae determinant indifferentem causam vel terminant, cognoscendo quae
- 100 impediunt causam naturalem vel non impediunt, potest effectum contingentem quemcumque cognoscere in sua essentia, quae est ens et causa certitudinaliter et determinate aliquorum sicut causa mediata. Unde scit omnia impedimenta possibile quae erunt vel quae non erunt, determinabunt vel non, etc.
- 105 Verbi gratia, ponamus quod hoc speculum habens speciem duorum pugilum, ponendo se cognoscere, cognosceret duos actus istorum pugilum dum pugnant actu et modum pugnandi. Addamus secundum: quod esset causa pugnatae et pugilum. Tunc non solum cognosceret actus pugilum in se dum pugnant, sed etiam dum non pugnant cognosceret actus eorum
- 110 motuum vel motivum quae relucet in eo sicut in causa; modo certum est quod in productione [P 51vb] omnis effectus Deus est omnicausa, et ideo determinate novit in se et ex se quid impediatur vel non, cum sit causa omnium causarum et concausa omnium effectuum, et quod determinentur vel non ad talem vel talem effectum contingentem; quare effectum contingentem quemlibet potest cognoscere in sua causa infallibiliter et determinate.
- 115 Ad rationem contrariam, quando dicitur, "Illorum etc.," dico quod verum est si nullo modo sit eorum veritas. Ad minorem, dico quod verum est accipiendi causas proximas et immediatas tantum. Accipiendi vero omnes simul, non est verum.

<Quaestio secunda>

- 120 Qualiter Deus cognoscit futura contingentia in sua actuali existentia?  
 Respondeo: prima conclusio est qualiter hoc quod dictum est intelligitur. Dicendum quod dupliciter intelligitur: primo quod Deus cognoscat futura contingentia actu existentia; secundo quod Deus cognoscat propriam eorum existentiam quam habebunt processu temporis in se ipsis.
- 125 Secunda conclusio: dicunt aliqui quod omnia futura contingentia sunt Deo praesentia ab aeterno, et hoc dicunt esse de intentione Thomae, prima parte, quaestione 14, articulo 13, propter quaedam verba quae ibi dicit.

116-119 Cf. hic supra, ll. 2-6.

125-127 Cf. Durandus, B ll. 1-4; cf. Aquinas, *Scriptum I*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., pp. 910-911), et *Summa theologiae I*, q. 14, a. 13, responsio (ed. cit., p. 186a-b).

97 causarum omnium *inv.* W 101-102 certitudinaliter] terlicu<->ter W  
 112 concausa] cum causa *Pac*<sup>2</sup>; causa W 113 et *om.* PW 121 du<randus>  
*add. i.m.* PW || conclusio prima *add. i.m.* W 125 conclusio secunda *add. i.m.* W

Tertia conclusio: ostenditur hoc esse impossibile.

Respondeo: quod nihil realiter est in se, nulli potest certitudinaliter et realiter esse presens – et patet istud quia esse praesens cuicumque supponit esse in se, sicut esse praesens realiter supponit esse realiter; sed creatura quaecumque nihil fuit ab aeterno realiter secundum proprium suum esse existentiae; ergo nec in Deo. Ideo illud non potest esse praesens. Et hoc expresse dicit Augustinus *Super Genesim ad litteram*, quod “haec visibilia antequam producerentur et erant et non erant: erant in sua causa, videlicet essentia divina sive scientia, et non erant in natura propria.” 130 135

Secundo, quia non ponitur ista actualis existentia sive praesentia in se nisi ut cognoscantur a Deo futura contingentia certitudinaliter et distincte; sed sic ponere est impossibile; ergo et futurum contingens ab aeterno secundum actualem existentiam essentiae. Maior est secundum positionem eorum. Minor est impossibilis. Patet sic: primo quia si futura contingentia ponuntur propter hoc sic Deo praesentia sua actuali existentia ut ea cognoscat certitudinaliter, sequitur quod certa [W 44vb] Dei cognitio a rebus dependeat, quod est impossibile, cum omnium causa prima. Secundo, quia ipse Deus intelligens et volens omne quod est immediate producere potest, ideo et cognoscere distincte ex se. Non oportet ergo quod cognitio Dei, qua cognoscit rem in actuali existentia quantum est ex parte cognitionis suae, quod exigit rem actualiter existere. 140 145

Tertia conclusio: quando ergo dicitur quod Deus cognoscit futurum contingens in actuali existentia propria, dico quod eandem existentiam quam habebit futurum contingens certo tempore novit Deus ab aeterno, nec aliter tunc erunt ista futura quam Deus novit nunc ea, sed modo eodem. Sed hoc quantum ad repraesentationem, ut sic se teneat ad tempora actualis existentia ex parte cognoscentis tantum, et nullo modo ex parte cogniti nisi pro tempore pro quo habebit existere. Ratio huius est: constat enim quod Deus cognoscit contingens ut est praesens, puta Sortem currere, alioquin ego cognoscerem illud quod Deus non cognosceret. Si igitur non cognosceret hoc prius quando futurum, sequeretur quod aliquid accrevisset scientiae Dei quando Sortes actu currebat; sed hoc est impossibile; ergo ante novit modo iam dicto. 150 155 160

Et ista videtur esse intentio Thomae, ut patet per eius verba. In *Scripto*

129-136 Cf. Durandus, B ll. 5-12.

134-136 Augustinus, *De Genesi ad litteram* V, c. 18, 36 (PL 34, col. 331; CSEL 28.1, p. 161).

137-148 Cf. Durandus, B ll. 13-19.

149-160 Cf. Durandus, A 1.11b.

161-171 Cf. Durandus, B ll. 20-34, verbatim; Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., pp. 910-911).

dicit sic: "Intellectus divinus intuetur ab aeterno unumquodque singularium non solum sicut est in causis suis, sed prout est in suo esse determinato. Nisi hoc esset, Deus aliter cognosceret rem postquam est et antequam fiat, et sic ex eventu rerum aliquid accresceret suae [P 52ra] cognitioni." Ecce non dicitur quod res in suo esse determinato realiter coexistent Deo ab aeterno, sed dicit quod videt eas in suo esse determinato quod res sunt habiturae in suis naturis processu temporis. Et hoc clare subiungit. Post praedicta verba dicit sic: "Deus ab aeterno non solum videt ordinem effectus contingentis ad suam causam ex cuius potestate erat futurus, sed ipsum esse rei contingentis intuebatur."

Item, postea subdit quod "cognitio Dei intuetur omnia temporalia, quamvis sibi succedunt, ut praesentia sibi." Et in *Summa* dicit sic: "Omnia quae sunt in tempore sunt Deo praesentia ab aeterno, non solum ratione sic quia habet rationes rerum ipsarum [sunt] apud se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia eius intuitus ab aeterno fertur super omnia prout sunt in sua praesentialitate."

Item, in *Scripto*, "Omnia," inquit, "contingentia diversis temporibus et quae realiter existere habent diversis temporibus ab aeterno praesentialiter videt Deus non tantum ut habentia esse in sua cognitione tantum, quia non tantum cognovit Deus ab aeterno quod res haberent esse in cognitione sua, sed etiam ab aeterno vidit singula tempora et rem talem esse in hoc tempore determinato et in hoc deficere, et hoc uno simplici intuitu."

Et sic patet qualiter Deus cognoscat futura contingentia, quia cognoscit ea determinate et ab aeterno quantum ad determinatas et proprias existentias suas, non quas habent ab aeterno, sed quas habere debent tempore suo certo. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod futurum quod actu nondum est sit praesens Deo actu et hoc in se, sed tantum in representatione divinae essentiae in qua relucent omnia aequaliter praeterita et futura sicut praesentia modo quo dictum fuit supra de singularibus, quia scilicet <est> totalis causa et perfecte et per se omnium omni modo specifico et individuo vel significato. Nec propter hoc tollitur quin Deus talia futura cognoscat in suis causis proprie totalibus sive in aliis.

Quarta conclusio est qualiter se habet cognitio quam habet Deus de futuris contingentibus in suis causis et in eorum propria existentia. De hoc fuit positum exemplum in speculo, de quo dicebatur supra quod si esset

172-177 Cf. Durandus, B ll. 40-43; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13, responsio (ed. cit., p. 186b).

178-183 Cf. Durandus, B ll. 57-62; Aquinas, *Scriptum* I, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5, solutio (ed. cit., p. 911).

184-193 Cf. Durandus, A 1.18; Palude, A 2.3.5.

194-202 Cf. Palude, A 3.2; hic supra, ll. 104 - 110.

aeternum speculum in <quo> naturaliter relucent omnia [W 45ra] quae fiunt et facta sunt in perpetuum, et cum hoc esset causa omnium in communi et in speciali eodem modo reluceret in eo pugna pugilum vel aliud ab aeterno sicut dum actualiter existit, supposito quod tale speculum cognosceret se, tunc per talem repraesentationem cognosceret futura quaecumque in actuali existentia et in causa. 200

Item, supposito etiam quod esset causa omnium causarum tam naturalium quam etiam aliarum, cum hoc cognosceret quod talia futura haberent esse certo tempore ex talibus causis naturalibus et ex sua virtute concurrente; sed in proposito ista perfectissime in Deo ponuntur; ideo prius in essentia divina perfectissime relucent omnia et aequaliter praeterita et futura sicut praesentia, et hoc quaecumque sint illa, sive contingentia sive necessaria, secundum quod cognoscit suam essentiam et comprehensive et in ipso omnia quae sunt in re, et esse possunt per omnem modum quo sunt 210  
possibilia multa quae numquam erunt.

Secundum est quod notificat primum et secundum, scilicet quod, quia Deus est vel esse potest saltem causa immediata totalis et perfecta omnium naturaliter, non tantum in communi sed etiam in particulari, ideo cognoscit connexiones omnium causarum tam futurorum contingentium quam necessariorum, et per consequens perfectissime futura contingentia et cetera singularia quantum ad omnem modum quem habere debent certo tempore in propria natura existentia, cum reluceant in eius essentia, sicut patet ex dictis immediate. Unde comprehensive cognoscendo [P 52rb] essentiam suam, cognoscit in ea futura contingentia etiam quantum ad earum existentiam, non quam in se habeant ab aeterno, ut dictum est, sed quam habere debeant certo tempore dum actu sunt in propriis existentibus et naturis. 215  
220

#### <Quaestio tertia>

Utrum scientia Dei imponat necessitatem rebus?

Videtur quod sic. Anselmus, *De liberto arbitrio*: "Omnia quae in scientia Dei sunt necessaria"; sed in scientia Dei sunt futura, sicut patet supra; ergo etc. 225

Contra: si scientia Dei imponeret rebus, tolleretur meritum et demeritum, quia tolleretur liberum arbitrium; hoc autem dicere non est tutum; ergo nec primum. Probatur consequentia: dictum est statim quod sub scientia Dei cadunt omnia; si ergo scientia unde scientia est imponeret necessitatem rebus, imponeret omnibus; ergo etc. 230

203-211 Cf. Palude, A 2.3.5.

225-226 Anselmus, *De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae cum libero arbitrio*, q. 1, c. 3 (*Opera Omnia* II, ed. F.S. Schmitt, Edinburgh 1946, pp. 251.28 - 252.1), non verbatim.

Ad quaestionem hanc praemitto unum quod est necessarium ad propositum nostrum eligendum, scilicet quod scientia Dei se habet in duplici  
 235 habitudine ad res, uno modo ut causa, alio vero modo ut infallibilis cognitio seu certa. Dico ergo ad quaestionem secundum hoc duo: primum quod scientia Dei primo modo dicta non imponit necessitatem rebus; secundum, quod nec secundo.

<Articulus primus>

Quantum ad primum, quod non imponat in quantum causa, hoc potest  
 240 intelligi dupliciter, quia aut sicut causa mediata vel immediata. Primo, quod non in quantum causa immediata, et hoc sic: effectus qui est mere voluntarius nullo modo est necessarius, in quantum huiusmodi saltem; sed sic est de omni producto a Deo immediate extra se, quia non est <nisi> mediante voluntate. Patet de coelo et angelo. Sunt enim a Deo et dicuntur effectus  
 245 necessaria, non tamen quod ex se necessaria sint, cum sint producti a voluntate divina libera. Dico tamen quod, quia a nullo dependent nisi a Deo, dicimus coelum et angelum esse necessaria entia, quod intelligitur comparando ea ad cursum naturae, quia Deo comparati sunt effectus divini libere. Hoc unum est.

250 Secundo probatur idem, scilicet quod nec scientia Dei imponit etc., sicut causa mediata, cum scilicet producit mediantibus aliis. Et hoc sic: concursus plurium causarum in quo una per se est impedibilis non imponit necessitatem absolutam effectui; sed scientia Dei sic currit cum aliis causis in productione multorum effectuum quod aliquae vel aliqua ex eis  
 255 sunt impedibiles; ergo non obstante tali causalitate, scilicet divinae scientiae, multa [W 45rb] sunt non necessaria et eveniunt. Minor patet quantum ad hoc quod multae sunt causae suorum <impedibiles> effectuum et propter actionem sui contrarii et propter indispositionem materiae. Maior etiam patet, quia sicut effectus impeditur quacumque causa per se impedita, sic etiam est per se impedibilis quacumque causa per se impedibili  
 260 existente, et sic non necessario evenit effectus si altera causarum per se sit impedibilis. Patet ergo quod scientia Dei non imponit necessitatem rebus in quantum est causa, sive ponatur ut causa immediata sive mediata.

233-249 Cf. Durandus, A 1.19.

250-263 Cf. Durandus, A 1.20.

---

239 primum principale <i>add. i.m.</i> PW	240 1 <i>add. i.m.</i> W	241-242 voluntarius] voluntatis W
250 2 <i>add. i.m.</i> W	252 quo] qua W	257 <impedibiles>] impediunt PW
259 impedita] impedi->ta PW		



## &lt;Articulus secundus&gt;

Secundum principale est quod nec etiam ut cognitio infallibilis et certa. Et ad hoc praemitto distinctionem de cognitione Dei, quae est duplex: una qua apprehendit absolute quidditates rerum et earum compositionem et divisionem eis possibilem tantum, alia est cognitio qua cognoscit quidditates et earum compositionem et divisionem non tantum possibilem, sed deducendam ad actum aliquo tempore certo, et hoc est per quam res cognoscitur esse et pertinet ad scientiam visionis, ita quod modi isti cognoscendi nullo modo differunt ex parte cognoscentis, sed ex parte rei cognitae.

Hoc supposito, dico ad propositum duas conclusiones: una quod nulla cognitio dicta imponit etc.; secunda in qua assignatur causa dicti. Quantum ad primam conclusionem, dico quod difficile est salvare ista simul, scilicet quod scientia Dei sit infallibilis et quod res scita non sit necessaria sive quod sit possibilis aliter se habere, quod idem est. Dico tamen quod prima cognitio dicta nullam [P 52va] necessitatem imponit etc. Nec tamen fallitur, quia sub cognitione prima non cadunt res fore vel esse, evenire vel non evenire, ut statim dicitur. Et ideo sive res eveniat sive non, posita in esse sive non, talis cognitio non fallitur.

Ratio huius dicti, videlicet quod res quantum ad esse vel non esse actu in se non cadit sub prima cognitione dicta, sic: non enim sub cognitione dicta cadunt nisi illa quae necessario repraesentantur in essentia divina, et dico "necessario" quia non potest huiusmodi non repraesentare; sed isto modo in essentia divina [non] repraesentantur solum entia quantum ad quidditates et compositiones et divisiones eis possibilem, non autem quo ad actualem compositionem et divisionem sive esse vel non esse actu; ideo etc. Probatio minoris: quidditatem enim possibilem repraesentat essentia divina ut virtualiter continens omnium rerum quidditatem. Prout autem quidditas rei includit esse vel fore, non representatur ab essentia divina nisi libere, sicut dum vult rem esse vel non esse. Et sic quantum ad hoc non representatur naturali necessitate. Quare non cadit sub dicta cognitione nisi ex suppositione, scilicet quod velit rem esse.

Item, nec secunda cognitio imponit necessitatem rebus, et tamen cum hoc stat quod est infallibilis. Ratio: sic est de Deo cognoscente futurum contingens sicut ponitur de nobis dum ponitur actu praesens; sed de contingente dum supponitur quod actu sit possumus habere certam et infallibi-

---

264-280 Cf. Durandus, A 1.21

294-315 Cf. Durandus, A 1.22; hic supra, ll. 63 - 84.

---

264 secundum principale *iter. i.m.* PW || et certa *om.* W 265 qua] quae P, Wac 267 possibilem tantum *inv.* W || cognoscit] item potest vocari indivisibilem intelligentia: alia qua apprehendit habitudinem rerum (et *add.* W) *add. i.m. infra* P, *add.* W (cf. Durandus, A 1.21, l. 292). 272 conclusio prima *add. i.m.* PW 294 tamen *om.* W

lem cognitionem, stante contingentia rei simpliciter; ergo Deus cognoscit infallibiliter futurum contingens quamquam eveniat fallibiliter. Maior declaratur: supposito quod dictum est in praecedenti quaestione, scilicet quod a causa impedibili et simpliciter quo ad hoc contingente, supposito tamen quod non sit impedita, sequitur effectus infallibiliter et de necessitate, similiter a causa indifferente ad utrumlibet, supposito quod sit determinata nec impedita, sic sequitur effectus determinatus infallibiliter – ex his suppositionibus patet de se; ergo de intellectu cui notae sunt omnes suppositiones istae, cuius [W 45va] est intellectus divinus qui novit nihilominus concursum omnium causarum, omnia quae impediunt vel non, etiam illa quae determinabunt liberum arbitrium nostrum vel angeli, et quae non determinabunt, de tali, inquam, intellectu erit in cognitione futuri contingentis sicut de nobis dum actualiter videmus cursum Sortis. Et sic patet maior. Probatio minoris: quia certitudinaliter scio cursum Sortis dum actu currit sicut video cursum solis. Primum tamen est necessarium ex suppositione tantum, sed secundum absolute. Cum cursu tamen Sortis <necessario sic> ex suppositione sicut visum est, stat contingentia cursus absolute. Currit enim libere cum sit cursus eius a principio voluntario et libeto.

Secunda conclusio est causa [quod] qualiter utraque cognitio dicta certa et infallibiliter stat cum contingentia, est enim universalitas divinae cognitionis quam nihil subterfugit. Probatur sic: sicut est de causa ut deficiat vel non deficiat in causando, sic de cognitione ut fallitur vel non in iudicando de productione effectus per causam; sed causa quam vel cuius ordinem nihil subterfugit in causando non potest deficere vel impedi in causando; ergo nec cognitio huius potest deficere in iudicando de effectu futuro quocumque. Maior patet, est enim cognitio per causam certa, maxime si omnes causae sint notae. Probatio minoris: quia una causa particularis comparata alteri impedit alteram, neutra tamen comparata universali impedit eam, immo perficit eius causalitatem. Ratio primi est: impeditur una particularis ab alia quia una subterfugit alteram, immo contrariatur alteri.

Ratio autem secundi est quia utriusque causalitas comparata causae universali non potest eam impedire quia continetur sub ordine illius causae primae. Verbi gratia, ponamus quod sit nunc constellatio quae facit hanc herbam florere sua [P 52rb] virtute. Supposito motu totius coeli, superveniente alia quae sua virtute contraria impedit ne floreat faciens florem cadere, hic una particularis aliam impedit, quia una non continetur sub alia. Sed nec propter hoc impeditur effectus totius coeli utramque stellationem continens, sed completur. Fuit enim effectus totius coeli ut nec usque floreret et postea flos caderet. Et ideo coelum adhibuit contrarias

---

316-355 Cf. Durandus, A 1.23.

causas particulares quarum una aliam impediret, et tamen causae particu-  
lares mutuo se impediunt in causando, quidquid sit illud, subserviunt  
causae universali.

Simile esse ponitur in agente <apposito>: ut volo comburere media- 340  
tem huius ligni, ad habeo ignem qui comburet totum lignum si sibi dimit-  
teretur, sed cum combusserit medietatem, appono aquam quae extinguit vel  
impedit effectum ignis, sed non meum, immo effectus meus omnino com-  
pletur. Impedimentum invenitur ergo in his et in aliis similibus comparando  
actiones particularium ad invicem, non autem in comparatione ad causam 345  
universalem agentem. Et sunt haec rationes quae dictae sunt, scilicet quod  
una particularis subterfugit aliam et eius ordinem, neutra tamen potest  
ordinem superioris causae subterfugere.

Et sic est recte in cognoscendo, quia intellectus noster, nesciens con- 350  
traria quae impediunt, decipitur in iudicando de particulari effectu, sicut  
particularis causa potest deficere in causando. Sed intellectus divinus,  
cognoscens hanc causam particularem et alias quae eam impedire possunt  
et universaliter totum concursum causarum pervenientem ex ordine supe-  
rioris causae, quaecumque sit illa, talis, inquam, intellectus nullo modo  
potest decipi circa quodcumque contingens futurum. 355

Sunt alia dubia. Videtur adhuc quod futura contingentia eveniant de  
necessitate vel quod scientia Dei quae se extendit ad illa sit fallibilis. Arguit  
[W 45vb] sic Magister in littera: Deus scivit ab aeterno Sortem currere cras;  
ergo curret necessario. Si non necessario sequitur, da oppositum, scilicet  
quod cursus Sortis cras sit contingens vel possibilis vel non necessarius. 360  
Tunc arguitur sic: possibili posito in esse, nullum sequitur impossibile; sed  
Sortem currere cras est possibile per dictum; ergo ponamus eum non cur-  
rere cras; positum autem primo erat quod Deus scivit eum cursurum; ergo  
Deus scivit quod non erit, et sic fallibilis.

Respondetur quod falsum est de necessitate absoluta, scilicet futura 365  
contingentia de necessitate evenire, immo aliter et aliter eveniet sicut prae-  
scitum est evenire vel praescita sunt evenire, alias scientia Dei esset falli-  
bilis quae non tantum est de eventu rerum, sed etiam de modo eveniendi.  
Unde quia praescita sunt aliqua evenire contingenter, ideo evenient illo  
modo, et sic de aliis. 370

Sed tu concludis in alia consequentia Sortem non currere cras et sic  
scientia Dei falli.

356-364 Cf. Durandus A 1.1.

358 Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *Sententiae in IV libris distinctae* I, d. 38, c. 2 (vol.  
I, pars II, ed. I. Brady, Grottaferrata 1971, p. 279).

365-378 Cf. Durandus A 1.24.

340 <apposito>] a proposito PW 350 impediunt] impediunt W 356 con-  
clusio secunda contra *add. i.m.* P 361 possibili] possibile W 367 vel... evenire<sup>2</sup>  
*om.* (*per homeo.?*) W 367-368 alias... fallibilis *mg.* P

375 Respondeo ad veritatem consequentiae, quae est hic duplex: ponamus  
 eum non currere, quia concessum fuerat per suppositum quod ipsum pos-  
 sibile est currere et non necessario. Dico quod si ponatur in esse eo modo  
 quo fuit possibile, nullo modo sequitur impossibile, fuit enim possibile non  
 evenire simpliciter et absolute. Sed stante connexionem, causa, et ordine ex  
 quo praescitum est a Deo quod sic eveniet, sicut est suppositum, ideo dicere  
 vel dicendo "Deus scivit ab aeterno Sortem cras currere" implicat contra-  
 380 dictionem quod ponatur ipsum non currere. Unde praescitum est ab  
 aeterno, ergo eveniet necessario, habito quod eveniet ea necessitate qua  
 praescitum est evenire, et hoc est ex suppositione causarum concurrentium  
 omnium, quia omnia, ad quamcumque partem sunt, clare videntur a Deo  
 et modo quo concurrunt ad im[P 53ra]pediendum vel non impediendum.  
 385 Nec ista necessitas quae est ex suppositione tollit contingentiam simplici-  
 ter, ut visum est.

Ponitur exemplum pro utroque, tam pro eo quod est dictum, scilicet  
 quod Sortem non currere cras non potest poni in esse, posito quod Deus  
 scivit ab aeterno contrarium, scilicet ipsum currere cras, tam etiam pro  
 390 addito, scilicet quod contingentia stat cum scientia, quia necessario ex sup-  
 positione scivit evenire hunc effectum et non oppositum. Exemplum est de  
 contingente praesente: Sortes currit actu potens absolute non currere, quia  
 <qui> currit volens currit libere, et tamen dum currit necessarium est ipsum  
 currere. Necessitas tamen est ex suppositione cum qua, sicut visum est, stat  
 395 contingentia absolute. Quamquam ergo currit actu et absolute potens non  
 currere, si tamen ponatur in esse, stante suppositione non implicatur con-  
 tradictio male, si ponatur ipsum <posse> non currere, supposito quod actu  
 currat. Et ideo Sortem posse non currere cras non potest poni in esse nisi  
 ponatur absolute quod potest fieri, ut dicunt aliqui.

400 Et tunc est dubium sic: Sortem non currere fuit possibile absolute;  
 ergo potest poni in esse. Et tunc ultra absolute Sortem non currere cras  
 potest poni; ergo scientia Dei absolute potest falli.

Respondetur quod in Deo ponitur duplex scientia, una qua scit essen-  
 tiam suam, alia qua cognoscit creaturas in ea. Et haec duplex adhuc, quia  
 405 vel secundum quidditates cum hoc secundum habitudinem compositionis  
 et divisionis eis possibilem tantum, vel secundum compositionem earum  
 actu positam. Tunc ponantur alia verba magis clara, quod ponitur duplex  
 cognitio creaturae in essentia divina, prima secundum quam creatura  
 cognoscitur possibilis absolute, alia secundum quam cognoscitur esse actu,  
 410 fuisse, vel fore. Tunc dico quod prima cognitio creaturae est ita necessario  
 in Deo sicut cognitio suae essentiae. Ratio: quia de potentia etiam absoluta  
 non posset Deus facere quod non relucet creatura in essentia eius modo  
 dicto primo. Secunda non est necessaria necessitate absoluta. Ratio: sicut  
 enim potest Deus de potentia absoluta creaturam non velle modo dicto  
 415 secundo tantum, ita eadem potentia potest eam nescire.

---

381 eveniet<sup>1</sup>] eveniat W    397 <posse>] post se PW    401 potest s.l. (?) P;  
 habet W    404 alia] aliam W

---

In proposito, sicut tu dicis quod potest poni absolute [W 46ra] Sortem non currere, dato quod actu currat, ita dico quod scientia quam habet Deus de cursu Sortis posito actu de potentia absoluta potest non esse talis cursus, et potest Deus nescire currere Sortem, sicut potest absolute velle eum non currere. Quare nec sic erit scientia Dei fallibilis. Nota hic quod 420  
stant ista de necessitate absoluta solum, quia si ex suppositione dicitur quod Deus sciat aliquid fore, impossibile est quod nesciat.

**Johannis de Neapoli, Quodlibet X, quaestio sexta**

Sexta quaestio est utrum Deus intelligat futura contingentia.

Et primo videtur quod non, quia omnis conditionalis verae cuius antecedens est necessarium et consequens etiam. Sed haec est quaedam conditionalis vera, 'Si Deus scivit aliquid futurum, illud eveniet', quia scientia Dei falli non potest. Et antecedens est necessarium, quod patet, tum quia scientia Dei est certa et infallibilis; tum quia designatur per verbum praeteriti perfecti, et impossibile est praeteritum non fuisse praeteritum, quia hoc solo privatur Deus: ingenta facere quae sunt facta, ut dicitur in 6 *Ethico-  
rum*. Ergo omne futurum scitum a Deo est necessarium. Sed contingens  
10 non est necessarium. Ergo non est scitum a Deo.

Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo de Deo, "Intelligit omnia opera eorum," scilicet hominum, que sunt futura contingentia.

Respondeo. Ad evidentiam huius quaestionis quattuor declaranda sunt.

<Articulus primus>

15 Et primum est quod effectus contingens, dum est futurus, habet esse contingens in causa sua, sed dum est praesens habet esse necessarium in se. Quod probatur quantum ad primam partem, primo sic: existentia effectus in causa est virtus causae per quam producit effectum, sicut existentia formae in materia est potentia materiae ad formam. Tale ergo esse habet effectus  
20 in causa qualis est virtus causae ad producendum effectum. Sed causa contingens habet virtutem contingenter producendi effectum. Ergo effectus contingens habet in causa sua, dum est futurus, esse contingens.

Secundo probatur idem quantum ad secundam partem, scilicet quod effectus contingens, dum est praesens, habet esse necessarium in se, non  
25 necessitate absoluta, sed ex suppositione. Quod probatur sic: "Omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse," ut dicitur in secundo *Periermeneias*, non necessitate absoluta, sed ex suppositione qua supponitur esse. Sed effectus

---

7-9 Cf. Aristoteles, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, c. 2: 1139b10-11 (AL XXVI.3, p. 255.6-7).

11-12 Psalmus 32.15.

25-26 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, c. 9: 19a23-24 (AL II.1, p. 17.2-3).

---

4 eveniet Npc    6 Dei] falli non potest et antecedens vacat T    7 perfecti] imperfecti Nac    8 sunt facta] genita sunt T || in om. T    9 scitum] situm Nac

contingens supponitur esse praesens. Ergo pro tunc necesse est ipsum esse, non necessitate absoluta, sed ex suppositione qua supponitur esse tunc quando est praesens. 30

<Articulus secundus>

Secundo [T 152va] principaliter probandum est quod effectus contingens, quantum ad esse quod habet [N 15rb] in se, potest sciri scientia certa et infallibili, non autem quantum ad esse praecise acceptum quod habet in causa sua. Quod probatur sic ex primo praedicto: scientia certa et infallibilis est solum de necessariis et non de contingentibus, ut patet in multis locis libri *Posteriorum*. Sed effectus contingens, dum est futurus, habet esse contingens in causa sua, dum autem est praesens habet esse necessarium in se, ut probatum est. Ergo potest sciri secundum esse secundum et non secundum esse primum praecise acceptum, licet etiam secundum esse tale possit coniecturaliter cognosci, sicut de ambulatione Petri, dum est, potest 40 haberi certa scientia, non autem dum est solum in voluntate Petri et est futura.

<Articulus tertius>

Tertio principaliter probandum est quod Deus ab aeterno cognovit effectum contingentem quantum ad esse quod habet in se dum est praesens, eisdem quattuor rationibus quibus in praecedenti quaestione probatum est quod 45 Deus cognoscit alia a se. In Perfectissimo enim ab aeterno est omnis perfectio simpliciter ab aeterno, et cognoscere contingentia quantum ad esse quod habent in se dum sunt praesentia est perfectio simpliciter, quantum ad primam rationem. Et quantum ad secundam, Deus ab aeterno comprehendit essentiam suam quam imitantur effectus contingentes quantum ad esse quod habent in se dum sunt praesentes. Et quantum ad tertiam, 50 per notitias creatas etiam humanas sensitivas cognoscuntur, ut experientia docet, tales effectus quantum ad esse quod habent in se dum sunt praesentes, et illud quod Deus scit quandoque, scit semper, quia non potest de nesciente fieri sciens aut augeri in scientia. Et quantum ad quartam, Deus 55 est causa per intellectum et voluntatem effectuum contingentium.

---

35-36 Cf. e.g. Aristoteles, *Analytica Posteriora* I, c. 2: 71b15-26 (AL IV.1, p. 7.10-22); c. 4: 73a21-22 (p. 12.8-9); et c. 6: 74b5-6 (p. 16.19-20).

44-46 Cf. Johannis de Neapoli, *Quodlibet* X, q. 5 (N 14va-b; T 151vb-152ra).

---

33 autem s.l. N 34 primo om. N 38 est s.l. T || secundum<sup>1</sup>] s exp. T  
49 secundam] Deus exp. T 50 essentiam suam inv. N 51 tertiam] secundam  
N 52 experientia] experienci N 54 et] Deus add. T

## &lt;Articulus quartus&gt;

Quarto principaliter probandum est quod certitudo et infallibilitas divinae scientiae non tollit ab effectibus contingentibus eorum contingentiam. Quod probatur sic: necessitas ex suppositione quam habent effectus contingentes quantum ad esse quod habent in se dum sunt praesentes non tollit ab eis contingentiam quam habent quantum ad esse quod habent in causis suis dum sunt futuri, ut supra in prima conclusione probatum est. Sed effectus contingentes subsunt aeternae notitiae Dei certae et infallibili quantum ad esse necessarium quod habent in se dum sunt praesentes. Ergo talis scientia non aufert ab eis contingentiam. Sicut ergo stant simul necessitas ex suppositione effectuum contingentium quantum ad esse quod habent in se dum sunt praesentes et contingentia eorundem quantum ad esse quod habent in causis suis dum sunt futuri, sic et stant simul talis contingentia et scientia Dei certa et infallibilis, nec unum tollit aliud.

Ad argumentum factum in contrarium, dicendum quod conditionalis verae cuius antecedens est necessarium est etiam consequens, ut est consequens, et non aliter, necessarium, sicut huius conditionalis verae, 'Si lapis intelligitur, lapis est immaterialis et universalis', consequens est verum ut est consequens, et non aliter, quia lapis est immaterialis et universalis ut intelligitur et non aliter. Et similiter in proposito, effectus contingens ut est scitus a Deo habet esse necessarium, scilicet quantum ad esse quod habet [N 15va] in se dum est praesens, quod esse est necessarium, non necessitate absoluta, sed ex suppositione, ut supra declaratum est. Qua etiam necessitate sola est necessarium antecedens eiusdem conditionalis, scilicet 'Si Deus scivit futurum contingens evenire'. Cuius probatio est quia facere, velle, et scire Dei respectu creaturarum se habent quodam ordine, quia facere supponit velle et scire, et velle supponit scire. Licet autem facere Dei sit necessarium supposita eius ordinatione de faciendo creaturam, quae ordinatione falli non potest, non tamen est necessarium necessitate absoluta, cum Deus libere faciat creaturam et possit eam facere et non facere. Et similiter, Deus non vult [T 152vb] creaturam necessario, sed solum bonitatem suam, cum creatura non sit finis divinae voluntatis, et Dei bonitas, quam Deus vult ut finem, potest aequae bene esse sine creatura sicut cum ea. Quia tamen Deus non potest de nolente fieri volens, aut e converso, si Deus voluit facere creaturam, necessario voluit necessitate ex suppositione; et similiter, si Deus scivit se facturum aliquam creaturam, necessario illud scivit, non necessitate absoluta, sed ex suppositione.

62 Cf. hic supra, ll. 15-22.

70 Cf. hic supra, ll. 2-10.

78 Cf. hic supra, ll. 23-30.



Hervaei Natalis, *Quodlibet V*, quaestio sexta

Utrum angeli cognoscant futura contingentia.

Ad evidentiam huius questionis primo distinguendum est de modo cognoscendi rem, scilicet ex parte obiecti cogniti; secundo ex parte cognoscentis; tertio ad questionem.

## &lt;Articulus primus&gt;

Quantum ad primum, sciendum est quod ex parte rei cognite ponitur duplex modus cognoscendi, quia res possunt cognosci vel quantum ad suas rationes quidditativas, sciendo scilicet quid est de ratione quidditativa uniuscuiusque, accipiendo rationem non pro conceptu respondentis ut obiectum cognitum; vel quantum ad suas existentias, cognoscendo scilicet quod sunt in effectu in re extra in sua existentia actuali. Quod sic non est intelligere quasi quod quidditas rei sit alia res vel modus alius diversus realiter ab existentia, quia ad eandem cognitionem sive ad idem genus cognitionis pertinet cognoscere naturam rerum et earum existentias quantum ad suas rationes quidditativas, ita quod antequam res sit actu, potest cognosci qualis nata sit esse natura essentiae cuiuslibet rei. Sed sic est intelligendum quod una est consideratio abstracta abstractione que est secundum rationem rei prout abstrahit ab esse in potentia et in actu, ita quod talis res sic abstracte considerata potest considerari vel in potentia tantum secundum aliquam differentiam temporis, et secundum actum, similiter secundum aliquam differentiam temporis, ut scilicet cognoscet talem rem pro tali differentia temporis esse in potentia, et non solum in actu, scilicet in tali preterito, presenti, vel futuro.

Et preterea cognitio, scilicet abstracta, dicitur absoluta cognitio quidditatum. Substantia autem dicitur cognitio existendi, scilicet cognoscere utrum res tunc vel non tunc sit sic simul vel non sit. Et istud sufficiat ad hoc quantum ad propositum, licet de se requireret magnum tractatum.

## &lt;Articulus secundus&gt;

Quantum ad secundum, scilicet quantum ad diversos modos cognoscendi ex parte cognoscentis, sciendum est quod aliquis intellectus potest reduci in actum cognoscendi vel intelligendi dupliciter: uno modo quod moveatur a re intellecta sicut convenit in nobis, et quantum ad intellectum saltem a principio et quantum ad sensum; alio modo quod moveatur ab aliquibus similitudinibus rerum apud intelligentem existentibus, sicut intellectus noster movetur a speciebus iam acquisitis, sive in ipso existentibus sive in fantasmate, licet secundum statum presentem, ut ponit doctrina communis, species acquisite non sufficiant in fantasmate. Iste autem species sive rerum similitudines existentes in absentia rerum ab intelligente possunt dupliciter haberi: uno modo quod sint innate et date a conferente naturam, et isto modo ponuntur a quibusdam species in angelis que sunt similitudi-

nes rerum a quibus moventur ad intelligendum res quarum sunt similitudines; alio modo quod tale species acquirantur a rebus, sicut ponuntur in nobis secundum ponentes species. Et secundum omnes ponuntur in nobis alique similitudines rerum, sive sint in intellectu, sive in fantasmate, sive in utroque, a quibus et per quas movemur ad intelligendum res absentes, sive sint absentes quantum ad locum sive quantum ad existentiam  
 45 actualem.

Quantum ad diversum modum cognoscendi ex parte medii accepti et ex parte obiecti, sciendum quod res potest cognosci dupliciter: uno modo in se; alio modo sicut in obiecto precognito in quo relucet, sicut cognoscitur causa in effectu vel econverso.

<Articulus tertius>

50 Ex his ad questionem, sciendum est igitur quod omnes communiter tenent quod angelus naturali cognitione et certa non novit futura contingentia, et precipue contingentia ad utrumlibet. Cuius causam assignare facile est, secundum illos qui ponunt quod multi angeli in cognitione moventur a rebus: quia intellectus [120ra] qui non movetur a rebus cognitis non potest  
 55 intelligere nisi preterita vel presentia, vel que ex talibus possunt deduci; sed futura contingentia non sunt preterita nec presentia, nec ex talibus possunt efficaciter deduci; ergo etc. Maior patet, quia nullum mobile potest moveri vel motum esse nisi ab eo quod est vel quandoque fuit, quia a non ente actu nihil movetur; sed secundum ypothesim, ponitur angelus non posse  
 60 intelligere nisi per hoc quod movetur a rebus cognitis, nec res cognite possunt movere nisi ad cognitionem sui et eorum que ex eis possunt deduci; ergo etc. Minor etiam faciliter patet, scilicet quod futura contingentia non sunt presentia vel preterita, quia hec futuris repugnant; nec etiam ex eis possunt efficaciter deduci, quia nec sicut ex effectu, quia posterius non est  
 65 causa prioris, nec sicut ex causa, quia effectus contingens ad utrumlibet non habet certitudinem prout est in causa, sicut contingenter se habet ad effectum habentem; ergo etc.

Secundum autem ponentes quod angeli cognoscunt res per species innatas difficilius est: quia si per tales species cognoscunt res quantum ad  
 70 omnia que nata sunt cognosci ab angelis de rebus, scilicet in universali et particulari, et quantum ad rationes suas quidditativas, et quantum ad esse vel non esse tali vel tali differentia temporis, non videtur quod quecumque cognitio eorum de rebus preteritis, presentibus, et futuris dependeat in aliis ab actuali existentia rerum; sed cognitio in nullo dependet ab actuali exist  
 75 entia rerum, quia potest esse ita respectu futuri sicut respectu presentis; ergo etc. Probatio maioris: quia stante ypothesi, si intellectus angelicus non potest cognoscere futura contingentia quantum ad quid determinate erunt et non erunt, aut hoc est propter defectum moventis vel mobilis, aut propter defectum assimilationis inter rem intellectam et speciem vel ipsius actus  
 80 intelligendi. Non primo modo, quia intellectus qui est semper ens presens sufficienter movetur ad cognitionem a speciebus innatis, que similiter ponuntur propter presentes; ergo etc. Non propter secundum, quia assimi-

latio que est inter intellectum et rem intellectam et speciem non est quod unum sit tale quale est alterum, sicut assimilatio duorum alborum consistit in hoc quod unum est tale quale est alterum, sed talis assimilatio est quod unum sit tale quale representatur ab alio; sed nihil prohibet aliquid presens esse representatum alicuius futuri, licet actu non sit, sicut patet de representatione effectuum que fit in causis habentibus necessariam habitudinem ad effectum; ergo etc. Minor etiam patet, quia contingens futurum non dicitur posse cognosci certitudinaliter nec propter <cognitionem?> existentie vel habitudinis necessarie ad causam. 85 90

Si autem ponatur tertio modo, scilicet quod angeli per species innatas habent perfectam cognitionem rerum quantum ad rationes quidditativas suas, quantum ad quid cognoscant an sint vel non sint, quantum ad aliquam differentiam temporis moveantur a rebus, tunc posset salvari dictum commune, scilicet quod angeli habeant cognitionem per species innatas quantum ad id quod directe pertinet ad perfectionem intellectus, scilicet quantum ad cognitionem quidditativam rerum absolute, et quod non cognoscant futura contingencia certitudinaliter quantum ad hoc quod sint vel non sint. 95 100

Et de primo patet, stante ypothesi, etiam de secundo similiter, quia posito quod in cognitione, qua cognoscunt de rebus an sint in actu vel futura sint, moveantur a rebus, sequitur quod de futuris contingentibus non habeant certam cognitionem, quia nec moventur ab eis, cum non sint, nec a causa, cum causa contingens ad utrumlibet non possit movere ad certam cognitionem effectus. Et hec positio videtur probabilior, quia licet habeamus in nobis species rerum et in intellectu et in fantasmate, tamen preter hec ad cognoscendum futurum contingens certitudinaliter requiritur quod moveantur a sensibilibus exterioribus. Et videtur magis consona dictis Sancti Thome, qui ponit species innatas. Si autem non ponantur predicto modo moveri a rebus, nescio quomodo angelus vel cognoscat determinate futurum contingens et antequam sit, vel ut numquam [120rb] cognoscat. Etsi aliter sensit Sanctus Thomas, vel alius, ego non possum videre aliud. 105 110

Bernardi Lombardi *In primum librum Sententiarum, distinctio 38*

&lt;Articulus primus: Durandus&gt;

[All 1.1-3a; all 1.6a; part 1.6b-7; all 1.8; most 1.9; all 1.10]

&lt;Contra Durandum&gt;

[E 119rb; L 69va; N 48ra] Ista rationes non vadunt ad mentem Sancti Doctoris. Doctor enim Sanctus supponit quod de effectu contingente nulla alia cognitio habeatur nisi per suam causam contingentem, et quia maior certitudo non potest haberi de causalitate talis causae quam de effectu, hinc  
5 est quod non potest haberi certa notitia eius.

Sciendum tamen quod sicut causae per accidens [N 48rb] reducuntur ad per se, sic omne contingens ad aliquam causam determinatam. Quod patet sic: nam effectus contingens habet aliquam causam, aut igitur determinatam aut non. Si non, ergo habet causam contingentem, et sic de illo  
10 iterum petam. Et cum non sit processus in infinitum, oportebit necessario venire ad aliquem effectum qui habeat causam determinatam.

Sed hic est unum dubium, quia si contingens habeat causam determinatam semper, contingentia perit a rebus.

Ad hoc dicendum quod non, quia secundum Philosophum, secundo  
15 *Physicorum*, effectus sequitur causam proximam, et quia Deus agit mediante libero arbitrio, quod est principium contingens, ideo effectus sunt contingentes.

Et per hoc patet, ad rationes Durandi contra Sanctum Doctorem, quod non valent, quia accipit causas quarum altera est necessaria et determinata,  
20 ut Deus, Doctor autem accipit praecise causam contingentem. Et sic patet ad primam rationem.

---

14-15 Cf. Aristoteles, *Physica* II, e.g. c. 5: 197a24-25 (AL VII.1.2, p. 72.7-8).

---

1 improbatur *add. i.m. E* || sancti *om. EL* 2 sanctus *om. EL* 3 habeatur] habetur habetur E || suam *om. EL* || maior] cognitio vel *add. EL* 4 causae] essentia N || quam *om. E* 5 notitia] cognitio seu notitia E; cognitio L 6 causae *om. L* 7 quod] quia N 8 patet sic *inv. EL* || aliquam *om. EL* 9-10 illo iterum petam] secunda peto iterum EL (iterum] terminum E) 11 venire] devenire EL || aliquem effectum qui habeat] aliquam EL || causam determinatam *inv. L* 12 dubium *add. i.m. E* || hic] hoc L || unum dubium quia] dubium EL 12-13 habeat... semper] semper habeat causam determinatam (causam determinatam *inv. L*; et *add. E*) videtur quod EL 13 perit] apareat E; pereat L 14 solutio *add. i.m. E* || ad hoc] et EL 18 et per hoc] per hoc igitur EL 18-19 contra... accipit] quae non sunt contra Doctorem quia tu accipis EL 19 et] altera (non *exp.*) contingens et indeterminata necessaria et *add. E* 20 deus] altera autem contingens et indeterminata *add. E* || accipit] hic ut *add. E*; ut *add. L* 21 rationem *om. EL*

Ad secundam, dicendum quod essentia divina ut est repraesentiva in quantum causa non habet rationem contingentiae nisi respectu voluntatis.

<Articulus secundus: Durandus>  
[Parts 1.11a-e; parts 1.12b-16; most 1.17]

<Contra Durandum>

[E 119va; L 70ra; N 48va] Ista autem reprobatio non vadit ad mentem Sancti Doctoris, nam Doctor excludit primum intellectum qui potest haberi de isto articulo, scilicet quod intelligat ipsa actu [E 119vb] existere, quia hoc est falsum et contradictionem implicat, ut dictum est. Et tunc in vanum Durandus mordet Doctorem, ut patet discurrendo per dicta sua. Arguit enim sic: quod nihil est non potest esse praesens vel coexistere, etc. Ubi clare patet quod dicit quod Sanctus Doctor dicat futura contingentia actu existere, quod numquam Sanctus Doctor somniavit. Et ideo rationes quas facit contra eum nihil valent, ut patet discurrendo per eas. 25 30

Et ideo ad evidentiam sententiae Sancti Doctoris, sciendum est quod quando Doctor dicit quod Deus cognoscit futura actu existentia vel quantum ad actualem existentiam, non est intelligendum quod intelligat ea existere actu, sed quod cognoscit eorum entitates et quidditates determinatas acsi actu existerent. Et ratio huius est quia intellectus divinus nullo modo terminatur ad res extra, sed solum ad essentiam divinam ubi relucent omnia possibilis. Et quia essentia sua est de se invariabilis et determinata, ideo repraesentat omnia invariabiliter et determinate et distincte. Quod pulchre declarat Doctor: "Ponatur," inquit ipse, "quod sint quinque homines" quorum unus praecedat alium per ordinem: primus non videbit alios, 35 40

40-49 Thomas Aquinas, *I Sent.*, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5 (ed. cit., p. 911).

22 ut *om.* EL 23 non] tamen *add.* E 24 non valet improbatio *add. i.m.*  
E || ista autem] sed ista EL || reprobatio] improbatio E 24-25 sancti doctoris]  
doctoris quod patet EL 25 haberi] esse EL 27 Et tunc *om.* EL || vanum] ergo  
*add.* EL 27-28 durandus] durandum N 29 non... etc] in se et causa EL (!) ||  
clare *om.* EL 30 quod<sup>1</sup> *om.* E || dicit] ipse accipit EL || sanctus *om.* EL || dicat]  
quod *add.* EL || existere] existant E 31 sanctus doctor somniavit] doctor dixit EL  
31-32 quas... eum *om.* EL 32 valent] concludunt contra doctorem EL || per eas]  
per singula E; *om.* L 33 et ideo *om.* EL || sententiae sancti] tamen sententiae EL  
|| est *om.* N 34 quando doctor *inv.* EL || existentia] existere EL 35 existen-  
tiam] essentiam N || ea] eas E 35-36 existere actu *inv.* EL 36 quod *om.* L ||  
eorum] earum N || et quidditates *om.* EL 37 acsi] antequam? N || actu] actum  
L || existerent] existant N || et ratio huius] ratio EL 39 de se *om.* EL 40 deter-  
minate et *om.* EL 40-41 quod pulchre] et hoc pulcherime EL 41 inquit ipse]  
enim EL || quinque] et E 42 alium] alterum EL

secundus videbit solum primum, et tertius videbit secundum, et quartus videbit tertium, et quintus quartum. Sed si unus homo esset super altam turrim, videret omnes simul et videret qualiter unus praecederet alium. Sic suo modo nos videmus futura hic secundum praesentia. Sed Deus sicut stans in supremo aeternitatis videt omnia simul, et sic intuitus Dei ut fertur in essentiam suam ubi relucent omnia tam essentiae [N 48vb] quam existentiae rerum, videt omnia. Quare negari non potest quin ipse cognoscat praesentialiter existentias rerum.

Et per hoc patet quod male, immo quod non solvitur ratio Sancti Doctoris. Ubi sciendum quod aliquid potest esse indivisibile dupliciter: uno modo habens positionem sicut punctus est indivisibilis, alio modo quod non [L 70rb] habet positionem. Et hoc dupliciter, quia quoddam est indivisibile non habens positionem quia est principium vel terminus, sicut nunc respectu temporis. Et quidquid coexistit tali indivisibili excludit partem et partem, quia non habet sed non excludit principium et finem, sed includit. Aliud est indivisibile non habens positionem quia non solum excludit partem et partem, sed etiam principium et finem, sicut aeternitas quae utrumque istorum, scilicet partem et partem et principium et finem, excludit. Quare patet quod male solvit Durandus rationem quando dicit quod temporale solum excludit principium et finem ex quo habet quod non sit ab aeterno, sed quia etiam excludit partem et partem, potest coexistere toti aeternitati, et per consequens ratio Doctoris stat.

Sed circa ista est unum dubium, quia Sanctus Doctor, prima parte, quaestione 14, articulo 13, dicit quod "omnia quae sunt in tempore sunt Deo ab aeterno praesentia non solum ratione quia habet rationes rerum apud

---

65-69 Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 14, a. 13 (ed. Leonis, p. 186b).

---

43 solum *om.* N || et<sup>1</sup> *om.* N || videbit<sup>2</sup> *om.* EL || et<sup>2</sup> *om.* N 44 videbit *om.* EL || et quintus quartum *om.* N || sed] tamen EL || homo *om.* EL 44-45 super altam turrim] in alta turri EL (alta] aliqua L) 45 videret<sup>2</sup> *om.* EL 46 nos *om.* E || hic secundum] semper E; haec scilicet N 47 supremo aeternitatis] alta turri aeternaliter EL (aeternaliter] aeternitas L) 48 essentiam] essentia E || suam *om.* EL || omnia... quam] et essentiae et EL 49 existentiae] essentiae N || quare] quia L || negari] negare E 49-50 cognoscat praesentialiter] principaliter cognoscat L 51 et *om.* EL 51-52 male... doctoris] rationem doctoris male solvit immo non solvit EL 55 non *om.* L || non habens positionem *om.* N 56-57 et partem *om.* N 57 sed<sup>2</sup>] quia hec EL 58 aliud] ad E || quia] quod EL 59 quae] unde EL 61 Durandus rationem *om.* EL 61-62 temporale solum *inv.* N 62 excludit] partem et partem et non *add.* E (!) || habet] et *add.* L 63 sed *om.* EL || partem et partem] principium et finem E (!) 63-64 potest... aeternitati] et sic toti aeternitati coexistit EL (aeternitati] coexistenti E) 64 ratio doctoris stat] stat ratio doctoris EL 65 dubium *add. i.m.* E || sed *om.* N || sanctus doctor] doctor dicit EL 66 13] vii N || dicit *om.* EL 67 ab aeterno *om.* EL 67-68 habet... se] apud se habet rationes rerum EL

se praesentes, ut quidam dicunt, sed quia intuitus eius fertur super omnia ab aeterno." Et ideo ipse excludit rationes.

Ad hoc dicendum est quod aliquid potest esse praesens alicui dupliciter in cognitione: uno modo sicut omne cognitum cognoscitur a cognoscente, ut color vel rosa cognoscitur ab intellectu vel visu. Alio modo est aliquid praesens alteri in cognitione non sicut obiectum cognitum, sed quia illud obiectum cognoscitur actu reflexo. Modo Deus non solum cognoscit se cognoscere creaturas, quod pertinet ad secundum actum, sed etiam cognoscit eas ut obiecta cognita.

Et quando dicitur "non per rationes ideales," dico quod rationes ideales non sunt praecisa ratio cognoscendi ut est in creaturis, cum Deus abstrahat ab omni conditione talium, et ideo per se novit ea.

Quomodo igitur ista cognitio differt ab illa quando erunt res actu? Dico quod cum omnia subsint divinae potentiae, et ipse "aliter non cognoscat facta quam fienda," ex parte sui nulla est differentia, sed ex parte obiectorum cognitorum est differentia, quia aliter sunt in se, et aliter cognita, quia tunc ut fienda, nunc ut actu facta.

<Tertius articulus>

[All 1.19-20; part 1.21-22]

[E120ra; L 70va; N 48vb] Propter quod sciendum quod circa eandem rem stant simul necessitas suppositionis et contingentia simpliciter, sicut patet de cursu Sortis. Sortem enim currere est contingens simpliciter, sed est necessarium ex suppositione, quia Sortem currere dum currit necessarium est ex suppositione. Et ideo de cursu Sortis stat infallibilis et certa cognitio dum currit.

Tunc probatur dupliciter quod cum contingentia effectuum stat scientia sive certa cognitio Dei. Primo sic: circa eundem effectum [N 49ra] stant

81-82 Augustinus, *De civitate Dei* X, c. 12 (CCL 48, p. 287.30-31).

68 praesentes ut] residentes sicut N || intuitus eius *inv.* LN 69 excludit] concludit EL (!) 70 solutio *add. i.m.* E || ad hoc *om.* EL || est *om.* EN 70-71 alicui... cognitione] in cognitione alicuius dupliciter E; alicui in cognitione dupliciter L 71 omne *om.* EL 72 color] calor E || ab intellectu vel visu] a visu vel ab intellectu EL 72-73 est... sed *om.* N 74-75 solum... cognoscere] cognoscit solum seu cognoscere potest EL 75 secundum actum *inv.* EL 76 eas] ipsa EL 77 dicitur] quod *add.* EL || ideales<sup>2</sup> *om.* EL 78 praecisa] praecise EL || Deus *om.* EL 79 abstrahant] abstrahant N || conditione talium] cognitione EL 80 res *om.* EL 81 subsint] subsit N 81-82 cognoscat] cognoscit L 83 cognitorum] creatorum EL || est differentia] bene N || quia] quoniam E 84 actu] sunt E 85 sciendum] quia *add.* N 86 sicut *om.* E; ut L 87-89 sed... ideo *om.* LN 89 cursu] tamen *add.* LN 89-90 stat... currit] dum currit stat infallibiliter (!) et certa cognitio EL 91 probatur... cum] primo (?) quod quod duplex cum certa L || effectuum] suppositionum E || stat] stet N 91-92 scientia sive *om.* EL 92 certa] creata L || cognitio dei *inv.* E

simul contingentia simpliciter et necessitas suppositionis; sed de eo quod est necessarium ex suppositione potest haberi certa et infallibilis cognitio; 95 ergo certa et infallibilis cognitio de aliqua re potest stare cum contingentia eius simpliciter. Maior patet, quia Sortem currere dum currit est necessarium ex suppositione, quia "omne quod est, quando est, necesse est esse." Minor est nota ex praecedenti notabili.

100 Secundo sic: ille qui cognoscit circa omnem effectum omnem causam impedibilem et omne quod potest impedire et quomodo potest impediri ipsa contingentia, cum illa contingentia potest stare infallibilis scientia; sed Deus, ut statim declarabitur, est huiusmodi; ergo etc. Tota ratio patet de se... [Most 1.23-24; first half 1.25; first half 1.27]

---

97 Aristoteles, *De interpretatione*, c. 9: 19a23-24 (AL II.1, p. 17.2-3).

---

94 haberi] esse EL 95 certa et infallibilis *inv.* L 95-96 certa... simplici-  
ter] etc N 96 quia *om.* E 97 est<sup>3</sup> *om.* L 98 est nota] patet EL 99 circa]  
esse EL || effectum] et *add.* E; ut *add.* L 100 impedibilem] esse *add.* EL || impe-  
diri] impedire E 101 infallibilis scientia] et certa cognitio EL (et] etiam E)  
102 statim declarabitur *inv.* EL || etc *om.* L || patet de se] de se patet L